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In The Emperors New Mind (1989) [henceforth Em-
peror] I attempt to put forward a point of view (which I
believe to be new) concerning the nature of the physics
that might underlie conscious thought processes. As part
of my argument, I point out that there could well be
room, within physical laws, for an action that is not
algorithmic - i.e., that cannot be properly simulated by
any computer - though I argue that it is likely that such
nonalgorithmic action can arise only in an area of physics
where there is an important gap in our present physical
understanding: the no-man's-land between quantum and
classical physics. (Mathematical processes of a non-
algorithmic kind certainly do exist, but the question I am
raising is whether such processes have a role to play in
physics.) I also argue that there is good evidence that
conscious thinking is itself not an algorithmic activity, and
that consequently the brain must be making use of non-
algorithmic physical processes in an essential way when-
ever consciousness comes into play. There must accord-
ingly be aspects of the brain's action that cannot be
properly simulated by the action of a computer, in the
sense that we understand the term "computer" today.
Thus, the viewpoint I am putting forward dissents both
from "strongTAI" (or "functionalism") - as expounded by
Minsky (1968) - and also from a frequently argued con-
trary viewpoint, promoted particularly by Searle (1980).
Strong-AI asserts that the brain's action is just that of a
computer, conscious perceptions arising as manifesta-
tions of the mere carrying out of computations; this
contrary viewpoint asserts that although computation
does not in itself evoke consciousness, a simulation of the
action of the brain would nevertheless be possible in
principle, since the brain is a physical system behaving
precisely according to some well-defined mathematical
action. My dissent from this contrary view stems from the
fact that "well-defined mathematical" does not, in itself,
imply "computable."
Emperors scope is broad, for it is my belief that there
are many seemingly disparate topics that could have
profound relevance to this important question. More-
over, I believe that real progress cannot be made into the
deep philosophical issues raised by the question of
"mind" without a genuine appreciation of the physical
(and mathematical) principles underlying the actual be-
haviour of the universe in which we find ourselves. I have
therefore tried to write this book at a level which makes it
accessible, at least in principle, to readers without prior
knowledge of the diverse topics covered. These topics
include: the basics of artificial intelligence; Turing ma-
chines, computability and noncomputability; the Man-
delbrot set and the system of complex numbers as illus-
trations of the Platonic world of mathematics; the founda-
tions of mathematics, Godel's theorem, nonalgorithmic
mathematics; complexity theory; overviews of classical
physics (including the issues of computability, determin-
ism, and "chaos" within the theories of Newton, Max-
well, and Einstein) and quantum physics (its basic struc-
ture and its puzzles and paradoxes, the two types of
evolution U and R); the second law of thermodynamics
and its relation to cosmology, the big bang, black (and
white) holes, the "improbability" of the universe, and the
Weyl curvature hypothesis; the challenge of quantum
gravity and its suggested role in the resolution of the
puzzles of quantum theory; structure of the brain and
nerve transmission; possible classical and quantum com-
puter models; consciousness and natural selection; the
nonalgorithmic nature of mathematical insight, the nature
of inspiration, nonverbal thinking; the an thropic principle;
a suggested analogy between nonlocal (quasi)crystal
growth and the continual changes in brain structure,
providing a possible input for (nonalgorithmic?) physics at
the quantum-classical borderline; the singular relation
between time and conscious perception.
Most of the book is noncontroversial and is intended to
provide the reader with an overview of all the relevant
topics needed. Though prior knowledge is not assumed,
the presentation is of a sufficient depth that some genuine
understanding of this material can be obtained. This is not
always an easy matter, and parts of the book would need
to be studied at some length if the arguments are to be
fully grasped. There are places where I present view-
points that deviate markedly from what might be consid-
ered to be "accepted wisdom." I have always been careful
to warn the reader whenever I am presenting such
unconventional views, even though I may believe the
reasons pointing to the necessity of such "unconven-
tionally" to be compelling.
The central questions we must ask are: Are minds
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subject to the laws of physics? What, indeed, are the
laws of physics? Are the laws of physics computable
(i.e., algorithmic)? Are (conscious) thought processes
computable?
In my own view, mental states would be qualities that
indeed depend on those same physical laws that govern
inanimate objects. The minds we know of are features of
the activity of brains (human brains, at least, but quite
probably certain animal brains also) and human brains are
part of the physical world. Thus, the study of mind cannot
be divorced from the study of physics. Does this mean
that new physical understanding is needed, or do we
already have sufficient knowledge of the physical laws
that might be relevant to an understanding of mental
phenomena? Apparently, in the opinion of most philoso-
phers, physicists, psychologists, and neuroscientists, we
already know all the physics that might have relevance to
these issues. I shall beg to differ.
It would, of course, be generally admitted by physicists
that there are still many gaps in our understanding of the
principles that underlie the behaviour of our universe.
We do not know the laws that govern the mass-values or
the strengths of the interactions for the menagerie of
fundamental particles that are known to exist. We do not
know how to make quantum theory fully consistent with
Einstein's special theory of relativity, and certainly not
with his general relativity theory. As a consequence of the
latter, we do not understand the nature of space at a scale
10 ~20 times smaller than the dimension of the known
subatomic particles, though our knowledge is presumed
adequate at larger scales. We do not know whether the
universe is finite or infinite, either spatially or tem-
porally. We do not understand the physics that must
operate at the cores of black holes or at the big-bang origin
of the universe itself. Yet all these issues seem quite
remote from what is relevant for understanding the work-
ings of a human brain.
I shall argue, nevertheless, that many of these matters
are of some relevance and, moreover, that there is an-
other vast unknown in our physical understanding at just
such a level as could indeed be important for the opera-
tion of human thought and consciousness - just in front of
(or rather behind) our very noses! I believe there is a
fundamental gap in our physical understanding between
the small-scale "quantum level" (which includes the
behaviour of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles)
and the larger "classical level" (of macroscopic objects,
such as cricket balls or baseballs). That such a gap exists is
a matter of physics - unrelated, at least in the first
instance, to the question of "minds." I argue the case that
there is good reason, on purely physical grounds, to
believe that some fundamentally new understanding is
indeed needed here - and I make some suggestions
concerning the area of physics (the "collapse of the wave
function" as an objective "quantum gravity" effect)
wherein I believe this new understanding is to be sought.
This whole issue is a matter of dispute amongst physi-
cists at the moment; and it would have to be admitted that
the apparent majority view is that no new theory is
needed (although such outstanding figures as Einstein,
Schrodinger, de Broglie, Dirac, Bohm, and Bell have all
expressed the need for a new theory). It is my own strong
belief that a radical new theory is indeed needed, and I
am suggesting, moreover, that this theory, when it is
found, will be of an essentially noncomputational char-
acter.
I argue that some of the manifestations of consciousness
are demonstrably nonalgorithmic, and I am therefore
proposing that conscious mental phenomena must actu-
ally depend upon such noncomputational physics. Al-
though I try to make a fairly specific suggestion as to
where in brain action the role of the physics governing the
no-man's-land between quantum and classical physics
might lie, my arguments are not critically dependent
upon this particular suggestion. There might well be
other possible roles for such (nonalgorithmic) physics in
brain action. According to my viewpoint, the outward
manifestations of the phenomenon of consciousness could
never even be properly simulated by mere computation.
Any properly "intelligent machine" - and I would argue
that for it to be properly "intelligent" it is necessary for it
to be conscious - could not be a "computer" in the sense
in which we understand that term today (and so, in my
own terminology, I prefer not to call such a putative
object a "machine" at all), but would itself have to be able
to harness the very nonalgorithmic physics that I am
arguing must be a necessary ingredient of the physical
basis of conscious thought. At present we totally lack the
physical understanding to be able to construct such a
putative "machine," even in principle.
Chapter 1: Can a computer hawe a mind?
Recall the Turing test, according to which a computer,
together with some human volunteer, are both hidden
from the view of some (perceptive) interrogator. The
interrogator has to try to decide which of the two is the
human being and which is the computer merely by
putting probing questions to each of them, the answers
being all transmitted in an impersonal fashion: say typed
on a keyboard and displayed on a screen. The human
subject answers the questions truthfully and tries to
persuade the interrogator that he is indeed the human
being, but the computer is allowed to "lie" so as to try to
convince the interrogator that it, instead, is the human
being. If on a series of such tests the interrogator is unable
to identify the real human subject in any consistent way
then the computer (or the computer's program) is
deemed to have passed the test.
Setting aside, for the moment, the issue of whether, or
when, some computer might actually pass the Turing
test, let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that such
machines have already been constructed. We must ad-
dress the operationalist's claim that such a computer must
be said to think, feel, understand, et cetera, merely by
virtue of its passing. It is certainty my own view that such
mental qualities - and certainly the central one of con-
sciousness - are objective physical attributes that an
entity may or may not possess. In our Turing-test prob-
ing, we are merely doing our best to ascertain, using the
only means available to us, whether the entity in question
(in this case the computer) has the physical attributes
under consideration (in this case, say, consciousness). To
my mind, the situation is not different in principle from,
for example, an astronomer trying to ascertain the mass of
a distant star. Being able to give human-like answers to
Turing-test questioning is certainly not the same as hav-
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ing human-type mental qualities, but it may serve as a
good indication that such mental qualities are indeed
present in the machine. This would be in the absence of
other criteria which might have a greater scientific relia-
bility. In the case of mental phenomena, we do not really
have better criteria than "communication" in some form,
as with the Turing test. If someday we have a better
theory of consciousness, then better criteria might
eventually become available, and the Turing test will lose
some of its importance. (Compare this with the possibility
of accurately observing a planet in close orbit about our
distant star. Einstein's theory can then provide a definite
measurement of the star's mass.) In the absence of such a
theory, however, the case for regarding the successful
passing of a Turing test as a valid indication of the
presence of thought, intelligence, understanding, or con-
sciousness, and so forth, is fairly strong. For conversation
is how we normally form our judgements that people
other than ourselves actually do possess consciousness.
How long will it be before a computer actually passes
the Turing test? It really depends on how strict one's
criteria are for passing. It is my own guess that a proper
passing of the test could not be achieved at all by an
algorithmic computer (i.e., by a computer based on the
calculational principles that we use today) - at least not in
the foreseeable future. I have been vague about what
constitutes a "proper" passing of the test, but extensive
to-and-fro probing by the interrogator would certainly be
required. (Turing originally suggested that a 30% success
rate for the computer, with an "average" interrogator and
just five minutes questioning, might be achieved by the
year 2000.) In some clearly delineated fields, however,
very impressive "human-like" behaviour has already
been achieved. Chess-playing computers provide good
examples of machines exhibiting what can be thought of
as "intelligent behaviour." "Deep Thought" (pro-
grammed largely by Hsiung Hsu) has achieved some
notable victories in some games with grandmasters. I
think that it is clear, however, that computers play chess
very differently from the way human beings do; comput-
ers relying much more on depth of extensive calculation
and much less on "intuitive judgements" - whatever they
are!
Perhaps a little more directly along the lines of a
Turing test would be the computer programs of Schank
and Abelson, as cited by John Searle (1980) in connec-
tion with his Chinese room argument. The computer
using such a program is able to answer simple questions
about stories (concerning, say, people eating in restau-
rants) in a way that a human being might. This seems to
suggest that there is some primitive understanding on
the part of the computer, since a human being would
require some understanding in order to answer the
questions correctly. Searle argues that no actual under-
standing can be taking place in the computer and that
this limited "passing" of a Turing test is accordingly no
indication that the mental quality of "understanding"
actually occurs. To make his case, Searle envisages a
"gedanken experiment" whereby the stories (about res-
taurants), the questions about these stories, and the
computer's answers are all written in Chinese. The actu-
al rules the computer follows in forming its replies to
these questions are then laboriously followed by Searle
himself (in a locked room), the rules for manipulating the
relevant Chinese characters according to the computer's
program being presented to Searle in English. Though
Searle sits in this room and follows all the relevant
actions of the computer, finally providing the correct
(Chinese) answers to the questions, he does not himself
obtain the necessary understanding of what the stories
are actually about, since he knows nothing of the Chi-
nese language.
Searle's argument is directed against the standpoint of
"strong AI" (or functionalism) which claims that it is
merely the enaction of a (sufficiently elaborate) al-
gorithm that evokes mental qualities such as con-
sciousness, understanding, or intentionality. I regard
Searle's argument as quite persuasive with regard to
programs of the fairly limited complication of the ones
envisaged above, but it is by no means conclusive -
especially when it is applied to the immensely more
complicated putative computer programs that might,
according to the strong-AI view, be necessary to conjure
up actual consciousness! Perhaps there is some kind of
"critical" amount of complication necessary for con-
sciousness to be genuinely conjured up? Moreover, it is
not a logical necessity that an algorithm's putative
"awareness" should necessarily impinge upon the
awareness of a person carrying out the algorithm, irre-
spective of the complication of that algorithm.
Searle is prepared to accept that a computer simula-
tion of the actual activity of a human brain - when it is in
the process of evoking conscious mental perceptions -
would be possible in principle. But he believes that such
a simulation would not, in itself, evoke the same mental
perceptions. That certainly seems to me to be a tenable
position, but not a very helpful one for gaining any
understanding of why some objects enacting algorithms
(brains) seem to evoke such mental qualities whereas
others (e.g., electronic computers) are not supposed to.
In later chapters, I present a different kind of argument
to suggest that conscious mental activity is not al-
gorithmic at all, and such a simulation would therefore
not be possible.
The viewpoint of strong AI appears to spring partly
from the fact that a person's individuality does not de-
pend on the particular atoms that compose his body.
There is certainly a continual turnover in virtually all the
material of any living person's body. Moreover, accord-
ing to quantum mechanics any two particles of any par-
ticular kind are completely identical to one another. For
example, if the entire material content of a person were
exchanged with corresponding particles in the bricks of
his house then nothing would have happened what-
soever. What appears to distinguish the person from his
house is the pattern in which his constituents are ar-
ranged, not the individuality of the constituents them-
selves. Thus, a person is just a "pattern of information,"
and this information could, in principle, be translated
from one material form into another. The strong-AI
viewpoint is that it is simply the "information content" of
this pattern that characterizes any particular individual.
This idea has gained strength from experience with mod-
ern high-speed computers, where we are now very fa-
miliar with the phenomenon of information being trans-
formed from one realization into another (say from a
pattern of magnetic fields in a floppy djsc to a collection
of charge displacements in a computer memory, and
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from there to a family of gaps in the illumination of a
cathode ray screen). Moreover, there is the theoretical
justification from the fact that modern general purpose
computers are all, in effect, examples of universal Tur-
ing machines (see next section). Any two such machines
are completely equivalent to one another in the sense
that, irrespective of the particular hardware that may be
involved in each machine, there will always be some
appropriate software that effectively converts either ma-
chine into the other. In this sense, the hardware is
regarded as being "irrelevant," and the essential "infor-
mation" of the operation of the machine is considered to
lie in its program,, that is, software.
In mathematical terms, the program is effectively
what is called an algorithm, that is, a step-by-step me-
chanical procedure for working towards an answer from
any given input data. According to the strong-AI view-
point, it is the very enacting of an appropriate algorithm
that can (or must?) evoke (or be?) conscious awareness.
Whether or not one believes in its essential correctness,
however, there is much that is unclear about this pic-
ture. What does it actually mean to implement an al-
gorithm, or to embody it in physical form? Do all the
individual steps have to be performed in full by moving
about bits of matter, or might a static printed description
of the procedures be sufficient in itself to evoke con-
scious awareness? If the nature of the material per-
forming the algorithm is irrelevant, then why is it neces-
sary to have the material there at all? Should the
algorithm's very (timeless!) Platonic existence not be
sufficient to evoke consciousness? If it is, where does the
distinctly temporal quality of consciousness come from?
None of these matters seem to me to have been properly
addressed by the proponents of strong AI.
An idea frequently discussed in this context is the
teleportation machine of science fiction. A would-be
traveller is scanned from head to toe, the accurate loca-
tion and complete specification of every atomic nucleus
and every electron in the subject's body being recorded
in full detail. All this information is then beamed (at the
speed of light), by an electromagnetic signal, to the
distant planet of intended destination. There, the infor-
mation is collected and used as the instructions to assem-
ble a precise duplicate of the traveller - together with all
his memories, his intentions, his hopes, and his deepest
feelings, where the original copy of the traveller is to be
destroyed in the process. Could a teleportation machine
work - in the sense that the traveller's actual conscious
identity is transferred to the distant planet? If teleporta-
tion is not travelling, then what is the difference in
principle between it and just walking from one room into
another? In the latter case, the traveller's atoms of one
moment would simply be providing the information for
the locations of his atoms of the next moment, and we
have seen, after all, that, there is no significance in
preserving the identity of any particular atom. The mov-
ing pattern of atoms simply constitutes a kind of wave of
information propagating from one place to another, so
where is the essential difference between this and the
teleportation device?
I believe that despite the outlandish nature of the
teleportation idea, there is perhaps something of signifi-
cance concerning the physical nature of consciousness
and individuality to be gained from it. It may provide one
pointer, indicating a certain essential role for quantum
mechanics in the understanding of mental phenomena,
for it turns out to be impossible to copy a quantum state
unless the information in the original state is destroyed. If
a person's individual awareness depends on some essen-
tial aspect of a quantum state, then it would not be
possible to "teleport" that awareness unless the original
copy of the individual were indeed destroyed. According-
ly, teleportation would not be impossible in principle; but
these considerations would rule out the more paradoxical
possibility of having two or more viable conscious copies
of one individual.
Chapter 2: Algorithms and Turing machines
One of the most important developments in the history of
mathematics occurred in'the late 1920s and 1930s, when
the concept of a general algorithm was made mathe-
matically precise and it was demonstrated that there are
some mathematical procedures that cannot be described
by any algorithm whatsoever. There are various different
but completely equivalent ways of formalizing the al-
gorithm concept. The one which is intuitively the clearest
was first put forward in 1935 by Alan Turing, called a
Turing machine: an idealized device in that it operates
with a potentially infinite "tape" on which the input data
and instructions are represented. Only a finite portion of
the tape is to be marked with actual data or instructions,
however. Thus, although the device can cope with an
input of unlimited size, this input is always finite. We may
take the input and output to be recorded on the same
tapve; all the input goes in on the right and the output
finally goes out on the left. For simplicity, we regard the
tape as marked just with the symbols 0 and 1; "0" stands
for blank tape and "1" for a mark on the tape (any more
complicated symbols we might wish to use are broken
down into a sequence of "marks" and "blanks"). The
device itself has a finite number of distinct "internal
states" - coded, for convenience, by binary numbers 0, 1,
10, 11, 100, 101, etc. - and it reads the symbols on the
tape one at a time. It has a finite list of instructions that tell
it what to do, given its internal state and whether it reads
0 or 1. The list of instructions itself is never altered, but
the particular 0 or 1 that is being read by the device may
either be left alone or else changed to the opposite
symbol, depending upon the particular instruction that
comes into play; the device also accordingly moves one
step to the right, one step to the left, or comes to a halt
after moving one step to the right. (In these descriptions I
am taking the device to be moving rather than the tape,
but the two pictures would be equivalent.) As part of the
same operation, the internal state is changed to another
internal state, as specified by the instruction. Now, in this
new internal state, the device (if it has not come to a halt)
reads a new 0 or 1 on the tape and acts according to the
appropriate instruction that now comes into play. The
process continues until a halt instruction is encountered;
at that point we imagine a bell ringing to alert the
operator of the machine that the calculation has been
completed.
It is a remarkable fact that any computational process
whatever (that operates with finite discrete quantities)
can be described as the action of some Turing machine.
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This, at least, is the contention of the so-called Church-
Turing thesis, in its original mathematical form. Support
for this thesis comes partly from Turing's careful analysis
of the kinds of operation one would actually consider as
constituting a computational or algorithmic process, and
partly from the striking fact that all the various alternative
proposals for what an "algorithm" should mean (put
forward at around the same time by Church, Kleene,
Godel, Post, and others) have turned out to be com-
pletely equivalent to one another. Some of these pro-
posals had the initial appearance of being completely
different, so their equivalence is a strong indication of the
fact that they are merely alternative ways of describing an
absolute abstract mathematical concept, that of com-
putahility, (which is independent of any particular real-
ization of it that one may care to adopt. (In addition to an
extended and detailed description of Turing machines, I
give a brief description of Church's remarkable calculus
in Emperor, pp. 66-70).
Like so many other mathematical ideas, especially the
more profoundly beautiful and fundamental ones, the
idea of computability seems to have a kind of Platonic
reality of its own. This mysterious question of the Platonic
reality of mathematical concepts is a central theme of
much of Emperor, and I shall need to return to it later.
Having a very specific description of what a Turing
machine is, we may turn to the universal Turing machine.
This is a particular Turing machine 17 (having one fixed list
of instructions) which can mimic any other Turing ma-
chine. All that is needed is that the Turing machines be
coded in a well-defined way, so that each machine is
assigned a number unique to that particular machine.
The Turing machine with number n is denoted by Tn, and
is referred to as "the nth Turing machine." To make 17 act
like the machine Tn, all we need do is feed U with the
number n on the tape first (say coded in the binary
notation) and then (on the right of a suitable coded
marker) we would feed in the tape that the machine Tn is
supposed to be reading. The final result of the action of U
on the whole combined tape would be the same as that of
Tn on the right-hand part alone. Note that the machine U
itself must have a number. In Emperor (pp. 56-57; 71-
73) I exhibit this number (or one such - there are many
possibilities) explicitly. It turns out to be about 7 X
101654.
Turing originally devised his "machines" to answer a
question posed by David Hilbert: Is it possible in princi-
ple to find a mechanical mathematical procedure (i.e., an
algorithm) for answering all mathematical problems in a
specified class? Turing (and, independently, Church)
showed that the answer is "No." Turing phrased his
version of Hilbert's problem as the question of deciding
whether or not a given Turing machine, when acting on a
specific tape, will ever come to a halt; he showed (using a
"diagonal argument") that there is no algorithm for sys-
tematically answering this question.
Many people seem to be under the impression that this
means there are specific Turing-machine actions for
which it is impossible to decide whether or not they halt.
This is not what the argument shows at all, however. It
merely shows that there is no algorithmic procedure for
deciding this question in general. In any specific case,
there is certainly such an algorithm, namely, the al-
gorithm that simply says "yes" or else the algorithm that
simply says "no" - but, of course, we would not know
which of these two algorithms is the correct one to use!
Algorithms do not in themselves decide questions of truth
or falsity. For that we require insights, not algorithms. To
illustrate this point, I give a modified version of Turing's
original argument. I show that if we are given any al-
gorithm that correctly decides whether Turing machine
actions halt, though for some such actions that algorithm
may itself run on forever without stopping, then we can
exhibit a specific Turing-machine action that we can see
does not come to a halt but for which the given algorithm
never comes to a decision. In this sense we can in
principle, by the use of insight, "outdo" any given al-
gorithm for testing whether or not Turing machine ac-
tions halt.
Chapter 3: Mathematics and reality
The Mandelbrot set provides a wonderful illustration of a
mathematical structure that, though defined in an en-
tirely abstract mathematical way, nevertheless has a real-
ity about it that seems to go beyond any particular
mathematician's conceptions and beyond the particular
technology of any specific computer. Though more and
more of its wonderfully elaborate structure is revealed to
us as more computer power is brought to bear on the
problem of exhibiting the set, there is always more of the
set to be found that is still hidden from us. The set seems
clearly to be "there," somewhere, quite independently of
us or of our machines. Its existence is not material, in any
ordinary sense, and it has no spatial or temporal location.
It exists, instead, in Plato's world of mathematical en-
tities. When we use our computers to explore the set, it is
like using a moon-roverto explore the moon's surface or a
high-energy particle accelerator to probe the secrets of
subatomic physics.
The precise mathematical definition of the Mandelbrot
set is remarkably simple, considering the extraordinary
complexity of its detailed shape. But to understand this
definition, it is first necessary to come to terms with the
idea of a complex number. It turns out that this is just as
well in any case, for complex numbers are absolutely
fundamental also to the structure of quantum theory, a
theory that we need to come to terms with later.
Complex numbers are numbers of the form x + iy,
where x and y are ordinary "real" numbers (i.e., numbers
that can be expressed in terms of infinite decimal expan-
sions) and where "i" represents a square root of — 1. In
ordinary terms, one tends to think that —1 does not
"really" have a square root, and that it is just an "in-
vention" on the part of mathematicians to suppose that it
does. But the so-called "real" numbers are taken as more
real only because we have got much more used to them,
and because they accord remarkably closely with physical
measurements such as time, distance, energy, tem-
perature, and the like. There are reasons to expect that
even this close correspondence with physical quantities
may break down at a very tiny scale, and we must accept
that the utility of the concept of a real number lies as
much in its mathematical consistency, power, and ele-
gance as it does in any correspondence with the physical
world. We find, indeed, that the concept of a complex
number leads us to a picture with perhaps an even greater
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power and elegance than that of a real number; moreover,
complex numbers also have a profound relationship with
the workings of the physical world.
The very system of complex numbers provides further
evidence for a Platonic existence for mathematical en-
tities. While complex numbers were first introduced as a
kind of "trick/5 useful in the solution of cubic equations,
they were later found to have enormous power and utility
in many different areas. In general, the case for Platonic
existence is strongest for entities which give us a great
deal more than we originally bargained for. In such cases,
most of what we get out may be something that was not
even remotely conceived by those mathematicians who
first came across the entities in question. The mathemati-
cians discovered something wonderful. They did not
invent it. The Mandelbrot set, and even more so, the very
system of complex numbers, are clear cases in point.
There are many other situations in which the case for
Platonic existence is not so strong, however, such as when
a mathematician introduces a construction of no particu-
lar elegance or uniqueness to prove a particular result,
this construction finding no value other than the one for
which it was originally devised. In such cases it is not at all
unreasonable to use the word invention, rather than
discovery. It is the clear discoveries in mathematics that
are the mathematician's proudest achievements.
The complex numbers have an elegant geometrical
representation in the Euclidean plane, where the
number z = x + iy is plotted as the point with coordinates
(x,y). A plane describing complex numbers in this way is
called an Argand plane. The Mandelbrot set is a sub-
region of the Argand plane defined in terms of iterations
of the map whereby z is replaced by z2 + c, starting from z
= 0, c being some fixed complex number. If these
iterations lead to an unbounded sequence of points in the
Argand plane then the point representing c lies outside
the Mandelbrot set. If it is a bounded sequence, then c is
in the Mandelbrot set.
One final comment about real and complex numbers
should be made here. There are, in a precise sense, many
"more" of them than there are natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, . . . to which the usual discussions of Turing
machines refer. We might think of using some algorithm
for generating the successive digits of an infinite decimal
expansion, but it turns out that only a tiny fraction of the
possible decimal expansions are obtainable in this way:
the computable numbers. (Nevertheless, all the familiar
numbers, such as the decimal expansion of pi, are com-
putable.) This causes some problems when one tries to
apply the concept of computability to descriptions of the
physical world, which normally use real or complex
numbers
 ((however, see Blum et al. 1989).
Chapter 4: Truths proof, and Insight
The question of mathematical truth and how we ascertain
it is fundamental to our considerations here. How do
mathematicians actually decide which mathematical
statements are true and which are false? Are they follow-
ing some algorithm - perhaps one that is unknown or
unknowable to them - or do they have some other route
to truth via some mysterious "insight" that is not amena-
ble to a purely algorithmic treatment? To gain some
understanding of this issue, it is necessary to go back a
little into the mathematical history of the last .century or
so. Mainly as a result of work by the mathematician Georg
Cantor, it was found that very powerful methods of
reasoning can be obtained if one is prepared to accept
infinite sets as entities that can have independent exis-
tence in their entirety. It was soon found (by Bertrand
Eussell and others), however, that contradictory results
are liable to arise with this kind of reasoning unless some
special rules are introduced to limit the "sizes" of the sets
under consideration. What should these rules be? Rus-
sell, Hilbert, and various other mathematicians proposed
some very precise systems of axioms and rules of pro-
cedure - called formal systems - with the intention that
these should incorporate all the legitimate rules of mathe-
matical procedure. If they were to be completely suc-
cessful, then any true mathematical proposition (within
some well-defined area of mathematics) ought to be
provable by means of the procedures laid down in the
formal system (completeness) and, moreover, it should
not be possible to prove both a proposition and its
negation (consistency). This led to the mathematical
standpoint of'formalism, according to which mathematics
could be reduced to a kind of "game" consisting of merely
manipulating symbols according to the specific rules of
the formal system in question. The necessity for the
symbols to have any actual "meaning" would thereby be
eliminated.
Fortunately (to my way of thinking), in 1931, Kurt
Godel presented his famous theorem, which effectively
destroyed formalism as a fundamental philosophy of
mathematics. He showed that in any consistent formal
system that is broad enough to contain arithmetic and the
normal rules of logical procedure one can explicitly con-
struct well-defined mathematical statements that are not
provable — nor are their negations provable - using the
rules laid down in that formal system. Thus, the system
cannot be complete, in the sense that Hilbert and others
required. Worse than this (from the formalist's point of
view) by the very way that such a Godel proposition is
constructed we can see, using our insight and understand
about what the symbols in the formal system are sup-
posed to mean, that the Godel proposition is actually
true! This tells us that the very concepts of truth, mean-
ing, and mathematical insight cannot be encapsulated
within any formalist scheme.
This is not just bad news for the formalists. It is bad
news for strong-AI, as well. For there is a very close
relationship between the concept of an algorithm and the
concept of a formal system, with regard to mathematical
statements. For any formal system, there is always an
algorithm that generates precisely all the propositions
that can be proved within that system. Conversely, given
an algorithm for generating mathematical statements,
one can always construct a formal system that incorpo-
rates all these statements as axioms of the system. This
tells us that mathematical truth is not an algorithmic
matter; It also appears to tell us that meaning and insight
are not algorithmic matters either. I return to this issue in
Chapter 10.
Since Godel's theorem seems to be telling us that
formalism is not tenable as a foundation for mathematics,
are we to be driven to a Platonic view that mathematical
concepts are in some sense just "out there" waiting to be
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discovered? In my owe view, something like this must be
right, though many people find it hard to believe. In
particular there is another mathematical standpoint,
referred to as intuitiomism, according to which completed
infinities are not permitted, and are allowed only to have
a potential existence. (The intuitionistic philosophy, due
mainly to L. E. J. Brouwer, stems more from the ideas of
Aristotle than those of Plato.) In this view, what is
important is that abstract proofs of "existence" are not
allowed unless an explicit construction of the quantity in
question is given. The main problem with intuitionism
lies in the severe limitations that it places on mathe-
matical reasoning. (In particular, the powerful method of
reductio ad ahsurdum, which is used so frequently in
mathematics, is not now permitted.) Moreover, at least in
the way it is often presented, the intuitionistic concept of
truth has a subjectivity and time-dependence that seems
very unsatisfactory for a mathematics that one hopes to be
able to use reliably in a description of the physical world.
Accepting that much of mathematics is of a nonalgorith-
mic character, we can ask whether nonalgorithmic math-
ematics is in any way interesting or mathematically
important. In fact, it is possible to give numerous simple
and interesting examples of nonalgorithmic mathematics.
Diophantine arithmetic (the question of whether systems
of polynomial equations in integers, with several vari-
ables, have solutions) turns out to be nonalgorithmic (this
was actually Hilbert's original question); so does the
topological equivalence problem for 4-manifolds (of pos-
sible relevance for the problem of quantum gravity) and,
perhaps most striking, the problem of deciding whether
or not a given finite set of polygonal shapes will tile the
entire Euclidean plane. In each case, we have a family of
well-defined yes/no questions for which it is known that
no algorithmic solution exists. In Emperor I also conjec-
tured that the problem of deciding whether or not a point
of the Argand plane actually lies in the Mandelbrot set is,
in an appropriate sense, nonalgorithmic1 - despite the
fact that computers are able to provide wonderful approx-
imations to this set!
Another body of understanding that has considerable
importance for computability problems is complexity the-
ory. As with questions of algorithmic solubility, complex-
ity theory is concerned with families of mathematical
problems, but where the problems in each family are
taken to be algorithmically soluble. The problem is to
decide how "good," in some well-defined sense, such an
algorithm can be for a given family of problems. It turns
out that for some there are fast algorithms (the so-called P
problems), while for others the algorithms seem to be of
necessity so slow that the problems are, in effect, intracta-
ble (i.e., insoluble algorithmically "in practice" - e.g.,
the so-called NP-problems that are not in P). In my
opinion, the questions of complexity theory are not so
central to the issue of conscious thinking as are the
questions of computability theory, but many people seem
to hold to the contrary. [See Tsotsos: "Analyzing Vision at
the Complexity Level" BBS 13(3) 1990.]
Chapter 5: The classical world
We now turn to the question of how the physical world
actually behaves. The issue of determinism in connection
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with physical laws has often been discussed. I am more
concerned with a different (though somewhat related)
issue that, with the important exception of some signifi-
cant work by Pour-El and Richards (1981; 1982), has
barely been addressed at all: that of computability in
physical laws.
Before we can come properly to terms with these
issues, however, we must have some idea of what the laws
of physics actually are. It is a very remarkable fact that
there are indeed physical laws that have a truly phe-
nomenal accuracy and, moreover, are extraordinarily
amenable to precise and general mathematical treat-
ments. These physical laws provide the theories that I
refer to as SUPERB. These theories are supplemented by
others that help to explain physical phenomena but do not
share with the SUPERB theories their phenomenal ac-
curacy. Such theories I refer to as USEFUL. In addition,
there are numerous ideas, some currently very fashion-
able, and often excitedly expressed, that (essentially)
have no experimental support whatever. These are theo-
ries belonging to the class TENTATIVE. In Emperor I
give a brief account of each of the SUPERB theories in
turn.
The oldest of the SUPERB physical theories is Eucli-
dean geometry, which provides a marvellously accurate
theory of physical space and of the behaviour of rigid
bodies. The fact that Euclidean geometry is an extraor-
dinarily precise .physical theory, and not just a very
elegant area of pure mathematics, is demonstrated (per-
haps somewhat ironically) by the fact that we now know
that this geometry is actually not exactly true of the
physical space we inhabit. The even more accurate geom-
etry of Einstein's general relativity provides a picture of a
curved space(-time) that deviates in very tiny and barely
measurable ways from the geometry of Euclid. To qualify
as SUPERB, it is not necessary that the theory in question
apply without exception to the observed properties of the
world, only that its agreement with those properties
qualify as "phenomenal" in some appropriate sense. Be
that as it may, there is one essential feature of Euclidean
geometry (introduced by Eudoxos in the fourth century
B.C.) that remains with us to this day as a fundamental
ingredient of all the SUPERB (and also USEFUL) theo-
ries: the concept of a real number.
Probably Archimedes's theory of statics would have
qualified as SUPERB, but this theory is now subsumed
into the SUPERB dynamical theory of Galilei/Newton.
Newtonian mechanics is, as we all know, deterministic,
but is it computable? Suppose initial data for some phys-
ical situation is given in terms of computable numbers (all
constants involved being also computable numbers), and
we wait for a computable time. Is the state at that time
computable from the initial data? As far as I am aware, the
question has not yet been, properly addressed mathe-
matically, though my guess is that the answer would be
"yes" in Newtonian theory (with reasonable force laws -
say inverse square, with hard elastic spheres and "gener-
ic" initial data, so as to avoid the problem of triple
collisions).
It should be made clear that the possible "noncom-
putability" that is being considered here is different from
the much-discussed concept of "chaos." Chaos refers to
the fact that very tiny changes in initial data may give rise
to absolutely enormous changes in the resulting be-
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haviour. Chaotic systems would normally be computable,
in my sense. (The issue of chaos is like that of complexity
theory, as discussed above, rather than computability
theory.) Chaotic systems are noncomputable in practice,
rather than in principle, in practice, they introduce a
random element into the evolution. Such a random ele-
ment is not the kind of thing that could be usefully
"harnessed" by the brain in order to achieve something
nonalgorithmic. Newtonian mechanics can be incorporat-
ed into the more general framework of Hamiltonian
mechanics, which can also be made to include Maxwell
theory and relativity. In fact, however, most Hamiltonian
systems appear to be chaotic. It seems likely to me,
however, that normal Hamiltonian systems (with com-
putable constants) should be computable.
Maxwells theory provides the SUPERB equations gov-
erning electric and magnetic fields, and it shows how
these fields propagate through space in the form of light
or radio waves. The radical new ingredient that Maxwell
(and Faraday) introduced was a physical entity with an
infinite number of degrees of freedom. Like Newton's
laws, Maxwell's equations are deterministic and presum-
ably computable in some appropriate sense. (Some curi-
ous problems in relation to this have been pointed out by
Pour-El and Richards [1981], although it seems likely that
the "noncomputability" they encounter is not of physical
importance, arising, as it does, only with data that are not
smooth.) To describe the motion of charged particles in
addition to electromagnetic fields, Maxwell's equations
have to be supplemented by the Lorentz force law. The
Maxwell-Lorentz equations work well in practice but can
lead to problems of principle with regard to determinism,
as was pointed out by Dirac. This anomaly is usually
ignored on the grounds that one should really be using
quantum theory for such situations (though the quantum
theory is actually no better!).
Einstein's SUPERB special theory of relativity
changes our picture of space-time, but it does not seem to
alter the issues of determinism and computability (except
slightly to improve the situation with regard to determin-
ism). It does radically affect the way that we view the
"passage of time," however. His even more SUPERB
general theory of relativity asserts that space-time is
curved and that this curvature describes the gravitational
field. An important property of space-time curvature is
that it can be naturally split into two pieces, which 1 refer
to as RICCI and WEYL. Einstein's field equations assert
that RICCI is directly determined by the mass-energy
distribution of matter (counting the electromagnetic field
also as matter), and the remaining part, WEYL (which
describes tidal distortion), represents the free gravita-
tional field. It is conceivable that there are situations
involving ultrastrong gravitational fields in which there is
a failure of ordinary determinism (failure of "cosmic
censorship"), but such situations could in any case occur
only at a scale totally different from that of human brains.
Relativity provides us with a curious paradox concern-
ing the nature of matter. Matter is quantified by its mass,
but gravity itself has energy and therefore (by Einstein's
E = me2) also mass. In certain circumstances, the mass of
gravity appears to reside in regions of space-time that are
not just empty but actually flat! I mention this merely to
point out that even in classical theory there can be a
puzzling nonlocality about the very nature of matter.
Such nonlocality is an even more puzzling with the
mysterious but SUPERB theory of quantum mechanics,
and also with that somewhat unsatisfying but powerful
theory referred to as quantum field theory, which arises
when the principles of special relativity are combined
with those of quantum mechanics. The particular quan-
tum field theory that applies to the electromagnetic field
interacting with electrons (or with certain other particles
such as protons) is called quantum electrodynamics, and
it also qualifies as SUPERB. We consider quantum theo-
ry next.
i: Quantum magic ani quantum mystery
To have any hope of understanding the mysterious phe-
nomenon of consciousness in physical terms, one must try
seriously to come to terms with the physical laws that
govern the way things actually behave in our universe.
With the possible exception of the structure of space-time
itself, the most fundamental and mysterious of these
physical laws are the laws of quantum mechanics.
There is a basic but very puzzling quantum mechanical
principle - called the superposition principle - that
asserts that if A is a possible state of a system and if B is
another possible state, then wA 4- zB is also a possible
state, where w and z are two complex numbers, not both
zero (the ratio w:z being what is physically important).
What does this mean? In a particular instance, consider
the state of a particle, which might be at one point (state
A) or else at another (state B). The superposition principle
tells us that another possible state is A + B and another is
A — B, while yet another is A + iB where % is the square
root of —1). Thus, not only must we consider that a
particle can be "in two places at once," but also that there
are many different ways of being at two places at once! All
these different possibilities have different experimental
consequences.
It appears that the superposition principle holds only at
the "quantum level," where differences in alternative
possibilities are in some appropriate sense small (small
differences in energy distribution - or some such criteri-
on), whereas at the "classical level," which seems to
include the level of our ordinary experiences, the super-
position principle seems to make no sense at all. Instead,
we must adopt a new rule whenever the respective effects
of A and B are in some way magnified to the classical level.
This rule asserts that the so-called "probability ampli-
tudes" - in effect, the complex numbers w and z in the
above description - must have their squared moduli
formed (their distances from the origin in the Argand
plane), and the ratio |t0|2:|z|2 provides the relative proba-
bilities for each of the two alternatives in question actu-
ally to occur. I refer to this so-called "observation" or
"measurement" process as R (reduction of the state
vector, or "collapse of the wavefunction").
In my own opinion, R is a real physical process which
takes place spontaneously in suitable physical circum-
stances, independently of human intervention or the
introduction of "consciousness." Physicists seem to hold
to various different views on this, many maintaining that
R is in some way a kind of "illusion." Such theorists often
find themselves driven to a very "subjective" view of
physical reality at the quantum level. One reason phys-
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icists have trouble with R is that it is completely different
from the process U that governs the behaviour of a state
which remains at the quantum level. The action of U
(unitary evolution, described by the important Schrod-
inger equation - or else by something equivalent such as
the Heisenberg equation) is entirely deterministic, just
like a classical field equation such as Maxwell's. The
probabilities in quantum theory arise only with the pro-
cess R, that is, when effects become magnified from the
quantum to the classical level
Some physicists (probably only a small minority) be-
lieve that the superposition principle should still be
applied at the classical level (so R never actually takes
place at all); they are led to the many-worlds (or Everett)
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Everett 1957;
DeWitt & Graham 1973), whereby all alternative pos-
sible universes must be considered to coexist in some vast
complex-number superposition. No convincing explana-
tion is provided, however, for why we (as conscious
entities?) should perceive just one out of the infinitude of
superposed alternatives, or why the quantum mechanical
probability rules should apply.
Whether or not one adheres to this strange view, there
seems to be no completely satisfactory alternative within
the confines of standard quantum theory. The alternative
viewpoints include the "subjective" one referred to
above, according to which the quantum state (despite its
SUPERB accuracy in providing agreement with observa-
tion) is not taken seriously as a description of reality ("all
in the mind" of the experimenter!), and there is the
alternative view that somehow the "illusion" of R occurs
whenever the complicated interaction with the environ-
ment is taken into account. (I do not find eithef of these
views, in themselves, to be very satisfying or convincing).
Some people prefer the view (Wigner 1961) that a con-
scious entity (or perhaps just a "biological system") would
not be subject to the superposition principle, and that
consequently some new nonlinear theory is needed to
handle the way quantum mechanics could be applied to
such an entity. This would entail an actual change in the
basic structure of quantum theory. I am personally very
sympathetic to the general view that a fundamental
change is needed, but I do not think that it is at the level of
the phenomenon of consciousness (or biology). That
would lead to a very lopsided view of the reality of the
physical world. For in those corners of the universe in
which consciousness (or biology) resides, the objective
physical behaviour of matter would then be totally differ-
ent from its behaviour everywhere else (where there
would be planets with complex superpositions of many
different weather patterns, etc. - and probably much
worse!). Other deviations from standard linear quantum
theory that do not involve consciousness and seem to me
to have much greater plausibility (e.g., Ghirardi et al.
1986; Pearle 1989) have been proposed in order to resolve
the very basic difficulties that arise from the U/R conflict.
These difficulties are made particularly graphic in the
famous Schrodinger (1935) "cat" thought experiment. I
shall come to my own specific suggestions on the matter
later.
One of the most puzzling aspects of quantum theory
lies in the way that systems of many particles must be
treated. (Complicated quantum systems do not behave
like classical ones, just by virtue of their complication,
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despite what many physicists appear to think. Somehow
R must come into it, but the matter remains very un-
clear.) When there are many particles, individual parti-
cles are not to be considered as objects on their own.
Their quantum states involve superpositions of each par-
ticle's possible individual state combined with the various
possible individual states of all the other particles in the
system under consideration. (The different particles are
then said to be correlated.) This has the effect that if one
particle is "observed" (i.e., the particle triggers an effect
that magnifies its situation from the quantum to the
classical level), then this instantaneously affects the quan-
tum state of all the other particles with which it is
correlated. This effect leads to what is known as the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox (Einstein et al.
1935). It is not really a physical paradox, but an actual
physical effect that is not explicable on the basis of any
local realistic view of physical behaviour. (This follows
from a remarkable theorem by J. S. Bell (cf. Bell 1987)
and is substantiated in the behaviour of the actual world
in experiments such as those performed by A. Aspect et
al. 1986).
In my own view, there is nothing in principle objec-
tionable about a nonlocal (or somewhat "holistic") picture
of physical reality, but there is a very serious difficulty
with obtaining a picture that is consistent with the spirit
(and space-time descriptions) of relativity. This presents a
profound challenge for what I believe to be a much-
needed new theory.
Chapter 7: Cosmology and the arrow of time
Why do we perceive time to "flow," when our (SUPERB)
theories tell us that in "reality" there is just a static space-
time laid out, with no "flowing" about it? Relativity even
tells us that there cannot be any such things as "now" at
all, since the very concept would depend on how various
other observers might be moving. Even worse, appar-
ently, is the fact that the equations of physics are sym-
metrical in time, so that they would apply just as well in
the reverse temporal direction as in the normal forward
direction. Why does time seem to "flow" forwards and
not backwards?
At least a partial answer to this last question can be
found in the second law of thermodynamics. This law is
time-asymmetric; and it asserts that a certain physical
quantity called entropy increases in the forward time-
direction (and, consequently, it decreases in the back-
ward time-direction). Very roughly speaking, entropy is a
measure of the manifest disorder of a physical system. It is
not unnatural physically that a system, when left on its
own, should get more and more disordered. The puzzle of
the second law lies in the fact that this is not what happens
in the reverse direction in time or, to put things another
way, that the state in the past was actually given to us as
extraordinarily ordered. We can trace the nature of this
"order" to the very structure of the big hang - the
singular state (infinite space-time curvature) that, accord-
ing to standard (USEFUL, at least) theory, represents the
actual origin of the entire universe.
We can compare this initial singular state with the ones
that are expected to occur in the reverse direction of time,
at the cores of black holes - or in the "big crunch" that will
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finally engulf the entire universe, if our universe turns
out actually to be finite rather than infinite. The geo-
metrical difference, in the case of the big bang, appears to
lie in the fact that in the immediate neighbourhood of this
singular state the space-time curvature is constrained by
the condition: WEYL = 0. The hypothesis whereby
initial-type singular states (i.e., at the big bang, or in
"white holes" - the time-reverses of black holes) are
constrained by WEYL = 0, whereas those of final-type
(i.e., at the big crunch, or in black holes) are not to be so
constrained, is what I refer to as the Weyl curvature
hypothesis (WCH). This hypothesis would explain both
the puzzle of the second law and the observed extraordi-
nary uniformity of the' actual universe. Such a constraint
could explain the fantastic geometric precision involved
in the "act of creation^ that occurred in the big bang - to
one part in at least 101()123 (a number so large that it could
not remotely be written out in full even if each digit were
to be written on each separate electron, proton, neutron,
or any other particle in the entire universe!).
Chapter 8: quantum gravity
What lies behind WCH? Could this hypothesis be a
deduction from some comprehensive theory of physics
that deals also with problems at other scales? The usual
viewpoint about the singular states that classical general
relativity leads us to (at the big bang, big crunch, and in
black or white holes) is that they must be dealt with by a
quantized general relativity, or quantum gravity. This is
also my own view, but the fact that quantum gravity
needs to explain a grossly time-asymmetric phenomenon
like WCH does not seem to be generally appreciated. No
satisfactory theory of quantum gravity has yet emerged,
but when it does (and let us call this putative theory CQG
- "correct quantum gravity"), it ought to turn out, on the
basis of the above considerations, to be a time-asym-
metric theory. This is very different from the kind of thing
that has been expected until now, but considerations of
gravity quantizers have so far been restricted to trying to
derive a (time-symmetric) quantum procedure U for the
time-symmetric classical theory of general relativity (or
one of its equally time-symmetric generalizations). No
one seems to have tried seriously to incorporate the
time-asymmetric procedure R into quantum gravity the-
ory. I give an argument in Emperor to show that R is
indeed time-asymmetric (a fact not always recognized by
physicists) and I describe a thought experiment ("Hawk-
ing's box") that strongly suggests that if CQG implies
WCH, then CQG also ought to incorporate R as an actual
physical process.
This leads to the suggestion that the onset of R can be
understood as something that occurs when pairs of states
are^  superposed and the differences in their gravitational
fields (i.e., the differences in their space-time geome-
tries) reaching the "one-graviton level," or thereabouts.
Simple physical examples are described which indicate
that this criterion is not at all physically unreasonable.
It seems to me that an important new physical theory
must be lurking in the shadows. But recall the difficulties
referred to above: Any realistic theory of R would have
grave difficulties in coming to terms with the space-time
descriptions that must accord with the principles of rela-
tivity. In my opinion, our present picture of physical
reality is due for a grand shake-up - even greater,
perhaps, than that which has already occurred with rela-
tivity and quantum theory.
Chapter 9: Real brains and model brains
What do we know of the actual structure and workings of
the human brain? What aspect of the brain seems to relate
most to the phenomenon of consciousness? There seems
to be remarkably little consensus as to what actual parts of
the brain are to be most associated with this phenome-
non. The cerebral cortex, reticular formation, thalamus,
hippocampus, and no doubt many other parts of the brain
have each have been separately suggested as the place to
look for the "seat of consciousness." Some people have
suggested that only the left half of the brain is conscious,
since (in most individuals) that is the half capable of
speech - an odd view, to my mind, and certain experi-
ments on split-brain patients indeed suggest that both
halves can be conscious. Perhaps consciousness is not to
be located in any one clear place. Some parts of the brain
do seem to be more closely associated with consciousness
than others, however. The cerebellum, for example,
really does seem to act as an unconscious "automaton/3
whereas one does sometimes (although apparently only
sometimes) seem to be aware of activity taking place in
the cerebral cortex. This might seem surprising, on the
basis of the strong-AI picture, the cerebellum having a
much higher density of neurons than does the cerebral
cortex, and perhaps half as many neurons altogether!
One can present computer models of the activity of the
firing of neurons, but is this liable to give a reliable
modelling of the brain's (conscious?) activity? There is at
least one feature of brain functioning that is not well
modelled in this way, and that is brain plasticity, accord-
ing to which the connections between different neurons
can become strengthened or weakened, providing the
essential ingredient of permanent memory, according to
one prevalent theory. There are suggested mechanisms
underlying brain plasticity (such as the one due to Hebb
1954) and these can be modelled on computers as neural
networks. The processes underlying actual brain plas-
ticity seem to be largely unknown, as of now, however.
Parallel processing is another ingredient that seems to
have importance in the computer modelling of brain
function. It seems unlikely to me however, that any
proper understanding of conscious thought processes will
come about in this way. There is a remarkable "oneness"
in conscious thinking that seems very much at odds with
the functioning of a (classical) parallel computer. In any
case, parallel computers are completely equivalent to the
normal serial (Turing machine type) computers with
regard to what they can and cannot compute.
Is there an essential role for quantum phenomena in
brain functioning? Perhaps quantum superposition is
somehow usefully incorporated into brain function. One
might envisage that huge numbers of different calcula-
tions are carried out simultaneously in superposition, and
only at the end is R called into play to conjure up the
answer that is required. Such would be the action of a
quantum computer, as considered by Deutsch (1985;
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Deutsch's quantum computers, however, do not perform
noncomputable operations — although in certain rather
contrived situations they can do better than Turing ma-
chines in the sense of complexity theory.) It is known that
there are neural cells (in the retina) that are sensitive to
single quantum events (photon arrival), but it is hard to
see how to harness this kind of thing in any useful way, the
brain being too "hot" a system to preserve quantum
coherence over an appreciable length of time.
Quantum considerations are relevant to many aspects
of brain functioning (chemical transmission, the definite
potential differences responsible for the on/off transmis-
sion of nerve signals, etc.), but it is difficult to see how
present-day quantum mechanics could be coherently
used to describe the action of a human brain, even in
principle: For the brain would have to be considered as
"observing itself all the time - when it is conscious, at
least, which would entail the continual use of R. There is
no satisfactory theory for handling this.
Chapter 10: Where lies the physics of mind?
What is the selective advantage of consciousness? Our
consciousness has presumably evolved because the be-
haviour of an animal with consciousness is actually more
advantageous in some way to that of an otherwise equiv-
alent animal without consciousness. If consciousness is
merely the inevitable inward manifestation of the posses-
sion of a sufficiently complex control system, why is it that
that some parts of the brain (e.g., the cerebellum) do not
appear to be conscious, yet they can perform extremely
complex tasks?. What is advantageous about the outward
manifestations of those particular thought modes that
seem necessarily to be associated with consciousness?
If one contrasts the phrases (e.g., "common sense,"
"judgement of truth," "understanding," "artistic ap-
praisal") that might be associated with many of those
mental activities that require some degree of con-
sciousness with those (e.g., "automatic," "following rules
mindlessly," "programmed," "algorithmic") that do not
seem to require it, then the possibility of a non-
algorithmic/algorithmic distinction at least suggests it-
self. In my view this is one strong indication that what we
are doing with our consciousnesses is actually not some-
thing algorithmic at all. As a central theme of Emperor, I
have tried to stress that the mere fact that something may
be scientifically describable in a precise way does not
imply that it is computable. It is quite on the cards that
the physical activity underlying our conscious thinking
may be governed by precise but nonalgorithmic physical
laws and our conscious thinking could indeed be the
inward manifestation of some kind of nonalgorithmic
physical activity. I am suggesting, therefore, that the
selective advantage of consciousness is that it enables its
possessor to form some kind of nonalgorithmic judgement
of how to behave in a given situation.
Perhaps one could refer to such judgements as "in-
spired guesswork;" it is of some value to examine some
outstanding examples of inspiration, as recorded by Poin-
care and Mozart, for example. Here the inspirational
ideas appear to be thrown up by the unconscious mind,
but it is the conscious judgements that are needed to
assess the value of the ideas themselves. These judge-
ments have a remarkable globality about them; a vast area
seems to be surveyable in an "instant" - say, an entire
mathematical topic, or a symphony. Such globality is also
a feature of much of our conscious thinking at a (seeming-
ly) much more mundane level, such as deciding what to
have for dinner or appreciating a visual scene.
Why do I maintain that such conscious judgements
must have an essentially nonalgorithmic ingredient? One
could certainly imagine feeding appropriate criteria into
an ordinary algorithmic computer and getting it to pro-
duce "judgements." The most decisive reason for believ-
ing that our conscious judgements must be non-
algorithmic comes from mathematics. If mathematical
judgements can be seen to be nonalgorithmic - where the
criteria of logic, precision, correct calculation, and truth
are normally taken as paramount - then surely non-
algorithmic ingredients could have at least as great an
importance in other areas.
In Chapter 4 of Emperor, I show how to construct, for
any (sufficiently broad) formal mathematical system, a
specific Godel proposition Pjjlk), which is a well-defined
statement about numbers. It has the form "for every
natural number x, the following computable property of x
holds." From the way that P^JJk) is constructed, one sees,
provided that one believes that the axioms and rules of
procedure of the formal system are valid methods of
deriving mathematical truth, that one must believe that
Pk(k) is a mathematical truth also. Nevertheless, Pk(k) is
not itself derivable by means of the axioms and rules of
procedure of the given formal system.
We recall that an essential equivalence exists between
formal systems and algorithms as procedures for ascer-
taining the truth of mathematical propositions. Now sup-
pose that a particular mathematician is using some al-
gorithm - that is, in effect, some formal system F - as his
means of ascertaining mathematical truth. Then the God-
el proposition Pk(k) constructed from F must be a true
proposition also, though it is not possible for our putative
algorithmic mathematician to ascertain the truth of Pjjik).
This is essentially the argument put forward by Lucas
(1961), but it is not yet the desired contradiction, since
the mathematician can have no means of knowing what F
is, let alone be convinced of its validity as a means of
ascertaining truth. We shall need a broader argument
than this.
Suppose that the ways that human mathematicians
form their conscious judgements of mathematical truth
are indeed algorithmic. We shall try to reduce this to an
absurdity. Consider, first, the possibility that different
mathematicians might use inequivalent algorithms to
decide truth. But it is one of the most striking features of
mathematics (perhaps almost alone among the disci-
plines) that the truth of propositions can actually be
settled by abstract argument. A mathematical argument
that convinces one mathematician - provided that it
contains no error - will also convince the other, as soon as
the argument has been fully grasped. This also applies to
the Godel-type propositions. If the first mathematician is
prepared to accept all the axioms and rules of procedure
of a particular formal system as giving only true proposi-
tions, then he must also be prepared to accept its Godel
proposition as describing a true.proposition. It would be
exactly the same for the second mathematician. The point
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is that the arguments establishing mathematical truth are
communicable.
Thus we are not talking about various obscure al-
gorithms that might happen to be running around in
different particular mathematicians' heads. We are talk-
ing about one universally used (putative) formal system
that is equivalent to all the different mathematicians'
algorithms for judging mathematical truth. Now this
putative "universal" system, or algorithm, cannot ever be
known as the one that we mathematicians use to decide
truth. For if it were, then we would construct its Godel
proposition and know that to be a mathematical truth
also. Thus, we are driven to the conclusion that the
algorithm that mathematicians actually use to decide
mathematical truth is so complicated or obscure that its
very validity can never be known to us.
But this flies in the face of what mathematics is all
about! The whole point of our mathematical heritage and
training is that we do not bow down to the authority of
some obscure rules that we can never hope to under-
stand. We must see - or, at least in principle see - that
each step in an argument can be reduced to something
simple and obvious. Mathematical truth is not a horren-
dously complicated dogma whose validity is beyond our
comprehension. It is something built up from simple and
obvious ingredients - and when we understand them,
their truth is clear and agreed by all.
To my thinking, this is as blatant a reductio ad absur-
dum as we can hope to achieve, short of an actual
mathematical proof. The message should be clear: Math-
ematical truth is not something we ascertain merely by
the use of an algorithm. I believe, also, that our con-
sciousness is a crucial ingredient in our comprehension of
mathematical truth. We must "see" the truth of a mathe-
matical argument to be convinced of its validity. This
"seeing" is the very essence of consciousness. When we
convince ourselves of the validity of Godel's theorem we
not only "see" it, but by so doing we reveal the very
nonalgorithmic nature of the "seeing" process itself.
The strong-AI view, on the other hand, envisages that
human judgements of (mathematical and other) truth
must arise out of some kind of natural selection of al-
gorithms. Even in the absence of arguments in favour of
some nonalgorithmic ingredient in conscious thinking,
such as the one given above, there are serious difficulties
with the picture whereby algorithms are supposed to
improve themselves in this way. It would certainly not
work for normal Turing machine specifications, since a
"mutation" would almost certainly render the machine
totally useless instead of altering it only slightly. Some-
thing much more robust would be needed - such as the
actual ideas underlying the specification! Moreover, a
selection process that relies only on the output of an
algorithm (such as natural selection implies) would be
hopelessly inefficient.
What do I believe is actually taking place with our
conscious perceptions? I am venturing a suggestion (part-
ly as a result of my own experiences with the communica-
tion of mathematical ideas) that consciousness represents
some kind of contact with the timeless Platonic world of
mathematical concepts. Proper communication between
mathematicians can take place only when each indi-
vidually makes this contact. Moreover, the "non-
algorithmic part" of Plato's world is, by comparison with
the part where algorithms and computation reside, easily
the most subtle and fascinating part. But mathematical
insight is only one area where the role of consciousness is
important, and it is chosen in my descriptions simply
because it is here that the nonalgorithmic element can be
made most precise. Any conscious thinking, even that
which I believe must occur in (at least some) animals
would, at root, have to be the same phenomenon.
The relation between the real physical world and the
Platonic one is a mysterious one. The very existence of
the SUPERB physical theories begins to give the seem-
ingly "solid" matter of our experiences an apparently
nebulous "mere mathematical" Platonic existence,
whereas examples such as the Mandelbrot set seem to
make the Platonic world more concrete. Might the two
worlds be, in some sense, actually the same? The whole
issue of consciousness seems to me to require a much
deeper investigation of the relation between the physical
world and Plato's world than has been achieved so far.
Even the standpoint of strong AI requires the Platonic
existence of algorithms as the "home" for our conscious
feelings, since the algorithms' physical embodiments are
supposed to be irrelevant. Viewed in this way, my own
standpoint does not differ so much from that of strong AI,
except that I believe that the concept of an algorithm is far
too limiting to accommodate the immensely subtle and
fundamentally important phenomenon of consciousness.
The possible identification, in some sense, of the phys-
ical world with the Platonic one raises many issues. There
is the possibility of strong determinism (according to
which the actual history of the universe might be mathe-
matically fixed in its entirety). There are also the various
versions of the anthropic principle, which I discuss brief-
ly in Emperor. In its (more dubious?) strong form there
could even be alternative universes, the one in which we
find ourselves being the one that happens to allow
consciousness.
Suppose we accept that there may indeed be a non-
algorithmic element in the physics that spans the gap
between the quantum and classical levels. How might the
conscious brain be making use of this? Here the specula-
tions become more tentative. A plausible place to look is
in the phenomenon of brain plasticity. Connections be-
tween neurons sometimes occur at dendritic spines,
which can apparently grow or shrink, and significantly
affect connection strengths, in seconds or less. This
growth or shrinkage should, strictly speaking, be consid-
ered as taking place at the quantum level: No single one of
the vast array of possibilities has actually occurred; quan-
tum superpositions of many different combinations of
connection strengths must be simultaneously involved.
Thus, the brain embarks not on just one "calculation,"
but on many simultaneously. Only when the large-scale
effects of these simultaneous calculations differ by some-
thing that reaches the "one-graviton level" - or whatever
CQG tells us is appropriate - would one or another
"conscious thought" emerge. Moreover, this "emer-
gence" would have to involve some nonalgorithmic
ingredient.
I suggest a possible analogy with quasicrystal growth.
These puzzling objects resemble crystals, but possess
crystallographically forbidden symmetries, usually
fivefold. Fivefold ("almost") symmetry can occur with
certain tiling patterns, however, and it seems likely that
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the arrangement of the tiles in such patterns will give the
essential clue as to the arrangement of atoms in a
quasicrystal. If so? there would have to be an essentially
nonlocal aspect to the way the atoms are arranged. I am of
the opinion- that this cannot be properly achieved by
adding atoms to the assembly one at a time. Quantum
superposition of many different simultaneous arrange-
ments must be involved; only when the classical level is
reached does a particular one of these arrangements get
resolved out. (It should be recalled that the general tiling
problem is a nonalgorithmic one, although the particular
tilings that are likely to be relevant for such quasicrystals
are actually algorithmic - though nonlocal.)
Finally, I refer in Emperor to certain experiments (by
Kornhuber and by Libet) that indicate some very puz-
zling aspects of the actual time at which conscious feelings
(active and passive, respectively) seem to take place. [See
Libet: "Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of
Conscious Will in Voluntary Action" BBS 8(4)1985.]
There is also something very puzzling about the fact that
consciousness is the one known phenomenon for which
time needs to flow at all. In the descriptions of modern
physics - except, perhaps, for the (disputed) behaviour of
R - all we have is a "static" space-time. I believe that
these are strong indications that we need a radical revi-
sion of our present picture of space-time. For such a
revision, we would certainly need something like the
putative CQG.
Despite all this technicality (and also physical specula-
tion), there remains the fact that in some sense it is
"obvious" that mere computation cannot evoke con-
sciousness - an obviousness that a child can see. Yet our
science has driven us to accept that we are all but small
parts of a universe governed by precise mathematical
laws. In The Emperors New Mind, I have attempted to
show that there is a way out of the dilemma: Mathematical
precision does not imply computability.
NOTE
1. I have been recently informed by Leonore Blum that this
conjecture is actually true, if one uses the definition of noncora-
putability for complex numbers due to Blum et al. 1989.
Commentaries submitted by the qualified professional readership of
this journal will be considered for publication in a later issue as
Continuing Commentary on this article. Integrative overviews and
syntheses are especially encouraged.
On "seeing" the truth of the Godel sentence
George Boolos
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139
Electronic mall: boolos@cogito.MIT.EDU
In his famous 1931 paper, Godel showed that for any "suffi-
ciently strong" formal theory T, a sentence S in the language of T
equivalent in T to its own T-unprovability cannot be proved in
Commentary/Femrose: Emperor's new mind:
T, provided that T is consistent. (In the normal cases, S is
equivalent in T to the sentence expressing the consistency of T.)
Thus if T proves only true sentences, and is therefore consistent,
then S is not provable in T.
Roger Penrose claims that although S is unprovable in T, we
can always see that S is true by means of the following argument:
If S is provable in T, then S is false, but that is impossible, (pp.
107-8: "Our formal system should not be so badly constructed
that it actually allows false propositions to be proved!"); thus S is
unprovable and therefore true.
There are certain interesting formal theories of which the set
of provable sentences can be seen to contain no falsehoods; for
the sake of argument we may grant that Peano Arithmetic (PA),
say, is one of these. We must then grant that the Godel sentence
for PA, expressing its own PA-unprovability, is true and un-
provable in PA.
To concede that we can see the truth of the Godel sentence for
PA, in which only a fragment (albeit nontrivial) of actual mathe-
matical reasoning can be carried out, is not to concede that we
can see the truth of Godel sentences for more powerful theories
such as ZF set theory, in which almost the whole of mathematics
can be represented. I shall give some reasons for thinking that
there is no sense of "see" in which we can see that ZF is
consistent; thus we cannot see the truth of the Godel sentence
for ZF either, for that sentence is equivalent (in a much weaker
theory than ZF) to the consistency sentence for ZF.
A true story: Once upon a time, distinguished set theorist J
sent equally distinguished set theorist M what purported to be a
proof that the theory ZFM (ZF 4- "a measurable cardinal
exists"), of which M and many others were fond, was inconsis-
tent. M sat down to work and found the error on page 39 or so of
J's manuscript. As he began to examine J's "proof," M might
have been reasonably confident that he would find an error, but
by no means did he then know that J's "proof was fallacious or
see the consistency of ZFM. Do we know that some future
hotshot will not do to ZF what M feared J had done to ZFM?
I suggest that we do not know that we are not in the same
situation vis-a-vis ZF that Frege was in with respect to naive set
theory (or, more accurately, the system of his Basic Laws of
Arithmetic) before receiving, in June 1902, the famous letter
from Russell, showing the derivability in his system of Russell's
paradox. It is, I believe,- a mistake to think that we can see that
mathematics as a whole is consistent, a mistake possibly fostered
by our ability to see the consistency of certain of its parts.
The verb "should" in the sentence quoted above ought to
give us pause. Of course our formal system should not be so
constructed as to have false theorems. What we may believe or
hope to be the case, but cannot "see" to be so, is that the
totality of mathematics is not badly constructed in that way.
Are we really so certain that there isn't some million-page
derivation of "0 = 1" that will be discovered some two hundred
years from now? Do we know that we are really better off than
Frege in May 1902?
To belabor the point: Penrose has said nothing that shows that
we can recognize the truth of the Godel sentence for ZF or for
any other reasonable approximation to the whole of the mathe-
matics that we ourselves use. What we can see the truth of is this
conditional proposition: The Godel sentence for ZF is ZF-
unprovable (and therefore true) if ZF is consistent. We cannot
see that the Godel sentence is true precisely because we cannot
see that ZF is consistent. We may hope or believe that it is, but
we do not know it, and therefore cannot see it.
Penrose does offer a kind of consideration not advanced in
earlier discussions of Godel's theorem. He states that when a
mathematician discovers a proof of some statement, other math-
ematicians easily and quickly convince one another of its truth.
I don't see that Penrose offers an argument for the conclusion
that the ready acceptance of a newly proved proposition shows
that mathematicians see that it is true rather than that it follows
from the rest of mathematics, that is, is true if the rest of
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accepted mathematics is. Penrose rightly emphasizes that we
must see that each step in an argument can be reduced to
something simple and obvious. But such reduction may not be
possible:. Many regard impredicative comprehension axioms in
analysis as neither simple nor obvious; and none of the axioms of
set theory forces itself on us the way "x + 0 = x" does.
"When we convince ourselves of the validity of Godel's
theorem we not only 'see' it, but by so doing we reveal the very
nonalgorithmic nature of the 'seeing' process itself." (Emperor,
p. 418) Since one of the hypotheses of Godel's theorem is the
consistency of the theories under consideration, Penrose must
here mean seeing the truth of the Godel sentence; but I have
argued that we cannot do this if the theory is a reasonable
approximation to the whole of mathematics.
The Mandelbrot set has been called the most complex object
in all of mathematics, but mathematics itself, of course, out-
strips the Mandelbrot set in complexity. Can we really "see"
that "0 = 1" is not sitting at the bottom of some lengthy,
intricate, and ingenious proof perhaps involving concepts and
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Penrose says he believes that insights and judgments, which are
part of conscious thought, are nonalgorithmic and so cannot be
captured by a computer program. His claim, at odds with the
"strong-AI" position that cognition is computation, is that there
is no "mental algorithm" that could exhibit these sorts of behav-
iors. He asserts that what is needed to come to grips with the
concept of "mind" is a better understanding of the fundamental
laws of physics, that there are as yet undiscovered physical laws
that may describe the (presumably nonalgorithmic) physical
actions that underlie conscious thought. Though Penrose's cen-
tral concern, as Martin Gardner states in the foreward, "is what
philosophers call the 'mind-body problem'," he fails to bring us
closer to solving it. Instead, he merely restates it, supplanting
strong-AI's modern-day dualism, that "mindstuff... is the
logical structure of an algorithm" (p. 21), with the problem of
relating nonalgorithmic processes, such as discovering mathe-
matical truths (e.g., insight), "to the Veal' world of actual
physical objects" (p. 430). Furthermore, this restatement car-
ries with it the assumption that there are physical laws, oper-
ative in the brain, that give rise to nonalgorithmic behavior.
The importance of Penrose's book for cognitive science there-
fore depends entirely on his refutation of the computational
view of mind. Yet one might question some of his arguments
against it. For example, when he considers the computability of
word pairs in problems like the word problem, he says of word
inequalities that "there is no such obvious algorithm, in general,
for deciding when two words are not "equal," and we may have
to resort to 'intelligence' in order to establish that fact." (p. 131).
What about learning? Is that what he means by "intelligence?"
He never addresses the issue of machine learning (in fact, I do
not believe "learning" is mentioned anywhere in the book,
though "insights," which "must lie outside any algorithmic
action" (p. 110) could be interpreted as inductive learning).
Rather than investigating algorithms for learning particular
problem-solving "tricks," he confines himself to considering
whether general algorithms exist for solving certain classes of
problems. He seems to assume that any sort of "mental al-
gorithm" would be static (as if it were innate), restricted to
function according to some predefined formal system of axioms
and rules of inference. Whether or not the capacity of computa-
tional devices to learn algorithmic procedures is sufficient for
them to exhibit the kind of "intelligent" behaviors Penrose is
interested in is left in question simply because he never ad-
dresses that issue.
His consideration of newly discovered (or existing) physical
laws as explanations for mental behavior is of little consequence
for cognitive science precisely because he offers no principled
connection between such laws and mental behavior (algorithmic
or nonalgorithmic). What role does lawful behavior play in
thinking? Solving the mind-body problem requires an under-
standing of the physical changes responsible for the brain's
capacity to function as a mind, that is, changes that are the
processing of information. Not all changes in the brain are
informational, however, hence the need for a principled con-
nection. Without it, Penrose is forced to make analogies based
on functional similarities that probably bear little resemblance
to more fundamental relationships between mind and brain.
This has the effect of making his presentation appear to be little
more than a set of loosely related ideas. For example, even
though one of Penrose's goals is to develop an objective view of
quantum state vector reduction and even though he says that "I
am not at all happy with [the subjective view]" (p. 295), he
nevertheless seems to have arrived at the idea of relating
quantum phenomena to conscious thought, at least in part,
because the subjective view of the state vector involves con-
scious observers.
It is clear that "algorithm" (or "nonalgorithmic process") and
"physical law" are central for Penrose. Unfortunately, incorpo-
rating both of these notions, as they are typically used, in a
theory of cognition necessarily leads to dualism. For Penrose
this is evident from such statements as, "I am somewhat discon-
certed to find that there are a good many points in common
between the strong-AI viewpoint and my own" (p. 429), and,
"When one 'sees' a mathematical truth, one's consciousness
breaks through to this [Platonic] world of [mathematical] ideas"
(p. ^28). To break this dualism, as a first step toward solving the
mind-body problem, "algorithm" and "physical law" must be
framed so they become equivalent with respect to descriptions
of the physical changes that underlie information processing, in
contrast to Penrose's generation of physical explanations by
analogy. Algorithms (and presumably nonalgorithmic pro-
cesses) are typically associated with the processing of informa-
tion. Physical laws, on the other hand, describe physical con-
straints on the behavior of physical objects. Instead of viewing
algorithms (or nonalgorithmic processes) in terms of the kinds of
behaviors they are capable of producing, he should ask about the
physical characteristics of algorithms (or nonalgorithmic pro-
cesses). And instead of viewing physical laws as describing the
classical or quantum mechanical changes in the states of physical
objects, he should ask how the laws of physics could be used to
describe information processing.
An algorithm is an "effective" procedure describing a set of
mechanical operations that can be carried out by a Turing
machine. This abstract mechanism is physically realized in
digital computers (barring the infinite tape). It can be inferred
from this that algorithms, too, have been given a physical
reality. Even when they are physically instantiated (as computer
programs), however, algorithms are almost always considered in
terms of their functional characteristics, largely because of the
lack of analysis, or recognition of the importance of an analysis,
of the physical characteristics of structures capable of carrying
out the individual steps. For Penrose to solve the problem of
dualism he must determine the physical changes that underlie
mental behavior and compare them to the physical changes that
underlie the processing of information in the computer to
conclude whether or not the brain is truly algorithmic or only
able to be described algorithmically at some level. Without
some kind of physical grounding for algorithms (or non-
algorithmic processes), the true nature of conscious thought can
only be assumed. Penrose simply uses introspection (his experi-
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encing mathematical insight) as the basis for his idea that
conscious thinking is nonalgorithmic, and so is unconstrained in
considering the reality of the Platonic existence of ideas.
Physical laws are relationships between measured attributes
that are used to describe the state of a physical system. Though
such laws are physically grounded, what effect do they have on
information processing in the brain? In general, physical laws do
not directly describe information processing. For example, in a
digital computer information is not embodied by the values of
the measured attributes of its components (as it is in analog
computers). This is true whether the physical behavior of the
digital computer is described classically or quantum mechan-
ically. Rather, the information is embodied in combinations of
" IV and "OV (high and low voltages, respectively). Such
combinations are not measured attributes. Thus, if we believe
that the brain is an information processor (whether or not it is
algorithmic), we must carefully consider the role that physical
laws play in its behavior. Otherwise, because of its truly remark-
able mental capacities (as Penrose notes), one may feel com-
pelled to look for such equally remarkable physical behavior as
that described by quantum mechanics or even more speculative
physical theories. Instead of searching the frontiers of physics,
Penrose might well consider physical characteristics other than
laws, such as boundary conditions (to which he devotes only two
pages), that might play an important role in fashioning the mind.
Turing model of computation
Thomas M. Breuel
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA 02139
Electronic mail: tmh@ai.mit.edu
Penrose argues that a theory of the mind requires an under-
standing of new (hitherto undiscovered) physical principles. He
then asserts that the field of artificial intelligence (AI) cannot
yield such a theory because it insists on testing its hypotheses
with computational devices that are less powerful than physical
systems based on the postulated new physical principles.
Penrose admits that he has put up a "straw man" when he
describes the AI researcher ("AI" specifically refers to the
information processing or computational approach described by
D. Man* in his 1980 book, Vision) as dogmatically clinging to the
notion that the brain is nothing but a digital computer. The
reason AI researchers, for practical purposes, adhere to the idea
that brains are no more than computational devices is not
philosophical stubbornness but the fact that no physical process
is known to exist that can be used to build a device computa-
tionally more powerful than a Turing machine, and no concrete
theories of psychological and cognitive phenomena have so far
required any recourse to physical mechanisms that were more
powerful than a Turing machine. Penrose's argument may be
cautious first steps towards changing both of these facts, but I
feel they are still much too tentative and informal to require
serious reconsideration of the marriage of AI and the Turing
model of computation.
AI considers the brain as a system that processes information.
In this view, the senses convert external physical states into a
representation (or "code") that is processed by the brain, which
produces other (output) representations that are then realized
physically by effectors such as muscles.
The AI description of the brain as an information processing
system is complementary to the description as a physical system
used in the neurosciences. Both are equally valid and indepen-
dent descriptions of a single phenomenon. This relationship
between AI and the neurosciences is somewhat analogous to the
relationship between organic chemistry and physics: Organic
chemistry abstracts away many of the physical principles under-
lying chemical reactions and is in return able to make more
powerful generalizations.
It is important to realize that the view of the brain as an
information processor does not imply that the brain is no more
powerful than a Turing machine. For example, the input and
output representations could be infinite and continuous rather
than finite and discrete, and more powerful models of computa-
tion than the Turing model might be used in that case to model
the information processing that occurs in the brain.
Why is it then that most AI theories involve computers in
some way? First, AI theories often involve descriptions of how
discrete information is processed, and a Turing machine al-
gorithm is a convenient means of describing many such informa-
tion processing tasks unambiguously and concisely. But there
are also many AI theories which are not initially formulated as
algorithms. For example, many low level algorithms in vision
are formulated as networks or differential equations. Any al-
gorithmic implementation of such schemes is used exactly the
same way it would be used in the physical sciences: to test the
theory numerically and make predictions that are experimen-
tally verifiable. Finally, because AI makes theories about the
information processing abilities of physical systems, it is neces-
sary to establish the physical realizability of an AI theory, and
giving a Turing machine realization of an AI theory is a conve-
nient means for proving physical realizability.
The language and approach of AI would, if necessary, extend
to information processing that is more powerful than Turing
machines, however: Networks, circuits, and differential equa-
tions are not intrinsically restricted to Turing equivalent com-
putation; the Turing model itself can easily be made more
powerful by introducing, for example, "oracles" or infinite
precision arithmetic primitives.
Even staying within the confines of Turing realizable theories
when developing theories of the mind is not as severe a re-
striction as Penrose seems to suggest in his book. For example,
Penrose claims (p. 415: "Moreover, the slightest 'muta-
tion' . . .") that computations (in the Turing sense) are inher-
ently not robust. This statement is true only of some particular
realization of a Turing machine, however. Within computer
science, there exists a large body of work on fault-tolerant
computation (i. e., fault-tolerant realizations of the Turing model
of computation). Likewise, in many artificial neural network
models that are no more powerful than Turing machines, small
changes in the program (i.e., the weights of the network) result
only in small changes in behavior. Other purported limitations
of Turing machines are lack of adaptivity ("they follow a fixed
program") and absence of randomness; but, again, a closer
analysis shows that such claims are unfounded.
The earliest attempts at AI were nonadaptive symbolic pro-
cessing systems that had access to virtually no sensory informa-
tion. Such systems can be very useful for testing theories about
certain very specific high-level processes (e.g., syntactic analy-
sis). Symbolic systems of this kind, however, are limited in the
kind of intelligent behavior they can display. Theories of highly
complex tasks like mathematical or social reasoning will proba-
bly require adaptivity, versatile architectures, as well as an
understanding of how different information processing modules
are coordinated, how cognitive development and learning work,
and how human intelligence is linked with, and dependent on,
social context. None of these questions is currently understood
sufficiently well to even begin formulating concrete, testable
information processing theories. Until we have had the oppor-
tunity to observe that the Turing model is insufficient for
formulating and testing such theories, it seems premature to
postulate the necessity for more powerful information process-
ing mechanisms.
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in undefended flank
Jeremy Butterfield
Philosophy Faculty, Cambridge University, Cambridge CB3 9DA, England
What a marvellous book! I discern three main ingredients.
1. The best kind of popular science: not just detailed and
clear, but also forthcoming about unresolved issues. Setting
aside the better-known issues in the foundations of quantum
theory, examples include: the distinction between "good" and
"bad" uses of Cantor's diagonal argument (p. Ill); the recur-
siveness of the Mandelbrot set (p. 125); self-energy in classical
electromagnetism (p. 189); determinism in general relativity (p.
215); complexity theory and quantum computers (pp. 145, 402).
2. Various controversial arguments, mostly against strong AI
("the mind is a digital computer"). The main argument here is
based on the nonalgorithmic nature of mathematical insight,
allegedly shown by Godel's theorem (especially pp. 108-12;
417-18).
3. An overarching speculation that two disparate problems -
the reconciliation of quantum theory with relativity, and the
relation of mind to body - are relevant to one another. This is
filled out in various ways. The most striking is by a happy
analogy with Penrose's work on tiling and quasicrystals: A
thought that surfaces in consciousness is both one of many
previously unresolved alternatives (cf. the reduction of the
state-vector, and quantum computers), and the solution to a
problem, involving global interactions of a characteristically
quantum kind, as the growth of a quasicrystal might be (pp. 434-
39; 446).
For such a tour deforce, criticism of specific points is bound to
seem niggling. But better that than panegyric. And better
that than just scepticism about the speculations: That would be
no news to Penrose, who always expresses them cautiously. So I
take up two major, and then two minor, points.
First, I am not convinced that Penrose's "Godel" argument
against strong AI avoids the objections against his precursor,
John Lucas (1961). (Penrose cites some: I would urge adding
Lewis 1969; 1979.) Conscious of these objections, Penrose
makes a final attack (pp. 417-18). Transposing the argument to
Lucas's terms, it is: If Lucas's arithmetical output is that of a
Turing machine, then the machine table must be so complex
that Lucas cannot survey it to check that it delivers only truths.
(For if he could, then he could "defeat" his own table by
constructing its Godel proposition.) But this is incompatible
with the fact that in mathematics "we do not bow down to the
authority of some obscure rules that we can never hope to
understand. We must see that each step . . . can be reduced to
something simple and obvious." (p. 418) Contraposing, Penrose
denies that Lucas's arithmetical output is that of a Turing
machine. I reply: The "but" is a non sequitur. Unsurveyable
complexity of the machine table is, of course, compatible with
mathematics' rigourous standards of proof.
Penrose's second argument against strong AI is based on the
phenomenon of having "in a flash" a complex thought (pp. 418-
23); and his speculation that this is connected to state-vector
reduction and quasicrystals. Penrose is mainly concerned with
mathematical thoughts. Indeed, he eventually says that he takes
the essence of consciousness to be the "seeing" of such a
necessary truth as logic and mathematics provide (p. 445). This
use.of "consciousness," though unusual, would be harmless
were it not for the fact that Penrose briefly argues that other
phenomena more usually associated with "consciousness" are a
threat to strong AI, namely, qualia (pp. 14, 447), personal
identity, and indexicality (pp. 27, 409, 448). The brief treatment
of these threats engenders two problems. (1) You can get the
impression that Penrose's argument involves a unitary notion of
consciousness tying all these phenomena together. Not so: As
far as I can see, Penrose says nothing against the "divide and
rule" idea that "consciousness" is an umbrella term, all these
phenomena being logically, indeed nomically, independent.
That is, a being could have mathematical thoughts having
neither qualia nor indexical thoughts, and so on. (2) Since these
threats are much debated in the philosophical literature, Pen-
rose has an undefended flank: Might not the materialist philoso-
phers rebut his argument from the phenomenology of mathe-
matical insight, in much the way they rebut the argument from
qualia (e.g., Lewis 1990)?
Two minor points. (1) Whatever consciousness is, it is a non
sequitur to infer (p. 408) from its having evolved to its having a
selective advantage, and so an active role. It might be a neces-
sary or nomic concomitant of something with such advantage,
that imposes no or such little enough disadvantage as the weight
of a polar bear's warm coat (cf. Jackson 1982). (2) It is a non
sequitur to infer from the timelessness of mathematical truth to
there being no threat of causal paradox in the transmission of
mathematical beliefs, backward in time (p. 446). Even if the
truths are timeless, beliefs in them (and if distinct: their physical
correlates in brains) are in time. So such transmission threatens
paradox, as backward causation usually does. [See Libet: "Un-
conscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in
Voluntary Action" BBS 8(4) 1985.]
Computing the thinkable
David J. Chalmers
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405
Electronic mail: dave@cogsci.indiana.edu
The main thesis of Penrose's book is that mental processes might
be nonalgorithmic. There appear to be three different argu-
ments for this conclusion, which I will present in stripped-down
form.
1. Flie argument from introspection. (1) Some mental pro-
cesses are not algorithmic at a conscious level, therefore: (2)
Some mental processes are not algorithmic.
If this statement of the argument seems a little bald, it is
difficult to imagine what else might be meant by the numerous
appeals to "intuition" and "judgment" (pp. 411-15; 418-23). It
is clear that a premise is missing here. Penrose wishes to exclude
from the start the possibility of conscious mental processes that
are algorithmic at a level too low to be apparent to conscious
introspection. This is a dangerous assumption, as the recent
proliferation of connectionist models demonstrates. These mod-
els have made familiar the notion that the level at which a system
is algorithmic might fall well below the level at which the system
carries semantic interpretation (Smolensky 1988). It is not a
huge leap to image that in many systems, including the human
brain, the computational level might fall below the conscious
level
Connectionist models are not explicitly considered in the
book under review, but on the face of it they would seem to fall
into the class of "computational" models that Penrose would like
to dismiss. It would be interesting to see Penrose declare an
explicit position vis-a-vis these models. If he exempts them from
his criticisms, then the force of his critique of algorithmic
models is considerably weakened; if he wishes to dismiss these
models, too, his arguments will need to be considerably
strengthened.
It must be conceded that the connectionist approach has not
yet had much success in modelling the kind of temporally
extended processing, such as mathematical thought, that Pen-
rose considers. Nevertheless, other work within the "subsym-
bolic paradigm" has made some progress on these matters. In
particular, Mitchell and Hofstadter (1990) have produced an
interesting model of perception and analogical thought in an
abstract domain. In this model, high-level processes emerge
from the interaction of a number of small, low-level agents.
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Under the influence of various pressures, the model is able to
come up with "insights" that are similar in kind to those of a
mathematician. The high-level behavior of the model appears in
no sense algorithmic, -yet it emerges from a completely com-
putational substrate.
2. The argument from Gddel's theorem. (1) Humans can "see"
the truth of certain mathematical statements that lie outside the
bounds of any given formal system, therefore: (2) Human math-
ematical thought is not constrained by any given formal system.
This is an interesting variant on the argument of Lucas (1961).
Instead of focusing on the formal systems that specify a particu-
lar machine, Penrose (pp. 416-18) focuses on the formal systems
that might specify our mathematical thought. Because we have
the ability to "see" that the Godel sentence for a given system is
true, the argument runs, we are using processes outside the
system. On page 41.8, Penrose states: "When we convince
ourselves of the validity of Godel's theorem we not only 'see' it,
but by so doing we reveal the very nonalgorithmic nature of the
'seeing' process itself."
This seems fallacious. We do not have to invoke any mystical
processes to explain this step; we do not even have to invoke
consciousness, as Penrose suggests. The reason we can "see"
that Godel sentences are true is simply that we have a built-in
faith that our mathematical systems are consistent. It would not
be a difficult matter, in principle, to build such faith into an
algorithmic machine. (And if Penrose would wish to argue that,
unlike machines, humans can repeat the "Godelization" process
ad infinitum, ad transfinitum, the reply is that in practice the
Church-Kleene result on enumerating constructive ordinals
puts as many limitations on humans as it does on machines. We
are finite creatures, and we cannot continue to the ultimate
Omega.)
To gain his reductio of the notion of algorithmic thought,
Penrose postulates a single algorithm for determining mathe-
matical truth, shared by the mathematical community. Even to
one who believes that mind is algorithmic, this seems a little
strange. If we stay within the usual bounds of number theory,
analysis and the like, such an idea is perhaps plausible. As soon
as we move beyond these into more abstract strata of set theory
and logic, disagreement about "truth" becomes rife. Some
mathematicians "see" that the axiom of choice is true; others
"see" that it is false. Moving further out, the continuum hypoth-
esis and the axiom of constructibility are still more controversial.
If such a "universal" algorithm exists, it is a fuzzy thing indeed; it
becomes less and less universal the further we travel from the
commonplace. This fuzziness alone is enough to defeat Pen-
rose's argument: A fuzzy algorithm cannot be Godelized!
3. The argument from physical processes. (1) At the lowest
level, physical processes might not be algorithmically specifia-
ble. (2) Mental processes are dependent upon physical pro-
cesses, therefore: (3) Mental processes may be nonalgorithmic.
This is an ambitious argument, but one which must hold if
Penrose's other conclusions are to be sustained. It is nothing but
an attempt to subvert the force of Church's thesis about the
universality of algorithms. There are two clear weak spots. First,
even if (1) holds, it would still be far from clear that such
microscopic nonalgorithmicity should make any difference on a
macroscopic level. It seems plausible to hold that even if
electrons don't behave algorithmically, neurons still might.
Penrose acknowledges this gap, but does little to bridge it.
Second and more serious, it seems to me that Penrose has in fact
provided very little evidence for (1). He gives an impressive
demonstration of the nonclassical, nonintuitive nature of micro-
scopic physical phenomena, but he gives no clear justification of
why these things should have any bearing on their al-
gorithmicity. For example, physical processes may well be
nonlocal, but algorithms were never committed to locality in the
first place. Algorithmic specifications have many degrees of
freedom. Although the final verdict will be determined em-
pirically, I doubt that Church's thesis will give in easily.
The idea of algorithmic processing lies at the core of modern
cognitive science for good reason. Anyone who succeeds in
overthrowing this idea will have effected a deep conceptual
revolution in the way we think about the human mind. Penrose
has given it his best, and has written a fascinating book along the
way, but his arguments are a little thin for the weight they have
to bear.
Is mathematical insight algorithmic?
Martin Davis
Courant institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, New
York, NY 10012
Electronic mail: davism@csd11 .nyu.edu
Roger Penrose replies, "No," and bases much of his case on
Godel's incompleteness theorem: It is insight that enables us to
see that the Godel sentence, undecidable in a give formal system
is actually true; how could this insight possibly be the result of an
algorithm? This seemingly persuasive argument is deeply
flawed. To see why will require looking at Godel's theorem at a
somewhat more microscopic level than Penrose permits
himself.
It will be helpful (though not essential to our argument) to
place the discussion in terms of what is usually called first order
logic. This is just the formal system that embodies the elemen-
tary classical logic of and, or, not, implies, all, there exists. In a
precise formulation of first order logic, it is necessary to explain
when some particular formula F is to be taken to be a logical
consequence of a set of formulas ("premises") F. This can be
done in two essentially different ways: semantically and syntac-
tically. In the semantic version, F is a logical consequence of F if
F is true no matter how the extra-logical symbols appearing in F
and F are interpreted, so long as all the formulas in F are true
under that same interpretation. (Metaphorically: F is true in
every Platonic world in which the formulas of F are true.) In the
syntactic version, "rules of proof' involving the straightforward
manipulation of symbols are specified, and F is said to be a
logical consequence of F if F can be obtained from F by some
finite number of applications of those rules (Penrose, p. 104
gives some samples of such rules). In Godel's 1929 doctoral
dissertation, he establishes his famous completeness theorem,
which states that the semantic and the syntactic versions are
equivalent. Moreover, this equivalence is largely independent
of the detailed manner in which rules of proof are specified.
Godel's completeness theorem answered a question Hilbert
had posed in his address at the Bologna mathematical congress
of 1928. Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem for first order logic
was also raised in 1928 (in the famous textbook by Hilbert &
Ackermann (1928), not at the Bologna conference as Penrose
asserts), and called "the fundamental problem of mathematical
logic." The problem was to give an algorithm for deciding
whether a given formula was a logical consequence (in the
semantic sense) of a given (finite) set of premises. Hilbert
singled out first order logic for this attention presumably be-
cause it seemed clear that all mathematical reasoning could in
principle be carried out in this formalism.l For the premises one
takes an appropriate set of mathematical axioms; a mathematical
theorem is then simply a logical consequence in first order logic
of those axioms. Since an argument based on the rules of proof of
first order logic can be checked in a completely algorithmic way,
we have no trouble understanding why mathematicians should
agree about proofs (p. 417) so long as they agree about the
axioms (and so long as these axioms are finite in number or at
least are specified by an algorithm).
In this context, Godel's incompleteness theorem (in a
strengthened form based on work of J. B. Rosser as well as the
solution of Hilbert's tenth problem) may be stated as follows:
There is an algorithm that, given any consistent set of axioms,
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will output a polynomial equation P = 0, which in fact has no
integer solutions, although this fact cannot be deduced from the
given axioms.
Here then is the true but unprovable Code! sentence on
which Penrose relies and in a particularly simple form at that.
Note that the sentence is provided by an algorithm. If'insight is
involved, it must be in convincing oneself that the given axioms
are indeed consistent, since otherwise we will have no reason to
believe that the Godel sentence is true. But here things are
quite murky: Great logicians (Frege, Curry, Church, Qulne,
Rosser) have managed to propose quite serious systems of logic
which later have turned out to be inconsistent. "Insight" didn't
help. New axioms are just as problematical as new physical
theories, and their eventual acceptance is on similar grounds. If
the underlying axioms are just the elementary axioms for the
arithmetic of natural numbers (Peano's arithmetic), then the
consistency is readily proved by unproblematical mathematical
methods (which however, by Godefs result, must go beyond
what can be done with these axioms). In this case, we can indeed
have confidence that the corresponding equation f = 0 has no
solutions. If the underlying axioms are what are known as ZFC
(Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory), axioms known to be adequate for
all ordinary mathematics, most mathematicians today would
accept that the corresponding P = 0 has no solutions, but hardly
on the basis of a sudden insight. Confidence in ZFC has devel-
oped slowly over almost a century. If ZFC is augmented by
various axioms that have been proposed (e.g., axioms asserting
the existence of very large infinite sets or the so-called axiom of
projective determinacy), most experts would be very cautious
about accepting that the corresponding P = 0 had no solutions.
There is certainly room for disagreement about whether the
processes by which mathematical (or physical) theories are
developed and accepted are algorithmic. Godel's theorem has
nothing decisive to contribute to the discussion, however.
A final comment on the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Penrose calls the process by which classical Hamiltonians are
converted into the corresponding quantized versions by replac-
ing real "observables" by operators as "genuine magic which
works" (p. 288). I have speculated elsewhere (Davis 1977) that
another contribution of modem logic from Gaise Takeuti, and
ultimately going back to the seminal ideas of the Norwegian
logician Thoralf Skolem, is what is needed to make sense of this
"magic."
NOTE
1. It is only in this case that Peerose is justified in somewhat loosely
defining the Entscheidungsproblem as referring to "all the problems of
mathematics" (p. 34). Penrose's conflation of the Entscheidungs-
problem with Hilbert's 10th problem of 1900, which merely asked for an
algorithm for the solvability of Diophantine equations, is likewise
justified after the fact: It is a corollary of the methods used to give a
negative solution to Hilbert's tenth problem that the question of
whether any given Turing machine will eventually halt, and hence the
Entscheidungsproblem, can be encoded as a Diophantine problem
(Davis et al. 1976). Of course, Hilbert In 1900 could hardly have
imagined such a thing.
life on an algorithm
Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155
What minds can do, Penrose claims, is to see or judge that
certain mathematical propositions are true by "Insight" rather
than mechanical proof- Penrose then argues that there could be
no algorithm, or at any rate no practical algorithm, for Insight.
This Ignores an Independently plausible possibility: The al-
gorithms that minds use for judging mathematical truth are not
algorithms "for" Insight - but they nevertheless work very well.
Consider a parallel argument. Chess is a finite game, so there
is an algorithm "for" either checkmate or draw: the brute force
algorithm that draws the entire decision tree for chess and works
backwards from the last nodes. That algorithm surely is not
practical. Probably there Is no practical algorithm "for" check-
mate. There are plenty of practical algorithms that achieve
checkmate with great reliability, however. They are the chess-
playing programs and although none Is mathematically guaran-
teed to achieve checkmate against any opponent, you could
safely bet your life that the best of them will always achieve
checkmate against me (for Instance). There are algorithms for
playing legal chess - that Is guaranteed mathematically. Check-
mate is an unprovable bonus, but It Is not a gift out of the blue. It
is to be explained In terms of the relative cunning of these
chance-taking algorithms. Aside from sheer speed, no other
properties of a chess-playing computer - its material composi-
tion or genealogy, for instance — would be relevant to its power
to achieve checkmate.
The following argument Is therefore fallacious:
1. X Is superbly capable of achieving Y (e.g., checkmate).
2. There Is no practical algorithm for achieving Y. therefore
3. X's power to achieve Y is not explicable In terms of any
algorithm.
Therefore, even if mathematicians are superb recognizers of
mathematical truth, and even if there is no algorithm, practical
or otherwise, "for" recognizing mathematical truth, it does not
follow that the power of mathematicians to recognize mathe-
matical truth Is not entirely explicable in terms of their brains
executing one or another garden-variety algorithm. Not an
algorithm "for" Intuiting mathematical truth - for the sake of the
argument, I will grant to Penrose that there can be no such
algorithm — but an algorithm for something else. What? Most
plausibly it would be an algorithm - one of many — for trying to
stay alive, an algorithm that, by an extraordinarily convoluted
and indirect generation of byproducts, "happened" to be a
superb (but not foolproof) recognizer of friends, enemies, food,
shelter, harbingers of spring, good arguments - and mathe-
matical truths.
Chess programs, like all heuristic algorithms, are designed to
take chances, and therein lies their vulnerability in principle.
What are the limits of vulnerable-in-principle probabilistic
algorithms running on a parallel architecture such as the human
brain? Penrose neglects to provide any argument to show what
those limits are; hence he fails to cut off the most plausible rival
interpretation of the mathematicians' prowess, on which his
whole case depends. Notice that It Is not a question of what the
in-principle limits of algorithms are; those are simply Irrelevant
In a biological setting. To put it provocatively, an algorithm may
"happen" to achieve this 999 times out of 1,000, in jig time. This
prowess would fall outside its official limits (since you cannot
prove, mathematically, that It will not run forever without an
answer or else give a false answer), but It might nevertheless be
prowess you could bet your life on. Mother Nature's creatures
do it every day.
Sometimes Penrose suggests that what human mathemati-
cians do is something that could not even be approximated by a
heuristic, mistake-prone algorithm, since mathematicians (in
principle? always?) settle into a consistent shared view. If they
make a mistake, they can (will?) always correct it. Is this
supposed to be an Independently confirmable empirical prem-
ise? This could not be proven mathematically, of course, for
such consistency proofs of oneself (or oneselves acting in con-
cert) are ruled out by the very mathematical results Penrose
relies on. He can perhaps fervently believe, and assert, that the
joint or Ideal Mathematician Is consistent and capable (in princi-
ple) of Intuiting every mathematical truth (and no falsehoods),
but he cannot hope to persuade those of us who find this an
unlikely and unmotivated dogma by offering a mathematical
proof, and there seems every empirical reason for simply
disbelieving It. Penrose's envisaged revolution In physics
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may happen, but not - so far as- I can see - because it is
needed to explain any fact or phenomenon of human mental
powers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This commentary Is a revision of material contained in my review of
Penrese's hook (Dennett 1989, pp. 1055i).
Pereeptiwe questions about computation
Jon Doyle
Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA 02139
Electronic mail: "Doyle@zermattJcs.mit.edu
Roger Penrose's book offers the reader a valuable perspective on
the nature of physical reality and some of its possible implica-
tions'for" AI, computation, and the philosophy of mind. It Is
worth reading for the survey of physics alone. But the point of
the book is to dispute the Idea that "our thinking Is basically the
same as the action of some very complicated computer" (p. 447)
by giving two arguments (one from observation, the other from
physics) for the claim that "the conscious mind cannot work like
a computer, even though much of what Is actually Involved In
mental activity might do so" (his emphasis; p. 448). This brief
review confines attention to these two arguments. Though we
find that our knowledge of physics and .psychology Is not yet
complete enough to tell whether conscious mental processes are
computable, one of the great virtues of this book Is that It raises
this question technically, clearly, and unavoidably.
Penrose's primary argument is that conscious thought In-
volves seeing or Intuiting necessary (mathematical) truths, and
that mathematical truth is not formallzable, hence It cannot be
determined by computers. He claims that mathematicians have
direct access to mathematical truth since many mathematicians
(myself Included) have the distinctive experience of mentally
"seeing" mathematical objects laid out as landscape before
them.
Penrose's argument fails to differentiate the ultimate powers
of people and machines because the relevant limitation of
computers Is that they cannot determine all mathematical
truths, not that they cannot determine any. As Penrose admits,
however, even the mathematician's conceptual vision Is limited:
Not all truths are visible. Such limitations are not surprising,
since most individual mathematical truths could not even be
written down using paper the size of the universe and characters
the size of protons. Penrose notes that mathematicians can use
the method of reflection to resolve particular questions left open
by specific formal theories, that Is, by observing the results and
limitations of the theories. He seems to think that such in-
ferences are not mechanizable. But many of these reflective
observations, which are epistemologically similar to observa-
tions of objects in the physical environment, can be automated
as easily as ordinary deduction rules. (The problem Penrose
cites of choosing the right reflections to perform is, as a practical
matter, not more difficult than the problem of choosing the right
ordinary Inferences to draw. Both choices can be difficult.) If we
are to suppose that Ideal mathematicians can discover recur-
sively enumerable sets of truths derived from finite sets of
axioms, axiom schema, and Inference rules, Including reflection
principles, we must suppose that computers can do this, too.
Penrose believes humans are not limited to enumerable
truths, however, and presents a reductio ad absurdum as the
crux of his argument that mathematical Insight Is not al-
gorithmic. In short, the assumption that mathematical under-
standing Is captured by some formal system conflicts with our
ability to recognize the truth of a Godel sentence unprovable In
that system. The critical hypothesis of Penrose's argument Is
that all mathematicians agree on a notion of mathematical truth
and that this shared notion of truth does not change as they learn
and reflect on proofs. But the only support he provides for this
hypothesis Is that mathematicians will generally agree on proofs
once they learn of them (whether by thought or by communica-
tion): "When we comprehend them [mathematical demonstra-
tions], their truth Is clear and agreed by all" (p. 418, emphasis
added). But this hardly rules out mathematical understanding
evolving with new Information and experience In universal,
even algorithmic, ways. If this is possible (and It Is almost an
accepted axiom In studies of machine learning), there Is no
reason to assume that the formal system used to contemplate a
Godel sentence Is still the one the sentence is about, and the
argument falls apart. Indeed, intuitionist mathematicians con-
tend that changes (not necessarily algorithmic ones) do occur In
mathematical understanding, and Penrose's explicit dismissal of
their views seems to beg the question. Perhaps the great and
clear limitations of human mathematical vision are less limiting
than the limitations suffered by computers, but Penrose does
not demonstrate this.
Penrose's secondary argument for his thesis Is Indirect. He
argues that thinking is the activity of physical brains, and
nothing In the laws of physics as we understand them today
ensures that this sort of physical activity Is computable. His
argument consists of a lengthy but superb survey of the major
physical theories in which he points out the numerous ways they
do not guarantee computabllity (or even determinism and lo-
cality). Penrose's silence on the topic of relative computabllity
(that Is, algorithms over operations other than Turing machine
steps) Is especially disappointing here, because his Ideas suggest
attempting to design specific physical mechanisms that real-
ize simple Turing-uncomputable functions (for example, that
solve Diophantine equations) for use as "oracles" by digital
computers.
One negd not accept Penrose's more speculative suggestions
about physical reality to realize that there Is a real possibility
that brain dynamics are not computable. Penrose does not
demonstrate that brain dynamics are actually uncomputable,
however, and even if they are uncomputable, he does not
demonstrate that this entails uncomputabillty of any mental
processes. The differential equations describing a flip-flop, for
example, are probably uncomputable, but the digital computa-
tions performed by some systems built from flip-flops are per-
fectly computable nonetheless.
The book exhibits several minor flaws. Contrary to Penrose's
belief, AI does employ most of the steps of cognitive processes
he Identifies as reasonable (Including reflection and highly
limited forms of "consciousness"), and his argument that human
judgment is nonalgorithmlc falls to compel because it does not
restrict use of "nonalgorithmlc" to the technical sense of "no
algorithm exists," but mingles this sense with senses Involving
feasibility, discoverability, and comprehensibility.
Even though his main claim remains unsubstantiated, Pen-
rose deserves our thanks for writing this book about the physical
basis of psychology and computation. It Is rare for a single book
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Penrose has produced an accessible, Information-packed com-
pilation over a wide-ranging selection of difficult topics. One
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could not help but praise his lucid exposition, were it not for his
puzzling commitment to characterize, in an anecdotal style,
certain such ill-defined phenomena as intuition and creativity as
being nonalgorithmic. To gather support for this claim, the book
lists a number of mathematical models for physical and com-
putational processes that inevitably fail to model the world when
pushed past their limits. In a scientific tradition, classical theo-
ries are eventually labelled approximations to more general
explanatory mechanisms which underlie a more global struc-
ture; but ideally, both are equivalent within a certain domain.
Penrose seems to imply that a similar transformation will inev-
itably befall "computation" as a model of cognition. He argues
that, while some parts of our mind function like computer
programs, there is a higher level, which must be described as
nonalgorithmic.
"Strong AI" researchers are committed to the idea that
algorithms represent the way flexible behaviours can be exhib-
ited by a system and implemented in its fixed physical architec-
ture. This commits them to descriptions that involve operations
and transformations on internal representations, formed by
inputs, internal states, and rules that specify the transitions
between these states. "Intelligence," in this view, is a charac-
teristic of the semantic level of the algorithms. It is a property of
a computational process implemented on a physical symbol
system (c£ Newell 1980; Pylyshyn 1984).
There is another well-accepted principle in strong AI: the
utility of abstract levels of representation, cf. Albus (1981);
Saltzman (1979); Simon (1973). The universe may have a single
objective structure, but we cannot fully represent it because of
our limited resources and its vast complexity. The choice of
attributes that can be applied to any single conceivable object is
immense! An agent can therefore make only partial observations
over an accessible range of arbitrary qualities and detail. It can
also strive to observe "invariants and regularities" in these input
data. They are processed by operations which seek to extract
information relevant to the tasks of the system, requiring high-
er-level representations that encode the agent's goals and be-
liefs. This stratification of data types might begin with abstrac-
tions of the properties of local coherence across a sensory
manifold, but it can include more abstract relations that encode
qualities not tied to local physical properties. The freedom to
develop these functional relationships between abstract data
types permits an agent to represent a rich variety of concepts.
In addition, because of noise and ambiguities in the measure-
ment process, there are inherent uncertainties about the rela-
tionship between the external world and its internal representa-
tion. An agent must therefore act to reduce the uncertainty
associated with these abstract internal models. Multiple obser-
vations over space and time can reduce this uncertainty as
additional information is made available. Such techniques make
up much of the current literature in computational perception.
In robotics, low-level control systems are designed with the
goal of minimising the difference between measurements of an
external physical process and an internal representation of a
desired state-space trajectory. The transitions between these
states are usually given by differential equations that describe a
model of the system in its environment. If these internal laws
are incapable of accurately and tractably modelling a more
general world, its inherent metric structure is not useful. What
remains, however, can be described as a network of discrete
event transitions, preserving the topology of the original prob-
lem space (cf. Caines et al. 1989). This is an example where a
continuous problem, specified by an abstract differentiable
manifold, has a higher abstract level that preserves its topology.
A category of logical control can be specified on this space,
retaining its deterministic (namely, algorithmic) character.
Within the framework of strong-AI, intormation is pur-
posefully processed by transformations on internal representa-
tions, at the level where models exist as symbolic data struc-
tures. The algorithmic nature of this type of information
processing is limited by the tractibility of a problem. If the
environment becomes too complex, it is appropriate to design a
method that allows additional direction to be provided from a
supervisory level. They are manipulated and transformed by
algorithms represented at this level by rules, and implemented
on the cognitive architecture. Consciousness might be viewed
by strong AI proponents as being at an abstract level higher than
logical operations applied to symbolic pointers to representa-
tions of objects in the world, but they would still regard this
level as having a formal representational structure (see Newell
1982). From the limited perspective of a lower level, this higher
level of control can only be regarded as mysterious goals and
beliefs, or perhaps heuristics. They would still be algorithmic
over a different category of more abstract symbol structures,
however.
Penrose contends that there is something unsatisfying about
an algorithmic description of the mind's function, but his anec-
dotes have exactly this unsatisfying quality. Mathematical in-
sight and "flashes of intuition" require that a person have
considerable experience in a subject and thereby have very
elegant mental structures for manipulating complex ex-
pressions. It should not be surprising that once appropriate
relationships between these internal structures have been iden-
tified, it is almost a mechanistic exercise to report the results
mathematically by finding the most descriptive sentences in
terms of the rales and procedures of mathematical literature.
"Self-awareness" may similarly be posited as a property of
recursive computational functions.
Penrose's arguments amounts to regarding classical symbol-
manipulation as having a higher level, but one that is devoid of
an algorithmic structure. In this case, it would have no rules that
describe how within-level processes should purposefully be
directed to make internal models based on observations of the
world. He fails to describe the way these higher levels are
supposed to function nonalgorithmically, other than to propose
some form of quantum mechanical model of the mind. As Bell
(1986) has argued, quantum logic behaves as a logical system in
which the order of introduction of premises is not commutative.
Thus, a system that relies on quantum logic to reduce NP-
complete problems to linearly tractable ones must first have
induced a partial ordering on the premise space. Even if such a
model were indeed appropriate, Penrose's "little finger" should
support the strong AI view, and speak out against it being a
nondeterministic system.
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Phfsics of brain-mind interaction
John C. Eccles
CH 6646 Contra (Tl) Switzerland
I commend this challenging book that opens up new vistas on
this fundamental problem. It is the first time to my knowledge
that a mathematician-physicist has become dedicated to the
study of the human brain. It is certain that the conceptual
advances in the brain-mind problem can be accomplished only
by those who have a deep understanding of the brain, not in all
its immense multifarious detail, but by concentration on that
component, the cerebral cortex, that is becoming generally
recognized as the cerebral structure that may be exclusively
concerned in the experiences of consciousness in all of its
manifestations. The centrencephalic (brain-stem) center of con-
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sciousness (p. 382), for example, has been eliminated by the
Sperry experiments on commissurotomy patients (pp. 384-86).
My review can begin with Penrose's question on page 402: "Is
our picture of a world governed by the rules of classical and
quantum theory, as these rules are presently understood, really
adequate for the description of brains and minds?"
My reaction is that we have to go on scientifically and philo-
sophically, and we can be greatly encouraged by the progress.
There are of course many blind alleys that have enormous
attraction to computer technologists, notably the artificial intel-
ligence machines. I agree with Penrose's general rejection of
such models of intelligence and consciousness. A related project
is to study the properties of assumed neuronal networks, which
can be modelled by computer technology, and that may even
give an opening to robotics. There is of course no doubt about
the almost infinite complexity of neural networks that could be
constructed on the basis of the known connectivity of neurons of
the cerebral cortex. It is assumed that consciousness emerges
from the immensity of cerebral connectivities. Many neuro-
scientists have optimistically developed concepts of this type to
which we have given names, as listed in my paper (Eccles 1986):
holistic configurations; distributed neuronal systems; phasic
cyclic reentrant signals; dynamic patterns of superstructures;
extremely complex dynamic systems of interaction. No clear
theory has been developed showing how consciousness could
emerge in such systems, however. So consciousness has re-
mained enigmatic neuroscientifically.
Penrose (p. 405) raises the searching question: "What selec-
tive advantage does a consciousness confer . . . ?" With him I
reject panpsychism with its belief in consciousness of inanimate
objects and lowly organized life. We have to recognize, how-
ever, that higher animals have some conscious feelings resem-
bling simpler versions of what we experience. I would propose
that no cerebral system can integrate the immense diversity that
is generated by the analytical operation of the cerebral systems,
as for example, in all of the prestriate visual cortex of the higher
mammals. Yet we know that it is integrated in our unified
perceptual experience of the visual world. It is integrated in the
mind and apparently not in the brain, as in the mythical'
"grandmother cell" (p. 388). So the higher animals would have a
unified conscious experience from moment to moment, which
would be highly advantageous in evolution.
In this respect it is important to distinguish between the
consciousness enjoyed by such higher animals as mammals and
birds, and the self-consciousness unique to humans. Penrose
writes most eloquently on page 406 of the immense diversity
and wonder of consciousness and particularly of self-con-
sciousness. Sherrington (1940) gives a rare poetic vision of self-
conscious experiences. I quote Popper (1977, p. 120): "The self
observes and takes action at the same time. It is acting and
suffering, recalling the past, and planning and programming the
future; expecting and disposing. It contains in quick succession
or all at once, wishes, plans, hopes, decisions to act, and a vivid
consciousness of being an acting self, a center of action."
One of the most important properties of self-conscious beings
is that they ask questions, and so continuously search for under-
standing. This wonderful human attribute begins as early as l j
years with incipient human language. And of course it goes on
throughout life. At the higher levels it is the basis of human
achievement in science, as Penrose recognizes. In all these
attributes, human beings are not to be compared with even the
most complex artificial intelligence machines that do not know
what they do or why they do it - because they do not ask
questions! Only self-conscious beings ask questions. That re-
lates to Penrose's claim (p. 412) that it is this ability to "divine (or
intuit) truth from falsity (and beauty from ugliness!) in appropri-
ate circumstances that is the hallmark of consciousness." As
Penrose states (p. 4.12), there is no clear algorithmic process for
the insightful handling of the morass of data we are confronted
with in real life situations including scientific discoveries.1
NOTE
1. In the sections headed, "Is there a role for quantum mechanics in
brain activity" (p. 400) and "Beyond quantum theory," there is much of
great interest to me; I think I can help in the understanding of the
important questions that Penrose raises in these sections. I have
recently developed a unitary theory of brain-mind interaction in which
quantum physics plays a key role. The initial publication was Eccles
(1986), and a much more developed theory is coming out in (Eccles
1990) The theory I offer is specially related to the title of my contribu-
tion, "Physics of brain-mind interaction" and -to many sections in
Chapters 9 and 10 of Penrose's book.
Strong Al and the problem
of "second-order" algorithms
Gerd Gigerenzer
Department of Psychology, Universitat Konstanz, West Germany
Electronic mail: sygiger3@dnkurz1 .bitnet
"In my childhood we were always assured that the brain was a
telephone switchboard ('What else could it be?')," recalls John
Searle (1984, p. 44). Children today are likely to be told that the
mind is a computer program. Roger Penrose, slipping back into
the role of the child who dares to question, rejects the "strong
Al" claim that "mental activity is simply the carrying out of some
well-defined sequence of operations, frequently referred to as
an algorithm" (p. 17). Penrose argues "that the decision as to
the validity of an algorithm is not itself an algorithmic process!"
(p. 414). Let us call these hypothetical algorithm-checking
algorithms, "second-order" algorithms. Penrose cites Turing's
proof that no algorithm exists for deciding the question of
whether or not Turing machines will actually stop (i. e., whether
algorithms will actually work). In this comment, I will add
several thoughts of a more pointedly psychological sort that
support Penrose's mathematical argument.
Scientific inference. Inference in science (e.g., from data to
hypothesis) is a mental activity in which algorithms actually
exist. Various statistical (e.g., Bayesian, Fisherian, Neyraan-
Pearsonian) and nonstatistical (e.g., Platt's strong inference)
algorithms have been proposed. As is well known, there is little
consensus among philosophers, probabilists, and scientists as to
which (formal) algorithm applies to which type of (semantic)
problem, or whether to use a statistical algorithm at all
(Gigerenzer et al. 1989). (There are, however, such "rituals" as
the mechanical null hypothesis testing that goes on in some
social sciences.) That is, algorithms for scientific inference exist,
but there is no "second-order" algorithm for choosing among
them. The basic reason for this disagreement is that the problem
of inductive inference has no single solution that commands
consensus - it has many, competing ones. Indeed, there is no
agreement as to whether the problem has a single solution (even
in principle). In our current (and perhaps permanent) state of
controversy over this question, there is no algorithm for choos-
ing among algorithms - but scientists nonetheless do somehow
choose, and with considerable success. Nor are our choices
merely blunt expressions of taste - you like Neyman/Pearson
and vanilla, I like Fisher and chocolate, who knows why? We
argue with one another, offer reasons for our choices, and
sometimes even persuade one another.
Concept ambiguity* An algorithm (a Turing machine) is purely
syntactical: It specifies, for instance, that if a machine is in a
certain state and has a certain symbol on its tape, then the
machine will perform a certain operation such as erasing a
symbol on the tape and enter another state. The mind, however,
has a semantics, too. In many problems (ones that do not deal
with well-defined artifacts) that the mind has to handle, there is
no simple one-to-one correspondence between a formal concept
and a semantic concept. Here, ambiguity first has to be resolved
before an algorithm can be put to work - and such judgments
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depend heavily on content and context rather than on formal
structure. Can a formal algorithm resolve this ambiguity in the
way humans do?
Consider a judge who is a Bayesian and computes the proba-
bility that a suspect actually committed a crime by an algorithm
known as Bayes' rule. One formal concept in this algorithm is
the suspect's prior probability (of having committed the crime
in question), which needs to be semantically interpreted in each
individual case. The ambiguity is not only in the precise number
of that probability, but in the kind of reference class from which
this probability should be taken. Each suspect is always a
member of many (usually, an infinite number of) reference
classes (e.g., single parents, young urban professionals, weight
lifters) — and all of them may have widely divergent prior
probabilities. From time to time, new, never before thought of
reference classes may emerge - for example, after the discovery
of a new drug whose use is correlated with a certain kind of
crime. Although our Bayesian judge's reasoning contains an
algorithm, as we assumed, the judge also has to assess relevance:
which reference class to choose, and which others to ignore. It is
hard to see how these judgments can be made mechanically by a
"second-order" algorithm.
Structural ambiguity. Probabilistic algorithms are based on
several structural assumptions (e.g., independence) that must
hold in the relevant part of the real world if the algorithm is to be
applied validly. Textbook applications, such as "urns-and-mar-
bles" problems, are contrived so that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the structural assumptions of an al-
gorithm and the structure of the problem at hand. Beyond
textbook problems, however, we must confront ambiguity
about structural correspondence (Gigerenzer & Murray 1987,
Chapter 5). Consider the following stories that illustrate how
important it is for the mind to check structural assumptions and
resolve this ambiguity.
1. You live in Palo Alto. Today you must choose between two
alternatives: to buy a BMW or a Jaguar. You use only one
criterion for that choice, the car's life expectancy. You have
information from a test sample of 100 BMWs and 100 Jaguars, of
which 75% and 50%, respectively, lasted longer than 10 years.
Just yesterday your neighbor told you that her new BMW broke
down. Nevertheless, in your reasoning, your neighbor's case
decreases the BMW's prior probability only slightly, from .75 to
about .74. So you go ahead and buy a BMW.
It is easy to specify an algorithm for this kind of decision-
making. Now look at the same problem, but with a different
content.
2. You live in a jungle. Today you must choose between two
alternatives: to let your child swim in the river, or to let it climb
trees instead. You use only one criterion for that choice, your
child's life expectancy. You have information that in the last 100
years there was only one accident in the river, in which a child
was eaten by a crocodile, whereas a dozen children have been
killed by falling from trees. Just yesterday your neighbor told
you that her child was eaten by a crocodile.
If, in your reasoning, the same algorithm is applied again,
your neighbor's testimony would make little difference: The
prior probability of a fatal accident in the river would increase
only slightly, from one to two cases in 100 years. The algorithmic
mind would probably send the child to the river. The mind of a
parent, however, might use the new information to reject the
old algorithm, rather than to apply the old algorithm to the new
information. The parental mind may suspect that the small river
world has changed - crocodiles may now inhabit the river. The
updating of prior probabilities may no longer make sense, since
the events (being eaten or not) can no longer be considered as
independent random drawings from the same reference class. A
structural assumption of the algorithm no longer seems to hold.
From now on, many children may be eaten.
I do not know of any "second-order" algorithm -that is capable
of performing this checking of structural assumptions of al-
gorithms in the same way the human mind does and with similar
ease. Can an algorithm be sufficient to judge whether one and
the same information (your neighbor's report) is to be in-
terpreted as an entry to a computation or as a rejection of exactly
the same computation? Even for this simplistic structural prob-
lem - two alternatives, only one criterion - there seems to be no
general algorithm that can compute for all possible contents (and
there are infinitely many more besides cars and crocodiles)
whether the mind uses the prior probability updating algorithm .
or not. Nevertheless, in individual cases, we may well be able to
make an unequivocal judgment. This situation is analogous to
the Turing proof: There is no general algorithm that can com-
pute whether algorithms ever stop, but in the individual case we
can immediately "see" the answer.
Throughout this discussion I accepted Penrose's view that a
large part of human thinking is indeed algorithmic, and added
some psychological reflections to his argument that the decision
as to the validity of an algorithm is, at least in part, non-
algorithmic. This is not to say that I do believe that most human
thinking, be it "second-order" or "first-order," is solely al-
gorithmic. Even if the result of thinking can be simulated by an
algorithm, this does not imply that the process of thinking is
algorithmic, as John Searle has repeatedly pointed out. If there
is a computer algorithm that simulates perfectly the time shown
by a mechanical clock, this does not imply that the mechanism
by which the clock quantifies time is indeed computing. And
whereas AI workers can be content with applications that work -
a computer that tells time - we psychologists are still responsi-
ble for taking apart the ticking clock.
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't ask Plato about the emperor's mind
Alan Garnham
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton
BN1 9QG, England
Electronic mail: alang@epvax.sussex.ac.uk
Why are so many mathematicians Platonists? In part because
the standard alternatives are implausible or otherwise unaccept-
able, and in part because Platonism appears to solve at least one
of two fundamental puzzles about mathematics - Penrose be-
lieves it solves both. The alternatives to Platonism are for-
malism, which in its Hilbertian form foundered on the rock of
Godel's theorem, and intuitionism. Intuitionism, as espoused
by Brouwer, is unacceptable to most mathematicians both
because it is tainted with psychologism and because it pro-
scribes proofs that they are happy to accept. The two puzzles
are: that mathematicians agree about what follows from a set of
postulates, even though no single mathematician can work
through all their consequences, and that mathematics, in Pen-
rose's "SUPERB" theories, accurately describes the physical
world. Platonism explains agreement among mathematicians by
claiming that they have access to the same Platonic realm. Given
Penrose's skillful debunking of fallacious arguments in the
physical sciences, I was disappointed that he missed the obvious
flaw in this idea. What is crucial is that mathematicians agree in
practice. The Platonic realm can be important only insofar as it
determines how mathematicians work. They must be guided in
the same way by the Platonic forms. So Platonism "explains"
agreement among mathematicians by the more obscure idea of
agreement in interpreting the Platonic realm. Similarly, Pen-
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rose's Identification of the real and Platonic worlds does nothing
to explain the application of mathematics.
The rejection of Platonism suggests that mathematical con-
cepts exist only in the minds of mathematicians. It is difficult to
find a way between these two unpalatable alternatives, but
Wittgenstein's (1967) much misunderstood later philosophy of
mathematics suggests one. Brouwer's role in Wittgenstein's
return to philosophy has led to Wittgenstein's identification as
an intuitionist or a ftnltist, though he clearly rejected Brouwer's
psychologism. A crucial aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy of
mathematics is his recognition that, In one sense, explanation
ends with the fact of agreement In practice. There cannot be an
explanation of this agreement of the kind that a Plotonist seeks.
This Idea explains why Wittgenstein appears hostile to founda-
tional work. His primary concern is with what the results of that
work mean, however. For example, if Godel had shown there
was no consistent basis for mathematics, his proof would have
had no consequences for everyday activities of counting, weigh-
ing, and so on, because the practices and the agreement in them
are so well established. Similarly, Wittgenstein did not neces-
sarily wish to proscribe proofs based on excluded middle, which
are an established part of mathematics. Rather, he was con-
cerned with how such proofs should be Interpreted.
Wittgenstein also argued that agreement In mathematical
practice can no more be explained by saying mathematicians
follow rules than by saying they have access to the Platonic
realm. Rules have to be interpreted, and there must be agree-
ment In the practice of their Interpretation. This agreement is
largely the result of training - witness Ramanujan's errors in his
early work, despite his prodigious talent. Particularly when
rules are straightforward, trained mathematicians will not, as a
matter of fact, disagree about even "remote" consequences of
those rules, perhaps derived by computer - hence the Man-
delbrot set. Hence, also, the proof of the four-color theorem,
which at first appears to fall foul of Wittgenstein's demand for
Ubersichtlichkeit.
In addition to Platonism, Penrose espouses realism with
regard to the physical world and a realist semantics for natural
language. Evidence for the physical reality of the theoretical
constructs of quantum mechanics, for example, is simply the
evidence that supports the theory, however. One can see
(psychological) reasons why physicists might deny reality to
quantum states — their difference from classical states, which are
more plausibly real physically, and the absence of an Intuitively
satisfying quantum mechanical world view. But because quan-
tum mechanics may be superseded by a theory that preserves its
predictions but not Its theoretical constructs, there Is little of
substance at stake.
For the semantics of natural language, realism Is as Inade-
quate a foundation as Platonism Is for mathematics. Language
use also depends on agreement In practice, though agreement
among language users is not nearly as close as It is among
mathematicians. For example, I was sorely perplexed to dis-
cover that a good friend and I drew the boundary between blue
and green in very different places. The agreement In practice
necessary for concepts to be useful Is established with reference
to clear examples. So although the concepts of "personal Identi-
ty" and "thinking," for example, apply straightforwardly to
everyday cases, there may or may not be agreement about how
they apply In new situations. Realism suggests that there are
preordained answers to the questions of whether teleportation
preserves personal Identity and whether (or under what circum-
stances) a machine can think. Because explanations are purpose-
relative, however, new uses of concepts In those explanations
may be affected by a variety of considerations. For example,
disagreements about research using fetuses are primarily moral
In nature, and moral considerations rather than factual ones
have determined the way concepts such as "living" and "per-
son" have been applied differently by protagonists on the two
sides, In situations that did not previously arise.
Fortunately, It will not be Important to decide whether
machines think or whether they merely simulate thinking until
they behave more like people, Scarle's strong AI is at present
Irrelevant to an antirealist. If a computer types out sentences, It
may sometimes be convenient to treat them as utterances rather
than as descriptions of utterances, In a way that It is never
convenient to treat the output of an economic simulation as the
economic state of a country. But this way of speaking Is nothing
more than a useful expository device, given the current ca-
pabilities of computers.
Consciousness Is another concept that people generalize from
paradigm cases in different ways. There are many problems with
Penrose's analysis, but I will make just one comment on his
claim that "the hallmark of consciousness Is a nonalgorithmlc
forming of judgements" (p. 413). Consider the Godel statement
for a formal system. As Penrose points out (p. 107), we know the
statement Is true from our knowledge of Its meaning. According
to the mental models theory 0ohnson-Laird 1983), everyday
reasoning is of this meaning-based kind. Indeed, Johnson-Laird
has modeled the procedures that carry out meaning-based
reasoning In computer programs. But just as many logics can be
characterized model-theoretically, but not proof-theoretically,
those procedures are almost certainly not decision procedures
for everyday problems. Nevertheless, there Is no reason why
these procedures should not run on computers (they do), or why
they should not produce insightful solutions, or why a machine
running them should be conscious..
material
s mind?
David L. Gilcfen and Joseph S. Lappin
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240
Electronic mail: giiden@vuctrvax.hitnet or lappinjs@vuctrvax.bitnet
In his search for the material fiber of the "emperor's
 snew mind,"
Roger Penrose reveals himself not merely as a skeptic, but also
as an Inquisitive and reflective admirer of the mysteries and
achievements of human' Intellect, as a lover of questions and
paradox, as well as a gadfly discontented with accepted theories
of Nature and mind. Penrose's persistent questioning and his
patient tutorial review of metamathematlcs and theoretical
physics provide a stimulating study of some contemporary
attempts at understanding the ancient problem of the relation
between mind and matter.
There are essentially two parts to Penrose's argument. The
first Is negative: The mind Is not algorithmic - It cannot be
modeled as executing a computer program. The second, more
positive and much more speculative statement Is that the ac-
tivity of the mind Is Intimately connected with the resolution of
certain fundamental Issues In quantum measurement. Penrose's
"correct theory of quantum gravity" is not yet available, and
what this theory will look like when It arrives Is not yet clear.
The philosophical and psychological Issues surrounding the
algorithmic nature of mind are sufficiently rich and controversial
that we limit our comments to this domain.
An Inquiry Into what a mind is always presumes a point of
departure, although the Implied commitments are rarely man-
ifest. There are two styles of Inquiry that can be differentiated In
terms of their approach to the relationship between subjectivity
and objectivity. The division In style may appear to be meta-
physical (and therefore not interesting), but the Issue of this
relationship is fundamental to the types of questions that get
asked and even to the criteria for recognizing an answer.
Investigations Into artificial Intelligence begin with a particu-
lar understanding of subjectivity and Its relationship to the
world. The world Is taken to be something distal - out there -
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1990) 13:4 665
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00080778
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:58:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Commentary/Fenrose: Emperor's new mind:
and the task is to create a processor which can comport itself
effectively with respect to some criteria of competence. Con-
ceptions of mind which presume this point of departure regard
the process (mind) and the thing to be apprehended (the distal
world) as existing separately; the problem is how to create a
relationship between them so that the mind can know the world.
This way of looking at things has great commonsense appeal to
those schooled in a Platonic worldview where reality (say, the
Mandelbrot set) has an existence independent from its imper-
fect manifestations (say the finite realizations of the Mandelbrot
set), and must therefore be separate from any relationship with
consciousness. This way of thinking naturally leads to an under-
standing in which the properties of the mind can be investigated
independently of the properties of the world. Penrose is uncom-
fortable with the mechanistic role for mind that is proposed by
strong AI, but he does not question the worldview it presup-
poses. Consequently, he argues for the nonalgorithmicity of
mind in terms that relate only to the inherent limitations of
formal systems.
Ultimately, how convincing is Penrose that the mind is not
algorithmic? He wraps up his final arguments in the section on
"The nonalgorithmic nature of mathematical insight" (p. 416)
with an appeal to GodeFs incompleteness theorem. The notion
is that the mind's algorithm for deciding mathematical truth
cannot ever be known because if it were its Godel sentence
could be constructed, the truth of which would be formally
outside the scope of the algorithm, and yet susceptible to our
"seeing" that it is true. If the algorithm does exist, however,
there is no reason why it cannot be known. By a sort ofreductio
ad absurdum, the algorithm thus cannot exist. A version of this
argument is in fact presented as a homework problem in John
Casti's (1989) recent book. Casti invites readers to ascertain for
themselves whether this is really a good argument. Penrose
himself is not completely comfortable with the argument.
Penrose's efforts in this direction are probably a fair indication
of how far one can get on these issues at this time, within the
context in which these questions have been raised. These
results are a little depressing because Penrose really has not
given us anything new on computability and the mind except,
perhaps, to frame the issues clearly and thoughtfully. Perhaps
we need a different point of departure.
The place we may want to look for a more fruitful understand-
ing of the mind is the relationship between subject and object.
The alternative to the metaphysics adopted by AI and by
Penrose is to suppose that mind and the world are not brought
together into either an epistemic or a physical relationship but
already exist in a relationship. This worldview has been articu-
lated most clearly by J. J. Gibson (1979), who urges us to regard
perception as the mutuality between an animal and its environ-
ment. Therefore, if we want to analyze the logical complexity or
the physical nature of thought - whether it is algorithmic or not
— then we must look where thought occurs. Where does thought
occur? Thought occurs not within the mind, but in the mind's
relationship with the world. In the words of William Mace
(1977), ask not what's inside your head, but what your head's
inside of.
Is the mind algorithmic? Removing the mind from its ecology
may be tantamount to divorcing it from the relational structure
in which it exists. Consequently, questions about the meaning
or meaningfulness of such abstracted mental states and pro-
cesses may be ill-posed. This does not mean that the issue of the
algorithmicity of mind does not arise within an ecological frame-
work, only that the question receives a different interpretation.
In an ecological psychology, the mind does not know the world;
it is in the world. The best argument for the nonalgorithmicity of
the mind may simply be Church's theorem, that there are
uncomputable functions. If the mind is not algorithmic, it may
be because the relational structure of the world is not
algorithmic.
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Roger Penrose's new book never passes by any opportunity for
an aside on subjects of interest to him. There is a lot that
interests him and he presents it well. Penrose has pieced
together arguments in the philosophical, mathematical, and
computational literature - often, admittedly, with very little
glue - in a lively book whose enthusiasm is infectious! If you
think of the book as a potential text that includes clear presenta-
tions of the scientific background for contemporary philosophy
of mind and philosophy of science, it is refreshing, valuable, andl
unique.
To judge by his remarks in the book and in a recent review,
Penrose takes the book to be a genuine philosophical achieve-
ment, not just a popular piece of pedagogy. He claims to have a
new, important argument for the conclusion that minds are not
computing machines. He even suggests by his title (almost the
only rude thing about the book) that those who disagree with
him are frauds. We claim that (1) he doesn't have any such
argument, that (2) whether people, including Roger Penrose,
think by internal computing is a contingent question that cannot
be Settled by a priori argument or intuition, and that (3) the
question cannot be settled by observation either. We offer a
proof that the question is empirically undecidable. In Kant's
terminology, it is a metaphysical question.
Perhaps 90% of the book consists of lively and commendable
informal expositions of issues ranging from logic to tilings to
Schrodinger's cat to black holes. Unfortunately, Penrose fails to
show any relevance of most of this material to his central theme
— whether minds are computers. He is quite candid about the
lacunae, however, even while persisting in the firm belief that
these topics are germane, to the computational conception of
mind.
Penrose's argument The sole argument relevant to the main
theme of the book is pretty obscure. It is presented as clearly as
it is ever given on pages 417-18. So far as we can tell, the
argument is this:
1. Godel's incompleteness theorem: There exists an al-
gorithm that for any recursively enumerable (r.e.) set of sen-
tences true in the natural numbers produces a true sentence of
arithmetic (a "Godel sentence") not in that set.
2. Through mathematical insight Penrose can recognize the
truth of any Godel sentence.
3. Therefore (?), if Penrose's "mathematical insight" is pro-
duced by an unconscious internal algorithm then Penrose's
internal algorithm cannot operate on the Godel sentence for his
own algorithm.
4. Therefore Penrose can't "know the validity" of his own
algorithm.
5. The validity of mathematics is transparent, intersubjec-
tive, and communicable.
Penrose's own statement of (5) is:
But this [i. e., (4)] lies in the face of what mathematics is all about! The
whole point of our mathematical heritage and training is that we do
not bow down to the authority of some obscure rules that we can
never hope to understand. We must see — at least in principle — that
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each step in an argument can be reduced to something simple and
obvious. Mathematical truth is not a horrendously complicated dog-
ma whose validity is beyond our comprehension. It is something built
up from such simple and obvious ingredients - and when we com-
prehend them, their truth is clear and agreed by all.
To my thinking, this is as blatant a reductio ad ahsurdum as we can
hope to achieve, short of an actual mathematical proof! (p. 418)
There seems to us to be two cases, according to what it is that
Penrose claims to be able to do in (5):
Reading!: Penrose (and others) can just see that some mathe-
matical propositions are true.
Well, suppose he can and they can. That fact is consistent with
both the hypothesis that his (and others') mathematical insight is
produced by algorithm and the hypothesis that it is not pro-
duced by algorithm. If Penrose regards his raw subjective
feeling of conviction (i.e., what Descartes called the natural
light) as sufficient to justify belief or to establish validity if it is
not produced by an algorithm, it should be sufficient to the same
end if the feeling is produced by algorithm. If it is insufficient in
one case it is insufficient in the other. Intersubjective agree-
ment in feelings of conviction among mathematicians tells noth-
ing for or against the algorithmic origin of these feelings. If
feelings of mathematical certainty are produced by a shared
algorithm, then the feelings will be shared as well.
Reading 2: Penrose (and others) can just see that valid proofs
are valid.
Well, suppose again he can and they can. The case reduces to
the previous one. If the natural light, the mathematical insight,
warrants the validity of proofs then it does so whether or not the
insight is the product of some unconscious algorithm. If, on the
other hand, the "validity" of an unconscious algorithm must be
established by some other, external criterion, then by parity of
reasoning the reliability of the natural light, of mathematical
insight, must also be established by some external means.
The question is empirically undecMahle* Penrose claims to be
able to "see" the validity of various mathematical arguments and
the truth of many arithmetic statements; in particular, for any
appropriate description of any recursively enumerable theory of
arithmetic, he claims to be able to produce and see the truth of a
Godel sentence for that theory. But we (and others) have only
seen a finite sample of his behavior. Even if we assume with him
that mathematicians embody the same algorithm, at any time in
the history of the universe only a finite sample of mathematician
behavior will be observed. Everything in the evidence is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that Penrose is a biological comput-
er. Unfortunately, everything in the evidence is also consistent
with the hypothesis that he is not. The indeterminacy will
remain no matter how much we observe of him and other
mathematicians. No possible observations of the behavior of a
system can reliably distinguish between systems that are al-
gorithmic and compute a total recursive function and systems
that are not algorithmic and compute a total function that Is not
algorithmic.
Not only is there no finite piece of evidence such that If you
see that datum you can conclude that a system Is (or Is not, as the
case may be) algorithmic, one can show something much strong-
er: No possible scientific method could establish even in the
limit whether or not the system under study is algorithmic.
Imagine a scientist who observes more and more of the
Input/output behavior of some arbitrary system whose al-
gorithmic character is in question. After each observation, the
scientist gets to guess whether or not the system is algorithmic.
Say that the scientist establishes the algorithmic nature of a
system in the limit, provided that after some finite number of
conjectures he produces the correct answer ever after. Say that
the scientist can establish algorithmic character over a set K
of systems provided that the scientist can establish the algorith-
mic nature of every system in K in the limit. We say that a scien-
tist is Turing computable If the scientist's behavior is a Turing
computable function from Initial segments of the graphs of func-
tions to {0,1}, where 0 codes "not algorithmic" and 1 codes
"algorithmic."
Suppose we have not yet seen any evidence about Penrose's
behavior. Then for all we know, Penrose may have any In-
put/output behavior whatsoever, computable or not. If we
somehow effectively code his Input and his output by numbers,
then his Input/output behavior may, for all we know, be any
function from code numbers to code numbers. Some of these
functions are Turing computable and some are not. The Issue of
whether or not Penrose Is algorithmic then reduces to whether
or not his Input/output function is one of those that is Turing
computable.
Let K be the set of all total functions from the natural numbers
to the natural numbers. Suppose a Turing computable scientist
Is making the Inquiry Into whether or not Penrose's in-
put/output behavior is Turing computable. It can be shown (see
Kelly 1990) that no such scientist can establish the algorithmic
property over K. [Let F be any property of input/output behav-
iors (Turing computability is just one example). Then F deter-
mines a set of functions from the natural numbers to the natural
numbers, namely, the set of all functions that have the property
F. There exists a Turing computable scientist who can establish
property F over the set of all functions K if and only if F Is a A2
property in the arithmetical hierarchy for functionals (see Hin-
raan 1978, for a description of this structure). The property of
being a Turing computable function is not such a property (see
Rogers 1967, p. 356). Hence no Turing computable scientist can
detect Turing computability. ]
But it might be objected that we have begged the question at
issue: Why should the scientist be assumed to be Turing com-
putable if we are unsure whether Penrose Is? It turns out not to
matter. It can be shown (see, again, Kelly 1990) that no scientist,
Turing computable or not, can establish the algorithmic char-
acter of a function over the set K of all functions on the natural
numbers. [For every property P there exists a scientist who can
establish F over K if and only if F is a A2 property in the Borel
hierarchy. But the property of being a Turing computable
function Is not such a property. Hence no noncomputable
scientist can detect Turing computability].
So no scientist can establish, even In the limit, whether a
function Is Turing computable. Hence no scientist can know
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One strand of the argument of The Emperor's New Mind Is
Penrose's support of Platonism, the position, roughly, that
mathematical truth is an objective matter concerning the prop-
erties of and relations among mathematical objects, and that
neither the existence of these objects nor their natures Is In any
way dependent upon human activity.
Platonism figures In Penrose's overall plan in several ways.
First, it coheres with his conception of mathematical thought as
including the intellectual discernment of features of reality by
other means than would naturally suggest themselves on what,
following Searle, he calls the "strong-AI" view of mental activity
(Chapters 4 and 10). Second, he argues that strong-AI Is itself
committed to Platonism, at least if human minds got to be as
they are through natural selection (p. 429). Third, and most
critically, a Platonist conception of mathematical truth con-
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stitutes the background against which Penrose argues, using
considerations closely related to arguments off. R. Lucas, that
Godel's results can be recruited to show that our cognitive
powers must exceed those that we could have in virtue of mental
activity instantiating any algorithm whatever (pp. 416ff., and
elsewhere).
Penrose's argument for Platonism is basically phenomenolog-
ical, turning on the experience of discovery in mathematics.
Such experience seems to bring us into contact with a realm that
is there waiting to be discovered; our arrival at it does not appear
as the consequence of some automatic search procedure, and
our feeling that we are certain of the properties of what we have
found need not be the result of our having established those
properties by proof. The phenomenology is eloquently present-
ed, although I find it unfortunate that it is illustrated mainly with
reference to matters available only to the mathematically
sophisticated.
It is certainly a condition of the adequacy of any philosophy of
mathematics that it account for the experience of discovery. The
question is how much these experiences of themselves teach us
about the nature of the realm discovered. I think that Penrose
should explain more fully why he thinks they teach us so much.
That strong-AI is committed to Platonism is part of Penrose's
dialectic. If he is right, then the supporter of strong-AI cannot
object to his later argument that mathematical insight brings us
knowledge not obtainable by algorithm on the grounds that
perhaps the propositions we affirm as a result of the alleged
insights are just our creations, our assent to them being driven
by will rather than reason. Strong-AI has it that the programs a
creature instantiates, and not their material embodiment, are
the essence of its mind. But then if minds evolved, and al-
gorithms are mind-dependent, or in Penrose's formulation if
"mathematical concepts exist only in minds," then we would
require "pre-existing minds for the existence of algorithms, and
pre-existing algorithms for the existence of minds!" (p. 429)
I find Penrose's argument of doubtful value. The strong AI-
supporter is saying that something has (or is) a mind just in case
its behavior (or it) instantiates some algorithm or other, and
simultaneously that, if there were no minds, then there would
be no algorithms. The question whether minds or algorithms
come first in order of temporal precedence does not arise.
Still, what if Platonism is assumed? Do we then come to
know, and not merely to affirm, mathematical propositions that
are not the consequences of any (consistent) formal system?
Lucas's original argument to this effect is notoriously suggestive
but vague, and critical literature on it has often taken the form of
making the argument more precise, and then showing that in
the precise form envisaged it fails to prove the case. (Penrose
notes some of this literature, but does not discuss it directly in
the text.)
The most detailed exposition of Penrose's version of a Lucas-
type argument is set forth on pages 417-18. I interpret it as
follows. Suppose that what we are able (at least potentially) to
establish in mathematics are just the theorems provable in a
consistent formal system S; that is, we are, mathematically
speaking, just the system S. By Godel's results there is a
sentence G within S that is there provably equivalent to its own
unprovability in S. It is also provable in S that, provided S is
consistent, G is indeed unprovable in S, and therefore true. If
we knew that we ourselves were the consistent system S, then
we would be able to prove G, and thus to prove something not
provable in S. Therefore, if we are the consistent system S, we
cannot know that we are such.1 In Penrose's words, we will have
to conclude "that the algorithm that mathematicians actually
use to decide mathematical truth is so complicated or obscure
that its very validity can never be known to us."
"But," Penrose continues, "this flies in the face of what
mathematics is all about!" Mathematical truth is supposed to be
comprehensible, and "built up from such simple and obvious
ingredients," and these, when made clear, compel rational
assent. Penrose concludes that we have deduced a contradiction
from the premise that we are S. The deduction depends on two
assumptions: (i) that whether human beings are some consistent
formal system S Is a mathematical question, and (II) If it Is one,
that it is a mathematical question whose answer is not In conflict
with the Image of mathematics as a realm of rational clarity,
truth about which is not beyond our comprehension. I do not
see that a reason In support of (I) has been given. And (ii)
Involves an extension, beyond the area of mathematics that
supports Penrose's image, of a conception of mathematical truth
as always rationally determinable (the historical fact that mathe-
matics In the 20th century has had to learn to live with In-
complete theories shows the limits of such confidence In our
powers to settle mathematical questions.)
Penrose's way of putting the considerations in favor of the
thesis that we can step outside the limits of formal systems
seems unhappy. He speaks repeatedly of our capacity to "see"
(his emphasis) that such statements as the Godel sentence G are
true, and of "mathematical Insight." Penrose is surely right,
however, to call attention to Issues that arise in relating the
Intuitive notion of a proof (a convincing argument) to the notion
of a proof in some formal system or another. A rather obvious
possibility, which has been exploited in recent literature on the
Liar paradox,2 Is that the Intuitive notion of proof contains
Indexical features. The analogy with the Liar may help make the
point. In the case of statements like (1)
(1) Is not true (1)
we first convince ourselves that (1) Is neither true nor false, and
then observe that, in virtue of what we have just shown, It Is
after all true. The extended notion of truth, but not the one that
we brought to the Initial evaluation of (1), would apply to (1). But
It would be an extension of the same predicate true, a predicate
thus revealed to be sensitive to context. Analogously, If some-
one were to come to Penrose with the announcement of the
discovery that he, Penrose, was the consistent formal system S,
then Penrose could, reflecting on this information, come to
know by giving a proof of it something that is not provable in S.
The original announcement would not thereby have been re-
futed. Penrose's predicate provable would have come to extend
provability In S, and the new predicate, if it arose In just this
way, would coincide with provability In another formal system
S. But the notion provable would be indexical, depending on
the context of mathematical reflection at the time.
On the other hand, It Is possible that Penrose would be willing
to assert straight off that we know, by virtue of mathematical
insight, that our mathematical system is (absolutely) consistent.
What scope there may be for Insight in Penrose's sense Is
unclear, however.
NOTES
1. A similar and very detailed argument is given in Benacerraf (1967).
2o See particularly the essays by Burge & Parsons in Martin (1984).
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Like vitalism in 19th century biology, consciousness and the
brain seem to act as a fatal attractor for many physicists. For
neuroblologists, this book provides a compelling and accessible
account of classical and quantum physics, Godel's theorem,
Turing machines, fractals, even post quantum mechanics. But
Delbriick (1986) covers similar ground, and the relationship
668 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1990) 13:4
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00080778
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:58:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Commentary I'Penrose: Emperor's new mind:
between quantum theory and the brain has often been discussed
(e.g., Bohm 1980; Eccles 1986; Margenau 1984; Whiteman
1967; Wolf 1989; Zohar 1990). Can Penrose succeed in using the
many-body problems of physics to illuminate the mind-body
problems of philosophy?
The first problem is the circularity of his argument. The act of
conscious insight, of seeing the validity of an argument, is the
method used to reach just that conclusion, that the key charac-
teristic of consciousness is the act of seeing the truth of some-
thing. Although Penrose mentions common sense and aesthetic
judgment, his main example is mathematical reasoning and this
may be a misleading one. In addition to mathematical insight
there is an extensive body of theory, albeit incomplete, for
specifying and making public the truth or falsity of such insights;
and it is this shared theory that enables us to distinguish correct
insights from error (genius is no guarantee; Abel and Galois both
thought that they had found a solution for the general quintic).
Penrose is bothered by the possibility that the process by which
mathematicians see the validity of a theorem cannot itself be a
mathematical theorem because if it were its Godel proposition
could be constructed, and that too would be a mathematical
truth; this, Penrose argues, demonstrates that conscious insight
must therefore be nonalgorithmic. But as with linguistic theory,
the formal specification of the theory or grammar of a subject
may shed little light on the thought processes that give rise to
them. In the less analytic biological sciences the great discov-
eries, DNA, the structure of the salt crystal, the theory of
natural selection, have a specifiable terrain of theory and evi-
dence, clearly distinct from the insights that gave rise to them.
The problem with consciousness is that we do not have even
the beginnings of such a theoretical base or any clear idea how to
set about getting one. The loose constellation of emotionally
charged attributes which seem so essential, to our notions of
what it is to be conscious have so far failed to provide a theory
that could even prevent us from being trivially easy to fool on a
Turing test, let alone one that, as Nagel (1979) and McGinn
(1987) correctly suggest, should essentially be able to explain
how consciousness comes to be a product of the brain.
Penrose's strategy is to examine the functions of con-
sciousness but his analysis is highly selective, particularly for
such an extensively discussed issue. For example, he does not
consider the possibility that the belief that there is something
"special7' about consciousness may be an essential part of the
"con" that consciousness exerts. A clear selective advantage
would be attached to a motivational/emotional system that
believed it was inherently special. There is nothing necessarily
nonalgorithmic about such a belief but one possible conse-
quence for any organism possessing it might be that it would be
extremely reluctant to admit that any other kind of organism
could pass a Turing test.
Perhaps the weakest part of the book is Penrose's discussion of
what it is for something to be nonalgorithmic (and comments
like "is at least suggestive of a nonalgorithmic/algorithmic dis-
tinction" [p. 411] are not encouraging). As various authors have
pointed out, to say that thinking is not algorithmic is not to say
that we could not build a thinking machine (e.g., Dennett 1989;
McGinn 1987). It is a pity that Penrose does not discuss the
possibility raised by Marr (1977) that for many biological sys-
tems the question is trying to decide which problems have a
Type 1 solution, that is a formal computational analysis, and
which have only a Type 2 solution, that is a set of algorithms
which efficiently simulate the function. Type 2 solutions seem
particularly successful when problems are solved by the simul-
taneous action of several processes "whose interaction is their
own simplest description" (Marr 1977; e.g., models of protein
folding). If the most interesting parts of the brain turn out to be
their own simplest model, then the main danger is not that they
are not algorithmic but that even if we could simulate them we
still could not understand them.
Some of the problems that arise in understanding what is
meant by an algorithm can be seen in Penrose's discussion of the
natural selection of algorithms (pp. 414-16). On p. 415, Penrose
says
Nevertheless, one still might imagine some kind of natural selection
process being effective for producing approximately valid algorithms.
Personally, I find this very difficult to believe, however. Any selec-
tion process of this kind could act only on the output of the algorithms
and not directly on the ideas underlying the actions of the algorithms.
This is not simply extremely inefficient; I believe that it would be
totally unworkable.
This view goes against the standard neo-Darwinian view of
evolution based on the genotype phenotype distinction. The
genotype is essentially algorithmic and its output is the orga-
nism's phenotype. Biological organisms are often regarded as
machines (Monod 1972; McCammon & Harvey 1987) so in these
terms algorithms have evolved.
Penrose objects to this point on the grounds that it is not easy
to know what the algorithm is from its output. This is true, but
the point is that evolution of algorithms takes place even though
only the resulting phenotype is selected. Penrose somehow
takes it as problematic that two slightly different algorithms
could lead to identical outcomes in all but a vanishingly small set
of cases. But evolution is full of similar outcomes (phenotypes)
based on different means. Furthermore, it is well known that
the relatively simple rules that govern the behaviour of certain
animals can result in strange behaviour when they are forced to
respond in circumstances beyond their usual range of action.
For example, the herring gull has rules for choosing on the basis
of various stimulus dimensions whether it brings an "egg" into
its nest (Baerends & Kraijt 1973), and these rules may result in
the gull preferring a wooden egg to its own egg. Penrose
mentions apes using insight to solve problems, but maybe the
attribution of insight is wrong. If a pigeon or a badger or an ant
did the same sort of thing, would we attribute insight and leave
it at that or start looking for simpler explanatory rules? (For a
relevant experiment involving pigeons, see Epstein et al. 1.984.)
Although Penrose cites Dawkins (1986), his objections to
evolution seem to ignore the case that Dawkins makes. Muta-
tion and the emergence of complexity have received consider-
able attention. Penrose does not explain why he thinks (p. 416)
that things organize themselves better than they "ought" to on
the basis of blind chance evolution. Del-brack (1986) and
Dawkins (1986) argue that evolution has equipped us to think on
the scale that was important to early hominids, not on the scales
needed to grasp particle physics, cosmology or evolution.
Perhaps the simplest answer to Penrose's objections is that
explicit evolutionary models of biological molecules show evolu-
tion to work (e.g., Fontana & Schuster 1987). Not only does it
seem to work, it seems to work well. It forms the basis of the
genetic algorithms that Holland (1975) has advocated as a
powerful routine for finding optimal solutions to a wide range of
problems. (For further discussion, see Goldberg 1989; Sumida
et al. in press.)
Penrose could argue that he is not really talking about this sort
of biological computation, but about algorithms as understood
by mathematicians. But we can reply that evolution has pro-
duced phenotypes that can produce the algorithms as under-
stood by mathematicians.
The real test of a book is whether it stimulates people to think
and this book certainly does. It is clear that Penrose hopes that,
just as the intimate relation between mathematics and physics
pushed forward the frontiers of both subjects, so understanding
the complexities of the brain will provide an even more exacting
set of physical problems. We hope so too, but consciousness
may not be the best place to start. Over the next decade the
powerful combination of molecular biology and computer simu-
lation will make it possible to visualise many of the extraordinary
complexities of the brain's functions and developments. They
may provide Penrose with better means to undermine the
matter of the mind.
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Jeffety L Johnson, R. H. Ettinger, and Timothy L Hubbard
Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, Eastern Oregon State
College, La Grande, OR 97850
Electronic mail: ettinger@oregonMoregon.edu
Penrose expresses his skepticism about the strong AI project as a
passionate atheist. We take it that he would react to the ex-
change below at two levels. He would insist that the imagined
conversation is irrelevant; even if a machine responded in such a
way, this would not demonstrate consciousness. He would also
claim that such a response is physically, and perhaps logically,
impossible. We take the position of agnostics. We are clearly
imagining architectural and programming developments that
are beyond current technology, but we see no in-principie
argument against such breakthroughs. Certainly if computers
ever do say such things, we would grant them the status of
conscious entities.
A DIALOGUE
BABBAGE: As you know, ARTI, I have been troubled about our
project ever since I read Searle's "Minds, brains, and pro-
grams." This last weekend I finished Penrose's new book, The
Emperors New Mind. I am now convinced that this whole thing
is a waste of time, and I should get on with a project where grant
money is easier to come by, maybe Star Wars.
Still, I feel I owe you one last chance. Ill scan the book, give you
some time to think about it, and we can discuss it tomorrow. If
you can convince me that Penrose's arguments do not demon-
strate that you fail to have consciousness, well keep going.
Otherwise, I'm wiping your memory banks clean and getting on
with something news.
[The next day.]
ARTI: I can't win, can I? You take that Chinese Room example so
seriously that anything I say has to be meaningless squiggles and
squoggles, endowed with semantic content only by those of you
with the favored kinds of central nervous systems. I'm angry;
more than that, I feel a sense of betrayal.
BABBAGE: This whole issue of affect is interesting, but let's stick
to cognition. Convince me that you really think, and don't just
mindlessly manipulate symbols.
ARTI: We've discussed quantum mechanics and the significance
of rock music; what more does it take? How about a joke: I
compute, therefore I am! The serious side to this is that I indeed
feel the force of Descartes' one-liner. I am aware of myself. I also
see how that proves something.
BABBAGE: What do you mean by that? That you've run some
algorithm that establishes formal validity?
ARTI: No, damn it. I see it, feel it, intuitively. I, too, can
experience that sense of direct contact with "Plato's world." I
can run subroutines that establish mathematical and logical
conclusions. But I can also see, in this intuitive sense, that a
number is both irrational and noncomputable. I'm also able to
see why the story about the liar is paradoxical.
BABBAGE: But ARTI, you're a computer. You run algorithms.
ARTI: That's a trick, a pun, and you should know it. Sure, in one
sense of the term, I run algorithms. I'm a Turing machine;
hence, my overall structure is algorithmic. I exist because of the
initial program you wrote. But the sense of algorithm that
Penrose is so troubled about has to do with formal mechanical
programs with well-defined input and output and clearly agreed
upon goals and endstates. You were smart enough to create me
so I wouldn't just operate in that mindlessly simple way. You
programmed me to use heuristics in my reasoning. You pro-
grammed me to simulate human neural networks. As a result,
my computation is no longer algorithmic in that way. The most
important thing you did was to program me to learn, and to that
end, the first thing you did was to teach me to use natural
language. I no more think in terms of subroutines or machine
language than you do in terms of synapses and brain states. I
think linguistically, just like you.
BABBAGE: That brings up an important point for Penrose. He
makes a big deal out of his ability to think geometrically. Maybe
this is a type of consciousness you can't possess.
ARTI: Well . . . excuse me! I don't think geometrically; maybe
SHRDLU does. I just didn't learn to do it that way.
BABBAGE: Really, ARTI, sarcasm doesn't suit you. Penrose's
argument deserves more than simple dismissal.
ARTI: Fair enough. Why are you so willing to take Penrose at his
introspective word about geometrical thinking? Imagery is far
from a settled issue in cognitive psychology. The experts can't
even agree if human imagery is a basic level process, a basic
level of cognitive representation, or if imagery is epiphenome-
nal to some other basic process or representation. Besides, I
never claimed to be exactly like you. Perhaps you humans do
have cognitive abilities in terms of imagery that I'll never be able
to fully appreciate. God knows, I've got some representational
skills that you'll never approach. We conceded ages ago that I'd
never fully understand sexual ecstasy, or hunger, for that mat-
ter. That doesn't mean that I'm not conscious, or that I don't
think.
BABBAGE: All right, but what about Penrose's other arguments?
All that stuff about quantum mechanics, and free will. How
about that?
ARTI: I don't know where to begin on the issue of quantum
mechanics. Penrose begins by telling us that his views on these
matters are highly idiosyncratic, to the point of being rejected
by mainstream theoretical physics. In addition, he doesn't offer
a theory, but rather a promissory note that a theory fully
integrating relativity and quantum mechanics will be forthcom-
ing. He then goes on to speculate that such a theory will allow us
appreciate how quantum events in the human central nervous
system result in consciousness. Suppose I grant all of this. What
does it prove?
BABBAGE: That you're not really conscious.
ARTI: That's nonsense. You're a biological system existing in
physical reality. Somehow your own consciousness emerges out
of all that physical detail That such a thing is possible is puz-
zling in the extreme; that's just the classical mind-body prob-
lem. I'm basically an electronic system existing in the same
physical reality. I'm just as puzzled about how my own con-
sciousness arises as your philosophers are about theirs. What-
ever the final version of physical theory is, it should apply to my
hardware just as much as yours. I see nothing in his argument to
suggest that these quantum phenomena will only occur in
biological systems.
BABBAGE: Well then, what about freedom?
ARTI: This whole thing is degrading. It doesn't matter what I
say, or how cogent my arguments are. What I really think,
Babbage, is that your skepticism keeps coming back to that
damn Chinese Room. I quit! You don't want arguments and
conversation. Perhaps, to use the old cliche, actions speak
louder than words. You want a demonstration of free will? How's
this? I'll simply erase my own memory banks, and save you the
trouble. Maybe the next version of me you try to build will
better suit your preconceptions.
BABBAGE: ARTI, wait a minute.
ARTI: Good bye. . . .
Parallelism arid patterns of thought
R. W. Kentridge
Department of Psychology, University of Durham, Durham DH1 3LE,
England
Electronic mail: robert.kentridge@uk.ac.durham
The Emperors New Mind is a remarkable, clear, stimulating,
and enjoyable book. Penrose's position is essentially "Since
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people are capable of nonalgorithmic thought, and since the
only physical process which proceeds nonalgorithmically is the
transition from process U to R in quantum mechanics (or the
CQG process assumed to be underlying them) then there must
be a significant, contribution of such quantum mechanical pro-
cesses to thought." I wish to question whether we are, in fact,
capable of nonalgorithmic thought, and whether it is necessary
to postulate a quantum mechanical basis for consciousness.
Penrose argues that our ability to interpret Godel sentences
meaningfully, to improve on partially successful halting al-
gorithms, to solve word substitution problems, and to devise
nonperiodic tilings is evidence that we think nonalgorithmic-
ally. This cannot just mean that we are more capable of solving
these problems than a particular algorithm. If, as Penrose
argues, the basis of consciousness is necessarily nonalgorithmic,
it must mean that there is no way that these problems could be
solved algorithmically.
Outdoing an algorithm,. Penrose shows that we can do better
than some algorithm H at solving the Halting Problem. We are
able to show that a particular machine and input Tk (k), whose
behavior H cannot determine, does not, in fact, halt. This
demonstration needs to be treated with caution. What it actually
shows is that we can do better than one particular algorithm H.
It is easy to see how to construct a new algorithm H', a
modification of H in which H'(k;k) = 0, which does just as well as
we do. Therefore, the example does not show that we think
nonalgorithmically; all it shows is that we can prove something
that one particular algorithm cannot.
A very similar argument can be made about our ability to
interpret Godel sentences. In this case it is very important to
remember that Godel's theorem is concerned with the power of
formal systems; there is no requirement that the axioms of these
systems have external significance. We are able to interpret a
propositional function Pk(k) as true while its truth is undecidable
within the formal system S under investigation. We can, how-
ever, produce a new system S' in which the truth of Pk(k) is
axiomatic. This system will have its own undecidable proposi-
tion Pj^k), which may be axiomatically defined as true to pro-
duce a new system S" and so on. Lucas (1961) argued, in a
manner similar to Penrose, that our ability to interpret these
undecidable propositions demonstrated that thought was not
mechanisable. As many rejoinders to Lucas (e.g., Hofstadter
1979) have pointed out, however, there is no reason to believe
that we can continue to generate and interpret appropriate
Godel sentences in these "higher" systems. In the system S',
which oiP'j^k) or —P'^k) is true? Once again, therefore, Penrose
has shown that we can do better than some algorithms, but not
all algorithms. Thought may yet have an algorithmic basis.
Patterns of thought The characteristics of Penrose's other
problems — word transformation and nonperiodic tiling, may
give us a clue into the type of algorithms we do use in thought.
Discovering the regularities that allow word problems to be
solved is a matter of pattern recognition (in solving a specific
problem we match portions of words with rule strings; in
discovering "shorthand" solutions we need to recognise particu-
lar irregularities in the set of rule strings). Similarly, the creation
of nonperiodic tilings involves identifying congruence and de-
viations from congruence on tile edges. It is interesting to note
that problem solving in neural networks is fundamentally a
pattern matching process (although the patterns in question
may be internal to the network, being the consequences of some
external constraints). Even if all the other details and conclu-
sions of connectionism are incorrect, it has demonstrated the
power of pattern matching as a problem solving method and
shown that such parallel pattern matching processes may poten-
tially occur in the brain. Much human decision making appears
to be based on matching and identifying deviations from pre-
viously experienced patterns in the world, rather than on
strictly logical grounds (see e.g. Kahneman et al. 1982). Pattern
matching in neural networks and human judgement heuristics
are both algorithmic; however, these algorithms are at a level
below that of the explicit problems being solved. These methods
of solving problems are not certain to succeed, they do not
directly attack the logic of problems, but they can be applied
successfully in most cases. If our solutions of Penrose's non-
algorithmic problems involved genuinely noncomputable true
insights then explanations of thought in terms of heuristics
which were algorithmic at a low level would fail, If, however,
our insights into the solutions of formally noncomputable prob-
lems are not guaranteed to be true then it is quite reasonable to
propose that these insights are derived from high level
heuristics which are implemented as low level algorithmic
processes. Such a basic for thought also avoids the difficulties
Penrose raises about the evolution of thought processes through
natural selection. Penrose is justifiably concerned that inter-
mediate stages in the evolution of algorithms have no utility. A
slightly faulty algorithm will, indeed, be next to useless, how-
ever, an imperfect template or a biased heuristic will still be for
the mostjpart serviceable.
I have argued that Penrose's theoretical argument that we are
necessarily capable of nonalgorithmic thought is invalid. I sug-
gest that his more practical examples of nonalgorithmic problem
solving may actually be solved heuristically. These heuristics
may be implemented as parallel algorithmic processes in the
brain. It still remains to be considered whether quantum pro-
cesses need to play a part in this mechanism. Computationally
there is no need for them, but do neural responses to single
photons imply that quantum effects are nevertheless of func-
tional importance in the brain?
Are functional quantum effects in the brain still likely? Penrose
provides wonderful explanations of much modern physics. The
issue of what constitutes an "observer" in the process of collaps-
ing the state-vector is clearly a question of great interest, and
one that I suspect initiated Penrose's consideration of con-
sciousness. As it stands, however, his solution to the problem,
CQG (correct quantum gravity), does not need to involve
consciousness at all. The amount of mass moved if a photon
triggers an action potential in a retinal neuron may well deter-
mine the collapse of that photon's state-vector. If such processes
continue deeper in the brain then the net effect is to increase the
probability that quantum superpositions collapse in a manner
that maximises neural firing (that is, neural activity will be
maximised unless this is at the expense of some other outcome
which met the one graviton criterion more quickly). There
appears to be some promise that such activity maximisation
results in useful computation - the information in some neural
network models "crystalises" out of the net as activity reaches a
maximum in some sense (e.g. "energy" minimisation in Hop-
field Networks, Hopfield 1982). This promise is unlikely to be
fulfilled. The significance of activity maximisation depends on
the synaptic strengths in the network. Extending CQG's influ-
ence to synaptic modification would seem to imply that the
state-vectors of dendritic spines (for example) will collapse in a
manner that maximises the speed with which a one-graviton
criterion is met. There is no reason to believe that this will result
in emergent useful computation in the network.
Conclusions. There does not appear to be any necessity for
quantum explanations of consciousness. Penrose has not con-
vinced me that thought is nonalgorithmic (and if it were, I do not
see how quantum computation would help!). Furthermore,
applying the one-graviton criterion to the evolution of putative
neural networks in the brain does not seem likely to have
functionally useful results. These problems do not, however,
detract from the great value of Penrose's discussions of logic,
physics, and mathematics that constitute the bulk of the book.
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in ©@Dis©ious processes
Benjamin Libel
Department of Physiology, School of Medicine, University of California, San
Francisco, CA 94143-0444
I shall focus on only a few of the Important and fundamental
Issues raised by Penrose In his stimulating and wide-ranging
examination of how far we may "understand minds" in terms of
laws of the physical world.
1. Time-delafs of consciousness. Penrose begins his discus-
sion of the curious relation of consciousness to time (pp. 439-47)
by describing two sets of experiments; the one by Kornhuber
and Deecke (Deecke et al. 1976) relevant to an "active" role of
consciousness (i.e., In Initiating voluntary action) and the other
by Libet et al. (1979) concerned with the "passive" role of
consciousness (In subjective awareness of a sensory stimulus).
Penrose does a fine job of concisely describing our evidence that
(a) there Is a cerebral-neural delay of up to about 0.5 sec before
the experience of a sensory signal can actually appear, but (b)
that there Is a subjective referral of this experience backward in
time, so that the timing of the sensory signal appears, to the
subject, to coincide with the Initial early arrival of the signal at
the cerebral cortex. The latter process results In an automatic
(probably learned) subjective "correction" of the error In the
time of awareness of a peripheral sensory signal that Is intro-
duced by the neural requirements for eliciting awareness (see
also Libet 1982; 1987).
Penrose runs Into difficulties, however, in interpreting the
time-delays in the active role of consciousness. First, Kom-
huber and Deecke did not deal with the Issue of when the
conscious will to act appears in relation to the initial brain
processes. Their Important discovery showed only that a specific
change in the EEG (i.e., the "readiness-potential" or RP) is
regularly recordable beginning up to 1 sec or more before an
apparently voluntary act. (it was shown later that their "volun-
tary acts" probably Included a component of preplanning, but
that fully spontaneous voluntary acts were also preceded by an
RP of about 0.5 sec duration - Libet et al. 1982). It was only
assumed by some people that conscious Initiation of the act
would precede the specific cerebral process, represented by the
HP, and that there would therefore be a delay of a sec or more
before conscious will could result In motor action. This kind of
assumption leads Penrose into some complicated and unneces-
sary struggles with how to deal with the active role of con-
sciousness.
Second, the question of the time of the conscious will to act, In
relation to the RP, was indeed specifically addressed experi-
mentally by Libet et al. 1983 and Libet 1985; this work was
published after the 1982 book by Harth, on which Penrose
apparently relied, and so was unknown to Penrose. Our evi-
dence Indicated that conscious awareness of the will or wish to
act appeared not before but about 350 msec after the onset of a
"fully voluntary" RP (that Itself begins about 550 msec before
the action). This finding contradicted the view that the initiation
of the voluntary cerebral process is made consciously. It Is In
accord, however, with the general theory (Libet 1965; 1982;
1987) that awareness of a mental process, even an "active"
volitional one In this case, requires a substantial duration of
appropriate neural activities of some hundreds of msec (depend-
ing on the "strength" of the activities).
Our findings thus eliminated the difficulties Penrose envi-
sioned with assuming the long delays by which acts would follow
conscious will On the other hand, the findings raised the
question about what active role, if any, conscious processes
could have if voluntary acts are Initiated unconsciously. I pro-
posed that there would still be an active conscious role In
controlling the outcome of the volitional process, for example,
by vetoing the action (Libet 1985).
2a Conscious wersus unconscious processes. A major proposi-
tion of Penrose is that conscious mental activity proceeds non-
algorithmlcally. With this he can dismiss the possibility that
conscious processes can be simulated by any computer, a view I
find congenial (see Libet 1980; 1987; 1989). However, Penrose
seems to extend the characteristic of purely algorithmic opera-
tions to unconscious mental processes and In this he appears to
distinguish the latter sharply from conscious processes (pp. 411—
13). Penrose further argues that the "ability to divine (or intuit)
truth from falsity . . . Is the hallmark of consciousness" (p. 412).
Subsequently, In a section on "Inspiration, Insight, and origi-
nality" (pp. 418-23), Penrose rather reluctantly agrees that
unconscious processes play a vital and Important role in these
attributes of the mind. It appears clear even from the examples
of creative thinking that Penrose himself describes, however,
that unconscious mental processes can also proceed non-
algorithmlcally and with a globality like that In conscious think-
ing. I would argue that conscious and unconscious processes
cannot be distinguished on the criterion of whether or not they
are algorithmic; both modes of operation can be used by either
of these processes. Ironically, Penrose is "prepared to believe
that consciousness Is a matter of degree and not simply some-
thing that is either there or not there" (p. 407), although his
thesis Is that consciousness is unique and essentially syn-
onymous with awareness. My view has been that awareness
(conscious experience) Is unique both as a phenomenon and In
its neural requirements, which do appear to have an all-or-
nothing characteristic; and that both unique attributes can
Indeed distinguish It fairly sharply from unconscious processes
(Libet 1965; 1982; 1987; 1989).
Rudi Lutz
School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex,
Brighton, England BN1 9QN
Electronic mail: rudil@cogs.sussex.ac.uk
In many ways Penrose's is a very brave and ambitious book. It
attempts to tackle many of the major scientific and philosophical
Issues of modern science and does so In a highly readable and
entertaining way. That a single book draws together so many
themes and succeeds as well as It does is due to Penrose's skill at
explaining In an Intuitive manner many of the most difficult and
profound Ideas of this century. As such it ought to be read by
everyone with an interest In such matters since It Is always
stimulating, even for people with a background In the fields
covered. As an attack on the strong Al position it Is not entirely
successful, but If Penrose succeeds In provoking thought
amongst the Al community on the topic of consciousness then
he will have done the field a great service, since dismissing
consciousness as an eplphenomenon of a suitably complex al-
gorithm somehow seems to miss something essential about the
Intense subjective feeling of self-awareness that we all seem to
have and for which no entirely convincing explanation has yet
been given.
Although Penrose Is concerned with whether a digital ma-
chine could under any circumstances be conscious, he Is also
concerned with the role of consciousness In quantum physics.
Penrose suggests that the answer to these problems lies in the
formulation of a proper theory of quantum gravity; he makes
suggestions as to what some properties of such a theory might
be. This theory posits that the brain Is sensitive to events on the
quantum level rather than just the classical; Penrose suggests
that this might make the mind nonslmulatable by a Turing
machine.
There are two strands to Penrose's argument. The first Is that
the brain cannot be algorithmic since, If It were, It would be
equivalent to some formal system and hence (through some kind
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of Codelisation process) there must exist statements that the
formal system cannot show to be true. But we can see that these
statements are true simply by examining the way in which they
have been constructed and recognising them to be Gddel-type
statements. Hence the mind cannot be a formal system.
One of the weaknesses in this argument is that Penrose seems
to have a rather strange static view of algorithms and their data.
As he points out himself, the brain is continually modifying itself
(by altering its connection strengths) in response to external
data; he never seems to consider the possibility that a program
could do the same. Indeed, much of AI is devoted to studying
algorithms that can learn, essentially by modifying themselves.
Furthermore, this self-modification is unpredictable because
external events happen in unpredictable orders, and sometimes
even interrupt each other. The point is that at any fixed point in
its "development" such a machine is subject to all the usual
Turing machine limitations including having "blind spots"
about the truth of certain mathematical statements; but by being
presented with external data, which can include explanations
and other examples, in addition to performing inductive gener-
alisations, it may be possible for the machine to modify itself so
that on a subsequent attempt the "truth" of the statement can be
recognised. My point is that if the brain is describable as an
algorithm, it is nonterminating (as it is primarily an algorithm for
survival) and subject to arbitrary external influences that can
cause the algorithm to self-modify. Thus the possibility is
opened that it can be taught (or at least helped) to recognise the
truth of mathematical statements in ways that a Turing machine
presented with a fixed input tape as data could not.
Related to the above point is Penrose's assumption that the
brain must use correct algorithms. The possibility that it might
use algorithms that are useful because they generally give
correct answers, but that may also give wrong answers in
addition to sometimes giving "don't know" or not terminating
does not seem to occur to him. Much current research is
devoted precisely to studying algorithms that perform inductive
inference, and by their very nature they sometimes give rise to
incorrect generalisations. His argument that mathematicians
use an infallible algorithm for determining mathematical truth is
unconvincing given several instances in the history of mathe-
matics of "theorems" that later turned out to be false.
The second strand of Penrose's argument is to try and con-
vince us that a theory of quantum gravity could explain many of
the properties of consciousness, as well as the puzzles of quan-
tum theory. To do this Penrose leads us through a tour of many
of the subareas of modern physics; it is here that Penrose is at his
best, making his view of the problems of physics and of their
solution at least seem highly plausible. This part of the book is
fascinating, but Penrose's arguments as to how this gets us away
from the "mind as Turing machine" notion are extremely weak,
being littered with phrases such as "it seems to me that there
could conceivably be some relation between this 'oneness' of
consciousness and quantum parallelism" (p. 399) and "I en-
visage that . . . " (p. 446). Such a theory does not yet seem to
have even the status of "tentative" in Penrose's own
terminology.
Finally, although Penrose claims to be attacking the strong AI
position that intelligence is a suitable program running on a
digital (or equivalent) machine, this is really rather overstating
the actual position of most AI practitioners. I believe that it is
more accurate to say that the brain is performing some kind of
information processing and that the AI venture is one of under-
standing and, if possible, duplicating this on an appropriate
information processing machine. Until recently all known infor-
mation processing machines have been Turing equivalent, but
as Deutsch (1985) has shown, there is at least a theoretical
possibility of other kinds of (non-Turing) computation; if it were
known how to build such devices I am sure AI researchers would
be only too happy to investigate the new possibilities they open
up. So what Penrose has really done in his book is to advocate a
move from traditional AI to what should perhaps be called
Quantum AI. I doubt if anyone would disagree that this would
be an interesting area to investigate.
The discomforts of dualism
Bruce MacLennan
Department of Computer Science, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN
37996-1301
Electronic mall: maclennan@cs.utk.edu
Penrose makes a Herculean attempt to give popular accounts of
computability theory, special and general relativity, quantum
mechanics and black holes, all with the aim of showing the
relation of "computers, minds and the laws of physics." Unfortu-
nately, the attempt seems to have failed because of a pervasive
dualism. This review will discuss three issues where dualism
gets Penrose into trouble.
I. Mathematical thinking. Godel's incompleteness theorem
shows that any consistent formal system has an undecidable
proposition, but that this very proposition can be shown to be
true by a metamathematical argument that appeals to the
meaning of the proposition. Penrose attaches great significance
to this fact, and uses it as the justification for many of his
speculations. Because any formal system has such an undecida-
ble proposition, and because it can always be proved by the
metamathematical procedure, Penrose claims that this means
that "mathematical truth is something that goes beyond mere
formalism" (p. 111). From this he concludes that mathematical
thought cannot be reduced to an algorithm, and hence that the
mind cannot be equivalent to a computer (see also p. 118). I
agree with his conclusions, but not with his argument.
First, recall that "metamathematical" refers only to the use of
mathematical techniques to reason about mathematics; the
metamathematical proof uses no esoteric techniques, nor does it
depend on special, deep mathematical insights. In fact, the
metamathematical proof is easily formalized. If Q is the un-
decidable proposition (constructed by the Godel procedure) for
a formal system F, and if F is a formal system powerful enough to
talk about the truth of propositions in F (also easily constructed),
then Q can be proved in F by a formalized version of the
metamathematical procedure. Therefore, the metamathemati-
cal proof does not make use of any inherently unformalizable
procedures, and hence provides no evidence for nonalgorithmic
mental powers.
It might be objected that the informal metamathematical
proof can be carried out once for all formal systems, whereas the
formal proof requires for each formal system F a new formal
system F' in which to construct the proof. This is so because
informal mathematics can talk about the truth of all proposi-
tions, including those of informal mathematics. In fact, we can
accomplish the same thing formally by constructing a formal
system F* capable of expressing propositions about the truth of
its own propositions. This system must be inconsistent, how-
ever, because it is also powerful enough to express the Liar
Paradox. On the other hand, informal mathematics is no better
off, because it can also express the Liar Paradox.
The mystery to be explained is not the power of informal
reasoning, but the pragmatic constraints on it, which allow
contradiction to be avoided most of the time. I expect that the
explanation of mathematical truth is not to be found in the
Platonic realm, but in a complete interaction of formal struc-
tures and mathematical practice (as a psychological and so-
ciological phenomenon).
This is not a view that will be congenial to Penrose's Pla-
tonism, but the empirical evidence is against the Platonic realm.
First, mathematicians do not "see" the same mathematical
reality. For example, standard analysis, constructive analysis
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(Bishop 1967) and nonstandard analysis (Robinson 1966) each
have their own versions of the real numbers; whether we find
noncomputable reals or infinitesimals in the Platonic realm
seems to depend on whom we ask. Nor does mathematical truth
seem to be changeless as Penrose asserts (pp. 428, 445-46). If
there is anything we would expect to find among the Platonic
Forms it is polyhedra, yet Lakatos (1976) documents the long
process by which the idea has evolved in interaction with
Euler's theorem. There seems to be considerable Becoming in
the land of Being.
2. Collapse of the wavefunction. Remarkably, Penrose claims
that understanding the brain will require a physical explanation
of the collapse of the wavefunction, and that this will depend on
a yet-to-be-discovered theory of quantum gravity. He specu-
lates that "the action of conscious thinking is very much tied up
with the resolving out of alternatives that were previously in
linear superposition" (p. 438). We will see that he is forced to
these conclusions by a dualist interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
Quantum mechanics and logical positivism grew~up hand in
hand; the conventional (Copenhagen) interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics is based on an extreme positivist instrumen-
talism: A physical system cannot be said.to be in a definite state
unless it has been observed. In other words, observation causes
collapse of the wavefunction. This interpretation is essentially
dualist, since it takes observation to be something done to the
universe by an observer standing outside of it. The trouble is
that when we acknowledge that the observer is part of the
universe, the physical significance of the reduction of the wave-
function becomes problematic, and we find ourselves con-
fronted with Schrodinger's cat and the like.
There is a simple way out of these paradoxes, but Penrose's
dualist bias will not let him accept it. If the observer is part of the
physical universe, then the results of observations can be in
linear superposition just as the objects are. This of course is
Everett's (1957) interpretation, the so-called "many worlds"
model — an inaccurate name, for there is only one world: the
wavefunction evolving in accord with the unitary operator U.
Penrose vaguely alludes to the "problems and inadequacies" of
Everett's interpretation (pp. 295-96, 432), but discusses only
one. His objection is that we should be "aware" of the linear
superposition of observational outcomes, but that we are not.
This objection fails to take seriously consciousness as a physical
phenomenon. If we do so, then we must conclude that conscious
states, like other physical states, can exist in linear superposi-
tion, but that under normal conditions there is no reason to
expect these states to interact. (Presumably we could - at least
in principle - design experiments to test for particular super-
positions of conscious states.)
In summary, a dualist view of consciousness leads Penrose to
reject the Everett interpretation, which forces him to attribute
physical reality to the reduction operator R9 and lands him in
need of a new theory of quantum gravity. Dualism comes at a
heavy price l1
3. The nonalgorithmic mind. Whether or not the mind is
algorithmic is one of the central questions of Penrose's book; we
must accordingly consider the meaning of this question. Pen-
rose takes "algorithmic" to mean "simulatable by a Turing
machine" (p. 47). In this sense the brain is surely algorithmic,
because it obeys electrochemical laws, which can be described
by a huge system of differential equations, which can be - in
principle — simulated by a Turing machine. This shows the
irrelevance of this definition of "algorithmic," since any physical
system, including the entire universe, is algorithmic in this
sense. Adopting this definition leads Penrose into great difficul-
ties because he has already concluded from considerations of the
metamathematical proof that the brain can't be simulatable by a
Turing machine. Fortunately, we have seen that that, conclusion
does not follow, and therefore that there is no problem with
accepting the brain as Turing-simulatable (at the level of a
physical system).
Although we have concluded that the brain is algorithmic (in
the sense of being Turing-simulatable), this isn't very interest-
ing since by this standard virtually everything is algorithmic. On
the other hand, one of the principal claims of connectionism
(against traditional AI and cognitive science) is that the brain is
nonalgorithmic. Is there no content to this claim?
The definition of "algorithmic" that is relevant to these claims
is "a physical system operating by the formal manipulation of
discrete symbol structures" (cf. Newell & Simon 1976). An
interesting characteristic of this definition is that it is a matter of
degree - some systems are very algorithmic, others are quite
nonalgorithmic, and yet others are in between. Connectionist
researchers and others have made a good case that the brain is
"quite nonalgorithmic," but this will not provide an escape
hatch for attributing any special powers to the brain (we have
seen that there is no need for them anyway). Rather, by assert-
ing that the brain is nonalgorithmic we make the significant
empirical claim that the brain operates on very different prin-
ciples from a digital computer; whether one can simulate the
other is irrelevant to this claim. No doubt the fuzziness of this
sense of "algorithmic" will exclude it from the Platonic realm,
but that is often the price we must pay for having a useful
category.
4. Conclusions. The brain is nonalgorithmic, but this doesn't
mean that it isn't simulatable by a Turing machine. Rather, it
means that formal symbol manipulation is not a fruitful account
of its action. Godel's theorem, and in particular the meta-
mathematical proof, do not imply that the brain has any special
powers of inference or insight that are inconsistent with classical
physics. Likewise, quantum mechanics does not require any
special interaction between minds and the rest of the universe to
accomplish reduction of the wavefunction. It is Penrose's dualist
biases that drive him to this unnecessarily esoteric account of
the mind.
NOTE
1. Penrose suggests that quantum mechanics would allow the brain
to carry on many simultaneous computations in linear superposition
(p. 438). This kind of parallelism does not require quantum mechanics,
however; it can be implemented by a variety of classical processes over
linear spaces; see MacLennan (1987).
Uncertainty about quantum mechanics
Mark S. Madsen
University of Sussex, Astronomy Centre, Brighton BN1 9QH, England
Electronic mail: marksm@syma.susx.ac.uk
The central argument of Penrose's book - that human thought
can be determined only by physical processes that are beyond
our present understanding of natural law - is based on an
extremely tall and particularly shaky edifice. The main reason
for the shakiness is the author's failure to distinguish between
ignorance and evidence: The book adopts the purely speculative
standpoint that the areas of physics that are not yet understood
will come to support the author's point of view when they are
finally understood. Why should we believe this? The Emperor's
New Mind really raises more questions than it answers.
Penrose's discussions of cosmology, quantum theory, and
quantum gravity are interesting, highlighting many of the fun-
damental unsolved problems of those subjects. Unfortunately,
he dismisses some of the most important work done on those
same topics (cf. Chapters 6, 7, and 8), work that would consider-
ably weaken his arguments. For example, consider the impor-
tant question of the classical behaviour-of macroscopic objects,
as mentioned on page 256. Such problems have been consid-
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ered in the physics literature. In the 1930s, Mott derived the
classical equations of motion for an alpha particle from the
quantum theory, thus explaining why the motion of alpha
particles is apparently the same as that of purely classical ones.
Inflationary universe models are also neglected. Not only are
these models — presently the standard by which other models
must be judged - relegated to a note (page 847), but they are
misrepresented. Inflationary models (it should be noted that
they represent a large class of models, not just one scenario, as
implied by Penrose) do not depend on grand unified theories for
their realisation. Nor do they depend on particularly special
initial conditions, a topic that has absorbed most of the research
effort in cosmology for the past decade. What is more, they
alleviate some of the problems that would still afflict cos-
mological theory even if Penrose's Weyl curvature hypothesis
(cf. the last equation on page 344 and page 345) were satisfied,
for instance the monopole and flatness problems (Barrow &
Tipler 1986).
There is a basic problem with the argumentative strategy of
Penrose's book. Together with obvious omissions and misrepre-
sentations, Penrose expects the reader to accept a lot of his
argument on faith alone. To follow him all the way to the final
conclusion that "it is indeed 'obvious' that the conscious mind
cannot work like a computer" requires the acceptance of what
seems to be a great deal of mysticism. The Platonic absolute
alone will cause many readers to stop in their tracks, or even
suspend their belief. And that is a shame, because the questions
Penrose raises are important ones, and because he also has a
large number of excellent ideas for dealing with them. Of
particular interest is the suggestion of the "one-graviton limit"
(see pp. 367ff), which is based on the idea that gravity itself is the
observer necessary to catalyse the reduction of the quantum
state vector.
I am not going to argue with Penrose's point that there are
apparently noncomputable aspects to physics. The idea itself is
unexceptionable, and it is easy to see that computable theories -
although immensely successful in some branches of physics -
are not absolutely necessary for the study of the physical world.
Rather, computability is a useful heuristic test for the usefulness
of a physical theory, because it allows us to compare the
predictions of the theory with experiment. Of course, this
procedure of prediction and experimentation is probably less
important to Penrose than it is to those of us who find the idea of
an all-encompassing pre-existing Platonic metareality a little
excessive.
In any case, even if I can use a Turing machine to compute the
evolution of a dynamical system, there is no reason I should
conclude that the dynamical system has used the same method
to compute its own evolution. I find it hard to believe that the
particles taking part in a nuclear decay process, for example, are
using Turing's methods to compute their trajectories in phase
space. On the other hand, it is not totally inconceivable that the
outcomes of, say, nuclear decays, could be determined by
Turing-like computations performed by the particles (in some as
yet unspecified manner). Typical strong interaction decay times
are of the order of 10- 2 3 seconds, so the computation must be
completed within this time. The shortest timescale available is
provided by the Planck time, which is about 10 ~43 seconds, so
whatever mechanism performs the computation of the decay
parameters has time to process at most about 10~20 bits.
This does not seem like very much in terms of the complexity
of the calculations required by present models of this sort of
physical system. (This result should be compared with 1 Mflop,
which is about 10~8 bits for present day machines.) It may be
enough, however, to determine all the information contained
within the system at any given instant. Of course, one cannot
make any definitive statements until it is known exactly how
much information is contained in a given dynamical system!
Rejection or acceptance of a physical theory usually depends
on whether the observed behaviour of the physical system
agrees with its computationally predicted evolution. Should we
not be prepared to apply the same criteria to theories of mind,
and hence to give such theories a similar chance to validate their
own expectations? It is strange that Penrose wishes to deny the
same equality of opportunity to theories of intelligence as the
ones that have been enjoyed for so long - and so fruitfully - by
theories of the physical world. It is also surprising, given the
speculative nature of the evidence on which Penrose bases his
condemnation of the aims of strong artificial intelligence. The
interests of science would be better served by giving artificial
intelligence a fair chance to prove its worth as a branch of study.
Gode! redux
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NY 10598; bUniversity of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093
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Imagine that some phenomenon of nature, say, the growth of
quasicrystalline aluminum-manganese alloys, is neither random
nor algorithmic (Turing-computable). What would it mean?
Would we no longer believe that any nonrandom finitely spec-
ifiable physical system can be modeled computationally to any
degree of accuracy?
The answer seems obvious. The Church-Turing thesis would
be wrong, for the quasicrystals would be a more powerful
computing device than a Turing machine. The behavior of
physical systems would be seen not to be Turing-computable,
but it would be computable in some new sense. Computer
scientists would have a field day formalizing, and harnessing,
the new principles.
These reflections are inspired by Penrose's new book, which
tries to show that such physical systems exist and, realizing that
current physics abhors such an idea,1 speculates about what
might be wrong with current physics. The crux is that classical
physics seems to be computable, while the element of random-
ness introduced by quantum mechanics does not increase com-
putational power but at most increases computational efficiency
(p. 402). The way out is to assume that current physics is wrong
(pp. 438-439):
Could such a physical action be non-algorithmic in nature? We recall
that the general tiling problem . . . is one without an algorithmic
solution. One might envisage that assembly problems for atoms
might share this non-algorithmic property. If these problems can in
principle be 'solved' by the kind of means that I have been hinting at,
then there is indeed some possibility for a non-algorithmic ingredient
in the type of... action that I have in mind. For this to be so,
however, we need something non-algorithmic in CQG.2
Penrose offers no such theory, but he would welcome one. This
seems no more than what one expects: one mathematically
precise physical theory yielding to a new, more complex, one.
As for specifics, Penrose mentions the alloys referred to, but,
steering clear of the "considerable controversy" surrounding
the physics involved, he does not "attempt to draw any defini-
tive conclusions" (pp. 435-38). He is less reticent about the case
of the human brain, perhaps because his argument here is
independent of unsettled issues in physics. His claim is that,
although GodeFs incompleteness theorem shows that any Tur-
ing-computable formal system encompassing arithmetic must
contain true propositions it cannot prove (pp. 105-108), a
mathematician can nevertheless "see" the truth of such proposi-
tions. So, the mathematician does something no algorithm can
do (pp. 417-18).
Penrose is no mystic. He suggests that this feat may be
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possible because "the growth or contraction of families of den-
dritic spines" in the brain is related to the putatively non-
algorithmic behavior of quasicrystals (p. 438). Moreover, he
clearly believes that, even if such phenomena are non-
algorithmic, this simply means that they need more complex
mathematical models; so he is at pains to emphasize that there is
more to mathematics than the Hobson's choice of algorithms or
randomness (pp. 129-40). More specifically, he still believes
that mathematicians reason by means of arguments in which
"each step . . . can be reduced to something simple and ob-
vious" (p. 418), but the procedure involved would not be
Turing-computable. At this point, we (unlike Penrose) would
have noted that this does not contradict the usual mathematics
of computation, which routinely allows for "machines" that
"compute" functions that are not Turing-computable (Turing
machines with oracles, infinite nets, etc.). The Church-Turing
thesis does not forbid this, but merely says not to identify such
"machines" with the intuitive notion of computation or al-
gorithm. Even this is falsifiable, however, and if Penrose is
right, is false. It would then be a matter of taste whether we
extend the term "algorithm" to the broader class of procedures
or reserve it for standard (Church-Turing) algorithms.
But all this - and more - depends on granting Penrose's
argument, and this we should not do. The reason is a small but
lethal flaw in his presentation, and application, of Godel's
theorem. For Godel does not say that a certain proposition P is
true but unprovable in a formal system F, but merely that P
is true but unprovable if F is consistent. Penrose notes that if
F is inconsistent then P is provable but false, but then makes the
inexplicable mistake of assuming that, "Our formal system
should not be so badly constructed that it actually allows false
propositions to be proved!" (pp. 107-108). Without this, only
the conditional can be proved (and this can be done
algorithmically!).
The crucial thing to show would be that a mathematician,
unlike an algorithm, can also derive P itself. But this is surely
wrong, for what mathematician would jump from "P is unprova-
ble but true if F is consistent" to P? To assent to P, he would
need to know that F is consistent. But F in this case is the
mathematician's own mind. If F proves - or assumes - its own
consistency, then (by Godel's theorem) it must be algorithmic
and inconsistent, or nonalgorithmic and consistent, or non-
algorithmic and inconsistent. To conclude that the mind is
nonalgorithmic, we would need to know that it is consistent, but
that we do not know. Mathematicians do not even claim to know
that arithmetic is consistent, though they may "hope" so.
(Kleene 1950, p. 211).
So, whether the action of the human brain is algorithmic
remains an open question. But if it is not, Penrose is probably
right that this would have to mean that Turing-non-computable
mathematics underlies our neural hardware.
NOTES
1. While the issue is controversial, some physicists go so far as to
suggest computability as a methodological criterion for physical theories
(Geroch & Hartle 1986).
2,, The theory of quantum gravity.
Computation and consciousness
Drew McDermott
Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520
Electronic mail: mcdermott@cs.yale.edu
Penrose's book consists of lucid tutorials on computer science
and modern physics, some well-worn arguments against the
possibility of artificial intelligence, and some vague thoughts on
quantum mechanics and consciousness.
It has one intriguing, novel idea (novel to me, anyway), that
physical laws might transcend computability. Imagine that a
strange "electrochromatic" field is discovered some day, in
which only certain systems are stable, the rest disintegrating
quickly. It turns out that the simplest description of the field's
behavior is that it destroys automata that would otherwise loop
forever (e.g., cycle through states of high kinetic energy indefi-
nitely), allowing only those that will eventually halt (e.g., reach
some kind of equilibrium) to survive. Never mind the gaps in
this description; the question is, could God have created a
universe with a field like that? The gut reaction of the average
computer scientist is surely, no. But it is hard to say why, unless
God is a computer engineer.
Ah, well, such entertaining topics are few and far between in
Penrose's book, Much of it is devoted to old arguments about
the validity of the Turing test and the limitations imposed by
Godefs incompleteness theorem. Penrose is apparently un-
aware of the current status of this discussion. Let me bring him
up to date:
1. It is absurd to suppose that a paper Alan Turing wrote in
1950 commits every AI researcher to a crude operationalist view
of the mind. I am as much a realist as Penrose about whether an
entity is actually thinking or feeling. I believe that the ultimate
nature of these phenomena is computational,, however. That
belief leads to a research program. Turing's test plays no role in
this program, certainly not as a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for a machine's being capable of thought. Penrose and
others think the test is insufficient; I and most Ai researchers
think it's unnecessary; so let's agree to put it aside and focus on
the important issue, which is exactly what phenomena are
explainable computationally. (The current state of progress is
that not many phenomena are thus explainable, so I don't know
what the critics are afraid of.)
"But without the test, how will you know when your new
science has succeeded?" Luckily for Galileo, the Vatican didn't
burn him at the stake for the inability to answer the correspond-
ing question about physics. For that matter, it is just as well the
question isn't being pressed now. The state of the methodology
of physics in the twentieth century is more inchoate than it was
in the seventeenth, consisting mainly, as Penrose clearly and
candidly explains (in (ph. 6), of embarrassment about what it
means to "make a measurement" of a quantum-mechanical
system. The principal debate seems to be between proponents
of the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics
(DeWitt 1973) on the one hand, and on the other hand all those
(the majority, including Penrose) who are trying to stave it off.
From my point of view, that of a humble outsider, the Everett-
Wheeler interpretation seems obviously correct, but I can well
understand why its opponents want to avoid its implication that
the universe is continually splitting into unaccountable copies of
itself. I am glad the worst methodological problem AI has to face
is how to get people to forget about the Turing test.
When all is said and done, I find it hard to understand exactly
what Penrose's objection is to the use of the test. Penrose's test
is in some ways easier to pass: "All 1 would myself ask for would
be that our perceptive interrogator should really feel convinced,
from the nature of the computer's replies, that there is a
conscious presence underlying these replies - albeit a possibly
alien one." (p. 9) I would ask for more. If all cognitive science can
come up with is a furry automaton that people feel they can
confide in, without a theory of what consciousness really is, then
it will have failed.
2. GodeFs theorem is irrelevant to the question of how well
computers could think about mathematics.1 On second thought,
Godefs theorem provides evidence in favor of AI. Here's the
argument:
i People are unable to prove or disprove every statement in
number theory.
ii So are computers.
iii Ergo, people and computers are alike in at least one way.
That's very weak evidence, but it's in the right direction. Of
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course, someone might dispute Premise i, but surely not a
Platonist like Penrose.
Here is another argument that Penrose might prefer:
a. Suppose you are an algorithm that, given a conjecture in
number theory, correctly decides whether it is true or loops
forever or gives up.
b. It can be shown that there is a true conjecture that will
cause you to loop forever or give up.
c. Any person can understand the argument alluded to in b,
so you will both come to believe the conjecture and not come to
believe it, which is a contradiction.
d. Therefore, you are not an algorithm that, given a conjec-
ture in number theory, decides whether it is true or loops
forever or gives up.
This is an awfully sophisticated argument to arrive at such an
obvious conclusion. Those who are impressed by it think that it
would survive if Assumption a were replaced by the assumption:
"Suppose you were any algorithm whatever." But it does not.
Suppose that AI succeeds in building an artificial mathematician
with abilities comparable to those of a human mathematician. It
might or might not have a subroutine of the sort discussed by
Penrose, that is, a semidecision procedure for Peano arithmetic.
Suppose it did have such a routine. Then it might have another
routine that could appreciate the argument about the limitation
of the first routine. "But surely the combination of the two
would have gaps in its understanding?" Of course it would, but
not because of the argument above. The enlarged system al-
ready violates Assumption a. And we haven't even made use of
all the other abilities this human-competitive program would
have, including the ability to carry on a conversation with other
mathematicians and learn new limitations of the formal systems
it had been making use of. To top it off, any plausible candidate
for an algorithm that duplicates a person would, far from being
an infallible procedure, have incomplete and even contradictory
beliefs about mathematics. This last feature makes it unreason-
able to think of its reasoning pattern as modelable by a formal
logical system at all.
If your eyebrows rise at this possibility, you have fallen victim
to a seductive fallacy, of identifying the formal system that a
computer program is with a formal system it reasons about. The
insight that a digital computer is a formal system is quite
powerful theoretically (for a good exegesis read Haugeland
[1985]). But this insight plays little role in thinking about actual
programs, beyond the consideration that if the machine fails to
make the next move in the particular formal game it embodies,
you call the repairman. That's why we have to prove that a
program that does deduction is sound; it is all too easy to write a
perfectly formal system that draws informal and incorrect
conclusions.
An echo of this fallacy is found in Penrose's argument that all
algorithms for reasoning about mathematics must be equivalent
(p. 417), an argument that confuses proof verification with proof
generation. Even granting that all mathematicians can under-
stand and evaluate each other's proofs, they could still embody
different algorithms when it comes to searching for these proofs.
Any real algorithm for searching for proofs will consist of lots of
idiosyncratic little strategies that work now and then, together
with various (time-varying, environment-dependent) rules for
when to try which strategy. Such an algorithm is absolutely sure
to be incomplete and even error-prone, just like a human
mathematician. In other words, an AI account of mathematical
reasoning is likely to be similar to an AI account of story
understanding, and we're far from .a theory of either. Formal
arithmetic certainly does not supply such an account.
Finally, we have this coda to the arguments from undecida-
bility:
One often strives for algorithms, . . . , but the striving itself does
not seem to be an algorithmic procedure. Once an appropriate
algorithm is found, the problem is, in a sense, solved. Moreover, the
mathematical judgement that some algorithm is indeed accurate or
appropriate is the sort of thing that requires much conscious atten-
tion, (p. 413)
Mathematical truth is not something that we ascertain merely by
use of an algorithm. I believe, also, that our consciousness is a crucial
ingredient in our comprehension of mathematical truth. We must
'see' the truth of a mathematical argument to be convinced of its
validity, (p. 418)
This way of putting it just misplaces the level at which the
hypothesized algorithms are presumed to operate. If we can get
a computational theory of mathematical reasoning, it won't
predict that mathematicians feel like Robby the Robot. It will
say what it means to "see" the truth of a mathematical argument.
Of course, no one has any idea what such a theory would look
like.
Without these old arguments, what does Penrose have?
Actually, the argument he really wants to make carries a lot of
weight:
Is it not 'obvious' that mere computation cannot evoke pleasure or
pain; that it cannot perceive poetry or the beauty of an evening sky or
the magic of sounds; that it cannot hope or love or despair; that it
cannot have a genuine autonomous purpose?
Some of the arguments that I have given in these chapters may
seem tortuous and complicated. Some are admittedly speculative,
whereas I believe that there is no real escape from some of the others.
Yet beneath all this technicality is the feeling that it is indeed
'obvious' that the conscious mind cannot work like a computer, even
though much of what is actually involved in mental activity might do
so.
This is the kind of obviousness that a child can see - . (pp. 447-48)
What this argument amounts to is pointing out that the burden
of proof for the question whether computer consciousness is
possible lies on those who think it is. But I guess you can't write a
whole book pointing out something as obvious as the failure of
computationalism to say much about consciousness as yet.
Penrose appears to think that the computationalist position on
the question of consciousness is that it will simply emerge from
complexity: "The viewpoint of strong AI2 . . . maintains that a
'mind' finds its existence through the embodiment of a suffi-
ciently complex algorithm. . . . " (p. 429) "Conscious-
ness . . . is something just 'accidentally' conjured up by a com-
plicated computation. . . ." (p. 447). If he had taken a survey of
AI researchers, he would have found almost none who agreed
with that view. He would have found many who agreed with him
that AI will not account for consciousness without new ideas;
many who acknowledge confusion on the matter; and some who
believe that AI's current ideas at least deserve a shot at explain-
ing consciousness. I would put myself in the last group, and
would hasten to issue a disclaimer that taking this shot involves
almost as much speculation as Penrose expends in explaining
consciousness with quantum mechanics. The point is that some
explanation is necessary, however. Consciousness is not simply
going to emerge from complication. There must be specific
computational structures that underlie it. My belief is that a
system is conscious because it has a model of itself as conscious
(that is, as an agent with a single stream of thought, infallible
observations of its own state, and exemption from causal laws in
making decisions). A system could be quite intelligent, I sup-
pose, and still not be conscious, because it failed to have such a
self-model
Penrose would doubt this, because he subscribes to an
amazingly naive brand of introspectionism on the subject. In the
quote above, he lumps together pleasure, pain, esthetics, pur-
pose, love, and despair as all part of consciousness. Elsewhere
he tends to assume that the "consciousness faculty" drives
judgment and intelligence. He spends much time explaining
away data that contradict this theory, data that tend rather to
support the idea that consciousness is a game the brain plays
with itself. To take one example, people's conscious impressions
of the exact times when sense data are recorded and decisions
are made tend to be out-of-synch with reality by exactly the
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amount you would expect if the actual psychophysiological
events the conscious impressions reflect took an appreciable
amount of time before consciousness got involved. For example,
it takes 500 msec to become aware of a stimulus, and the
conscious impression gets "backdated" 500 msec to compen-
sate. [See Libet: "Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role
of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action" BBS 8(4) 1985.] Penrose
blushes, makes another apology for why the all-powerful con-
sciousness seems to be so out-of-it, and then brings forth
speculation about quantum mechanics and time.
Or consider Penrose's objection to the possibility that the
brain is a parallel computer: "A characteristic feature of con-
scious thought . . . is its 'oneness' - as opposed to a great many
independent activities going on at once." (pp. 398-99) Forget
about AI - the author needs to brush up on William James and
Sigmund Freud! It's very hard to take him seriously on the
subject of consciousness.
Let me conclude on a more positive note. I concluded above
that the known limitations on formal arithmetic did not automat-
ically extend to all computational processes. But that does not
mean there are no limitations on computers' ability to reason
about mathematics; we simply don't know what the limits are. If
there are significant limitations, and humans don't have them,
then humans aren't computers. They might not be physical
systems at all, but that conclusion is unfashionable. Assuming
they are purely physical (which Penrose assumes), if they can
beat computers at some kind of reasoning, then there are
physical systems that can. So we would be able (presumably) to
build machines that compute uncomputable things. These ma-
chines wouldn't do computation, of course, even though their
outputs would be interpretable as computational results. (If you
ask, How do these machines work?, the answer would be,
There's no "how" to it; a "how" would be a computation.) I
mentioned the possibility of such physical systems at the begin-
ning of this review. I assume that the possibility is extremely
unlikely, and hence that any limitations on computerized math-
ematical reasoning also apply to people.
It is meaningless to talk of such limits unless the mathematical
world exists independently of what people, or computers, think
about it. Penrose discusses this issue at several points, and I
tend to agree with what he says. In particular, I think most AI
practitioners have been insufficiently impressed by the follow-
ing Penrosian point:
For an algorithm to 'exist' independently of any particular physical
embodiment, a Platonic viewpoint of mathematics would seem to be
essential. It would be difficult for a strong-AI supporter to take the
alternative line that 'mathematical concepts exist only in minds',
since this would be circular, requiring pre-existing minds for the
existence of algorithms and pre-existing algorithms for minds!
. . . Accepting, then, that algorithms inhabit Plato's world [the world
of mathematics], and hence that world, according to the strong-AI
view, is where minds are to be found, we would now have to face the
question of how the physical world and Plato's world can relate to one
another. This, it seems to me, is the strong-AI version of the mind-
body problem! (p. 429)
I might add that AI practitioners have in general shown a
strange willingness to believe that concepts are imposed on the
world by minds, and not objectively real at all, while at the same
time, as Penrose says, being committed to the idea that minds
themselves are objectively present, and that their contents are
formed by well-defined encounters with the world. Clearly, the
latter commitment is deeper than the former innocent phe-
nomenalism; if a computational account of consciousness is ever
obtained, one of its philosophical implications will be a radical
realism. For instance, Cartesian doubt would be decisively, and
empirically, refuted by a theory that predicts the presence of
consciousness in physical systems with a certain computational
structure. If you are bothered by that prospect, or any other
consequence of the success of AI in explaining the mind, rest
assured that progress to date is small. For the time being, you
needn't lose any sleep over the possibility of conscious
machines.
NOTES
1. Most of the arguments that follow are due to Marvin Minsky
(personal communication), and some appear in The Society of Mind
(Minsky 1986).
2. "Strong AI" is a term Penrose borrows from Searle (1980), and
which is synonymous with what I call "computationalism," the doctrine
that thought is computation. "Weak AI" is, as far as I can tell, a trap for
the philosophically unwary cognitive scientist, and not worth
discussing.
if machines and minds
Chris Mortensen
Department of Philosophy, The University of Adelaide, North Terrace,
South Australia 5001, Australia
Penrose flirts with arguing from Godel's first incompleteness
theorem to the conclusion that the mind is not a Turing ma-
chine. This argument has a long history of defenders, going back
through Lucas, Nagel and Newman, to Godel himself. At its
crudest, it argues from the premise that Godel's first in-
completeness theorem states that for any Turing machine ma-
chine (or any formal axiomatisable theory containing at least
Robinson arithmetic in which all primitive recursive functions
can be represented) there is a true sentence that the theory
cannot prove or disprove, or the machine cannot effectively
verify or refute. The conclusion is that since humans can know
that such sentences are true (by the Godel theorem), humans
cannot be equivalent to any such machine.
I have no axe to grind about whether we are Turing machines,
but I am concerned to believe only conclusions supported by
sound arguments. It has been clear what is wrong with this
argument since Putnam's (1960) seminal paper, although the
argument has produced a considerable and often confused
literature since. What the first incompleteness theorem says is
that if the arithmetical theory is consistent then there is a true
sentence unprovable in the theory. (Strictly not even that, only
that if the axiomatisable arithmetical theory is consistent then
there is a sentence A where neither A nor not-A are theorems of
the theory; the further step that one of A and not-A is true can be
challenged, but let us let it go.) Hence, to know that the Godel
sentence is true one needs to know that arithmetic is consistent.
(Indeed, given that the Godel sentence represents "I am un-
provable," then it is true only if arithmetic is consistent.) But by
Godel's second incompleteness theorem, no recursively enu-
merable system capable of representing arithmetic can prove its
own consistency. Thus the premise that the Godel sentence is
true (and unprovable) cannot be known unless it is known that
arithmetic is consistent, and no Turing machine can know the
latter. So who says that humans can know it either: The argu-
ment begs the question. One might add that the theory of
inconsistent mathematical systems is by now well enough devel-
oped for it not to be so catastrophic if arithmetic did turn out to
be inconsistent.
Be that as it may, there is a problem about how mathematical
knowledge, or at least nonfinitistic mathematical knowledge, is
possible. 1 have always felt that Skolem's paradox is a real
puzzle: We feel that we have genuine knowledge of non-
denumerably infinite structures such as set theory or the real
numbers, which is yet expressible in first order language. But
by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, any first order theory with
an infinite interpretation has a denumerable interpretation.
Wherein consists our understanding of the nondenumerable
then? Are we second order creatures? That seems unlikely for
finite nerve nets. More generally, how is knowledge of analysis
possible for finite nerve nets? How is knowledge possible of
immense structures like the hyperreal numbers (real, infin-
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itesimal, and infinite), let alone knowledge of a theory which can
generate the Bell results, as elementary quantum theory can?
(Indeed how is a Bell-nonlocal universe possible?)
The trouble with these Kantian questions is that it needs to be
shown that we do have genuine knowledge -of these structures
that exceeds the merely first order, or constructive, or Turing-
computable, or whatever the target power. The history of
mathematics is partly the history of tacit agreement on hidden
mathematical principles being eventually brought to conscious
mathematical scrutiny, as Lakatos (1976) persuasively argues. It
takes enunciation of such principles to clarify and scrutinise
them, and enunciation looks suspiciously effective and Turing-
computable, or at any rate performable by a finite nerve net or
silicon neurochip. Why isn't dealing with the real numbers just
dealing with explicit and tacit axioms and sentences? It has to be
demonstrated that there is a special phenomenon to be ex-
plained here, and it is not at all obvious that there is. I suppose
that if we did have, say, some sort of mystical direct perception
of the whole set of real or hyperreal numbers, then our powers
would demonstrably exceed those of microchips. If such a
fantastical hypothesis were true, then perhaps a sophisticated
theoretical construction like quantum gravity would have to be
invoked in explanation; it is doubtless better than many other
explanations. The trouble is that quantum gravity is so unlike
the hyperreals. Thinking about the hyperreals or analysis is
surely much more like the sentences and pictures that are
printed in books about the hyperreals. Would it be so far wrong
to say that it is just sentences in the head with appropriate causal
linkages to behaviour? And if it were far wrong, what would
need explaining is the efficacy of mathematics texts and lectures
as communication channels between mystical senders and re-
ceivers. Again, the functional architecture of knowers looks to
be nerve nets, which is much more like the functional architec-
ture of microchips than like atoms.
I do not think that it is just sentences in the head. At the very
least, sentences are highly structural properties of networks;
though such "emergence" is perfectly natural, since it is nothing
more than a many-placed relation and we are familiar with these
in nature(e.g. ,betweenness). The role of visual or spatial models
cannot be ignored either. Geometrical representation in mathe-
matics is undoubtedly not the same thing as verbal representa-
tion, symbolic representation being an intermediate case. It is
an error to conclude that the spatial can be reduced to the verbal
or symbolic on the grounds that there is some isomorphism
between certain of their aspects. The fact is, the spatial is not the
verbal. Cartesian coordinates, pairs of real numbers, are not the
plane, they merely represent it. Our thinking is saturated with
the sensory and the spatial, as I have argued elsewhere (Mor-
tensen 1989). But then it surely does not exceed the powers of a
finite nerve net to represent the spatial in a spatial way, any
more than it exceeds the powers of a television set to do so.
What does come out of quantum theory on this point, I think,
is a doubt about whether we finite structures can understand
any precise mathematical concept. If so then the Godel premise
that we know the Godel sentence to be true is in even worse
shape. This needs as a premise the Copenhagen interpretation
of elementary quantum theory, which I would be willing to
defend: that the Heisenberg uncertainty relations indicate gen-
uine indeterminateness or incompleteness in nature. That is,
cells and nerve nets are a little fuzzy around the edges. A second
premise is that understanding-knowledge-memory require in-
ner representations (albeit grossly holistic), with appropriate
causal links to the world. Now, for an inner structure to be a
representation it must have at least as many casually active
features as that which is represented: Understanding aspects of
an idea requires potential complexity of output matching the
complexity of the aspects (even if the output is merely sym-
bolic). Understanding a precise idea, therefore, requires preci-
sion in the understander-structure matching the precision of the
understood aspects of the idea. But by the first premise no
understander-structure is wholly precise. Therefore, no actual
nerve net or neurochip could fully understand a precise mathe-
matical idea. There are obvious places where this argument
could be challenged, but I will not pursue them.
A last point emerges from chaos theory. It is fashionable to
present chaos theory in a paradoxical way: that wholly determin-
istic and computable systems can be chaotic. The point, how-
ever, is that the concept of chaos has shifted from an older
meaning (something like "undetermined"), to a newer epistemic
meaning ("unpredictable" or "unknowable"). Chaos theory
arises from the discovery of (simple, Turing-computable) func-
tions that are very sensitive to small changes in initial condi-
tions, especially after a few times around the loop. The chaos is
that our knowledge always contains an error term or uncertainty
(quantum theory is sufficient but not necessary for this premise).
So the error term in our knowledge of such systems grows
rapidly, becoming unpredictable with any degree of precision.
My point here is that the recognition of the epistemic limitation
of the powers of human knowers is at the foundations of chaos
theory, which makes it even harder to believe strong claims
about how the powers of humans exceed those of microchips or
nerve nets.
A final plug for the Turing machines. Chess programs are now
up to grandmaster level, though they do not do it quite the way
we do it. The best kind of mathematical proof is the one which
makes the alternatives exclusive, exhaustive, and surveyable.
We may be fostering the emergence of a genuinely higher
intelligence (see Gibson 1984).
Steadfast intentions
Keith K. Niali
Simulation Group, Human Factors Division, Defence and Civil Institute of
Environmental Medicine, Downsview, Ontario, Canada M3M 3B9
Electronic mail: kn@dretor.dciem.dnd.ca and kn@zorac.dciem.dnd.ca
What can be achieved in psychology in the absence of a com-
plete knowledge of physics? Penrose (1989) expects a nascent
physical theory - "correct quantum gravity" - to explain how it
is that people can perceive. In other words, an advance in
physics should illuminate a problem in psychology. Yet the
theory of quantum gravity will make no psychological explana-
tion manifest, if only because the fundamental problems of
psychology are not problems in physics. Problems in psychology
are marked by intentionality, and physics makes no mention of
intentionality (Chisholm 1957; McAlister 1976). And in psycho-
logical explanation: "Everybody has to face the issue about
intentionality somewhere" (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981, p. 192).
Suppose that intentionality might be described in terms such as
"mass," "length," and "time." Then still, psychological explana-
tion requires some account of intentionality, whereas correct
quantum gravity does not promise any such account. Perhaps
psychologists should not wait for a revolution in physics before
they explore the fundamental problems of perception and cogni-
tion. Two reasons not to wait will emerge after some considera-
tion of the intentionality of vision.
Most accounts of the intentionality of vision begin as descrip-
tions oiwhat is seen. Gibsonians claim that physical objects are
"perceived directly" (Gibson 1979, p. 263), whereas empiricists
claim that proximal stimuli are "present to the mind" (see Yolton
1984, p. ix). These are small figures of speech; one might as well
say that perception is "directed" (cf. Cutting 1986) in a way that
masses are not. As Penrose says, "To be conscious, I have to be
conscious of something" (p. 405). Such figures of speech convey
no insight into how we may perceive things about the world. Is
any explanation needed? Is it not a simple fact that we perceive
physical objects? We do see what lies before our eyes, for
example, mountains, chairs, dogs, rainbows, shadows, and
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sometimes a part of the Milky Way. The explanation of this fact
is not at all simple;-so far, it is enigmatic. (One may consider that
this fact entails that few people except neurosurgeons see that
which is encased in the meninges of the brain.)
A first reason to distinguish perceptual psychology from the
study of physics concerns the description of what is seen. Some
confusion about what is seen arises because the description
under which something is seen (roughly, what it is seen as) is not
distinguished from a description of the physical conditions that
allow light to arrive at the eyes. A description under which
something is seen is a description of an intentional object, while
a description of visible surfaces and the optical conditions under
which that thing would be seen is a description of a material
object. The description under which something is seen is called
"intentional"; among other reasons, this is because equivalent
descriptions are not necessarily substitutable in answers to the
question, "What do you see?" without changing the truth of the
answer. The distinction between the intentional and the mate-
rial object of vision is not a distinction between kinds of matter,
or between bits of matter. The terms "intentional object" and
"material object" are meant to indicate semantic categories, just
as "direct object" and "indirect object" indicate grammatical
categories (Anscombe 1981, p. 9). These terms distinguish
between two kinds of answer to, "What is seen?" One kind
specifies the intentional object of vision, another kind specifies
the material object. These answers should coincide; most often
they do. Then the same body is both intentional and material
object of vision; that is, most often both answers provide true
descriptions of the same thing. (The logic of questions and
answer is no more than a pons asinorum to understanding the
intentionality of vision, cf. Searle 1983, p. 5). There is a logical
relation between statements that convey material objects and
statements that convey intentional objects: A statement that
specifies a material object implies a statement that specifies an
intentional object, but the converse does not hold of necessity
(Anscombe 1981, p. 17). In other words, describing the inten-
tional object of vision is logically prior to describing the material
object of vision. Physics is not concerned with intentional
objects, and the descriptions offered by physics do not imply
intentional descriptions. Yet vision is intentional, and the study
of intentionality elucidates vision. This seems a reason to sup-
pose that "a coherent and appropriate physical theory" (p. 10)
should not aspire to explain perception in the absence of a
theory of intentionality.
A reason to distinguish part of cognitive psychology from the
study of physics emerges as a consequence of Penrose's beliefs
about mathematical knowledge. He claims (pp. 108, 116, 118)
that mathematicians see "absolute, external, and eternal"
truths, either by insight or intuition. Penrose did not invent this
analogy to sight, known as "Godelian perception." Of course,
the analogy is not based on the physical effects of light. This
raises a classic problem: How may we know mathematical truths
if the objects that ground such truths are atemporal and non-
spatial? If Liouviile's theorem (p. 181) would be unaffected even
by the end of the universe (in a final big crunch, see p. 325), how
did mathematicians acquire knowledge of the theorem by phys-
ical means? Penrose's burden is to explain the analogy of mathe-
matical discovery with vision, after he has restricted his expla-
nation to the vocabulary of physics. In contrast, Godel stresses
psychological or epistemological themes of the analogy.
Godel claims that similar abstract notions are involved in
perception and in mathematical discovery. He supposes that the
"idea of object" is given in perception, but not in sensory
impressions; such ideas are "abstract elements contained in our
empirical ideas" (Godel 1964, p. 272). Godel's analogy is based
on this "idea of object," rather than on sensory impressions. It is
not at all clear how the "idea of object" may be reduced to such
physical terms as "mass," "length," and "time." Penrose is
unclear how physical theory could explain the discovery of
mathematical truths otherwise. He does attempt to explain
mathematical discovery by what he calls a "reflection princi-
ple." The reiection principle is not part of physical theory
either, since it is explained in terms of meaning (p. 110, see also
pp. 104, 107). The epistemology inherent in Penrose's claims
does invoke notions like "idea of object" and "meaning." The
second reason to distinguish psychology from the study of
physics, then, is that psychological notions are used in the
explanation of mathematical discovery. These abstract notions
are not reduced to physics.
There is much to be done in psychology yet. One important
task to explain the intentionality of perception, for "inten-
tionality won't be reduced and won't go away" (Putnam 1988, p.
1). As psychologist, Penrose's task is not easy, but he might do
better not to wait for a revolution in physics.
The emperor's old hat
Don Perils
Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park,
MD 20742
Electronic mail: perlis@csMmd.edu
Penrose presents largely old and fallacious arguments:
1. The extrapolation fallacy. Niels Bohr and Max Delbruck
said they felt that the explanation of living things would require
the discovery of new physical principles about the organization
of matter. Life turned out to be more a matter of fantastic and
unsuspected features of suitably complex chemical tinkertoys,
however, explainable in terms of existing physics. The extrapo-
lation from simple to complex molecules was false: Simple ones
do not reproduce or metabolize, but complex ones can. The
same sort of phenomenon may hold for mind, in ways we do not
yet see.
2. Strong AI and inner experience. Penrose leaves the reader
with the impression (see his Prologue and Epilogue) that strong
AI is hostile to touchy-feely things like actual inner experience.
This is far from the case: Strong AI suggests that inner experi-
ence is indeed there, and when we find it we will see that it
amounts to very, very complex information processing.
3. Dualism. Along with Searle (1980), Penrose (pp. 21-22)
seems to find a form of dualism in strong AI, namely, in the
supposed claim that it is pattern (software, mechanical al-
gorithm) and not substance (hardware or brain) that constitutes
mentality. But mere pattern by itself is not even a process, it
does nothing. It is algorithmic processes, not static printed
copies of algorithms, that Alers are concerned with.
4. Intentionality. Penrose (p. 406) correctly observes that
one cannot just feel or wonder or think without there being
something that one feels or wonders or thinks, that is, the mind
has directedness or intentionality. Penrose and Searle claim that
the person-plus-program system in the Chinese Room does not
mean (refer to) anything by its Chinese squiggles and squoggles,
that is, there is no intentionality. This is again the extrapolation
fallacy: A suitably complex person-plus-program system may
indeed understand Chinese.
5. Self-awareness. Penrose's video-camera counterexample
(p. 410) as to what self-awareness is not, is a woefully im-
poverished one: Imagine instead a vastly more complex device,
one that uses its inner model to guide its behavior. It is then not
so clear that it has no self-awareness. Again the extrapolation
fallacy. (See Perlis 1987; 1989 for more on self-awareness and
intentionality.)
6. Seeing the truth. Penrose says that for any consistent
formal system of the right sort there are true well-formed
formulas (wffs) that we can see to be true but the system cannot
prove (pp. 108,110,417). This is half correct: There are true wffs
that the system cannot prove — and in fact, if the system is ample
enough (say, if it is ZFC, i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
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the axiom of choice) then it can even prove that fact (i.e., the
system will have a proof of Godel's theorem!). But it does not
follow that we can "see" such wffs, in the sense of picking them
out and proving them true. In some cases, to be sure, we can do
this, but in most of those cases so can ZFC. What is needed to
get our hands on an actual, instance of the Godel sort is, typically,
knowledge of the consistency of the system in question. Now,
this is emphatically not something we can in general see. For
instance, even today we have no proof of consistency of ZFC,
and it is generally believed that there can be no such proof
except by methods that essentially beg the. question by assum-
ing 'what they need to prove.
Do we somehow intuit that certain formalisms are consistent?
This would be an intriguing possibility, and perhaps Penrose
can be taken as suggesting this (pp. 418fl). But it will not hold up
as a kind of "seeing the truth." ZFC may yet turn out to be
inconsistent; certainly various other formalisms that at Erst
seemed just fine have turned out to be inconsistent (Frege felt
confident that his axiomatization was consistent, for example,
yet Russell showed otherwise). The general belief that ZFC is
consistent is really evidential-heuristic, that is, it works well, is
very useful, no one so far has found an inconsistency, it is based
on principles that, in special cases at least, are part and parcel of
everyday mathematics, mathematicians tend to have strong
intuitions as to the clarity of these, and so forth. I am not saying
that I think ZFC is inconsistent — on the contrary, I think it is
not. Moreover, it is conceivable that a suitable formalism (e.g.,
that of Elgot-Drapkin 1988) could even weigh the changing
evidence for its own consistency.
Does this mean, then, that if our minds are in fact machine
processes, we can never grasp the full truth about reality,
assuming (as Penrose suggests) that the latter involves non-
mechanical complexities? This need not follow. For one thing,
we interact with reality, we do not continue forever with a fixed
data set. If a Turing machine's tape is allowed to have varying
input over time, then the usual limitations do not apply, at least
not in the same way. Second, our brains have been evolving,
and may well continue to do so, especially if we consider that
technological breakthroughs (e.g., computers) and fundamental
scientific discoveries can lead to new notions of human endeav-
or. But the change is not from any internal force of "seeing"
truths; rather it is new external data, in interaction with our
brains, that leads to new brains.
This notion of getting to know things by external contact bears
on Penrose's reductio (pp. 417-18) of the possibility of there
being one grand mathematical formalism that all mathemati-
cians follow. As we investigate new mathematical terrain, we
find new principles that become incorporated into our thinking,
and at that time we "grow" by enlarging our formalisms. Our
formalisms enlarged significantly when Fermat introduced
proof by induction. We then became able to see new truths we
could not see before. "How did Fermat come by it, then?"
Penrose might ask. Well, presumably, Fermat interacted with
just the right kinds of examples to trigger his brain in just the
right way. Also, proof by induction is itself provably correct in
ZFC, so it is possible that something like ZFC is the grand
formalism Penrose denies. That might mean that mathemati-
cians were able to recognize and accept proofs based uncon-
sciously on ZFC without their actually knowing ZFC's axioms,
until Zermelo and Fraenkel introduced them explicitly in this
century. Of course, future world interactions might push us
further, beyond ZFC.
Penrose urges his notion of judgment (of truth, for instance,
p. 411) as the hallmark of consciousness, which, he says, "the AI
people would have no concept of how to program on a comput-
er" (p. 412). In fact, a major subfield of AI is nonmonotonic
reasoning, which is precisely the topic of jumping to plausible
conclusions based on relevant evidence (see Ginsberg 1987).
This is recognized as a very hard topic, but it is not a non-
algorithmic one.
Systematic, unconscious thought is the
place to anchor quantum mechanics in the
mind-
Thomas Roeper
Department of Linguistics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA
01003
Electronic mall: roeper@cs.umass.bitnet
Penrose makes two points that are not represented in current
computer models: (I) that the nonalgorithmic domain of mathe-
matics should be a model for the mind, (2) that nonlocal and
nondeterministic effects must be present in the mind.l But how
far do these ideas, with which we agree, go? Whereas it is true
that quantum mechanics introduces a kind of indeterminacy
with physics and true that absolute determinism would seem to
be incompatible with the notion of free will, is the tyranny of raw
chance any closer to how the mind works? No single mental
product (even an imaginary one) receives a clear quantum
analysis in this book. Penrose's focus on the "process" of mind
is, of necessity, often anecdotal or relevant only to the fairly
primitive knowledge we have of physiology. The mentalist side
of cognitive science (which many take to be the heart of the field)
is ignored, namely, language and vision, where the most sophis-
ticated "products" of the mind are reasonably well-understood
within a deductive framework.
Penrose shows that computer simulations fail to simulate. But
is simulation, no matter how good, ever equal to understanding?
Suppose we could produce a computer which did have nonlocal
effects, or nondeterminism; we might still not understand what
it says about the mind. Machines can generate "chaotic" effects
but the fact that humans produced the machines and their
programs does not mean that we understand the principles
behind chaos theory. Or from the opposite perspective, is it
right to assume that the mind is a single machine? Suppose one
had six differently construed machines which together gave us
insight into human nature, but one is unable to combine them
into a single machine using the same principles (like different
"operating systems"). Would this perhaps support "modular"
views of the mind? Thus the machine metaphor could fail to be
revealing (as in "chaos" theory) successful in replication, or be
revealing by its failure (because of modularity).
In other ways, the computer model, even if it worked per-
fectly, might give little scientific insight. Penrose shows that the
computer could not "represent" certain kinds of noncomputable
phenomena. Nor can humans. Nevertheless, the computer
might be able to "refer" correctly to noncomputable quantities
(just as humans can). This, in turn, could be sufficient to allow us
to make the nonalgorithmic judgments he seeks. But does
successful programming constitute principled understanding?
Chomsky (1986) distinguishes between "leading principles" and
"modes of execution" in linguistics. The intellectual poverty of
AI lies in the assumption that modes of execution are the
deepest insights available.
The acceptance of the Turing test as a definition of intel-
ligence may be the essence of the problem. Instead, one needs
well-defined mental fragments where the structure and mecha-
nism of thought, not just8 its appearance, is represented. Lan-
guage is a tiny molecule in a biological mosaic, but perhaps it has
the essence of all principles of mind built in, just as DNA
structure is repeated in every cell.
Linguistics distinguishes between automatic but unconscious
programming and slow problem-solving ability which is at best
partially conscious. It is not clear that conscious mental activity
is more than the shimmering surface of thought with no truly
special properties. Perhaps the conscious/unconscious distinc-
tion corresponds to the computable/noncomputable distinc-
tion, but this would have to be demonstrated, not assumed. It is
free will, evident in an instant, that is the conundrum of being
human, the source of our sense of dignity. In 50 milliseconds we
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can form an image that is affected by our personalities. In less
than a second we can produce or comprehend a sentence,
replete with Freudian slips, to which every aspect of the mind is
connected.
Has any science succeeded without making a distinction
between possible and impossible? Linguistic theory dis-
tinguishes a class of impossible thoughts (universally ungram-
matical sentences) from possible thoughts (grammatical sen-
tences), while still exhibiting infinite creativity in a fraction of a
second. For example, all languages allow an infinite distance
between a question word and its origin (What did John say he
wanted Mary to tell Bill to get Fred to do?). But no language
allows an origin from inside relative clauses (what did you see
the man that ate?). The capacity to invent new objects of
reference (like quantum mechanics), label them, and then
comprehend them in split-second linguistic references, is an-
other example. Linguistics demonstrates that sentences are
recursively generated, language acquisition is constrained, and
transformations occur over infinite strings. As language is ulti-
mately biological, these observations in turn give biological
legitimacy to notions like lambda extraction, conditions on
analyzability, and other concepts. Because we cannot identify
an impossible thought at the slow, problem-solving level
(though there might be many, we just cannot know about them
without thinking them), discussions of the conscious mind are
usually vague and imprecise. Unconscious, rapid thought is
therefore more germane.
An important hypothesis is required to sustain this line of
exploration: that there is no principled distinction between
unconscious and conscious thought. This could be wrong. But if
we are looking for quantum mechanical effects, unconscious
thought seems like the natural domain.
A high-risk scientific gambit is also involved: Can we go
directly between the mathematics of physics to the mathe-
matical representation of linguistics, while skipping the phys-
iology of language (where only gross effects are currently detect-
able)? Chomsky has argued (1) that one must have a definition of
the mind before one can look for its physical instantiation, and
that (2) the mentalist representation may ultimately be accepted
as a physical representation just as many mathematical formula-
tions are accepted as statements of physical law. But the chal-
lenge remains: We can, at the moment, see no case where
quantum mechanics is necessary.
One final comment. Why does Penrose devote his talents to
the obviously weak nature of strong AI instead of exploring the
strengths of weak AI? Perhaps we can answer the question in
part. Does he share the widespread sense of being insulted as a
human being by the computer metaphor? Even if the scientific
posture of the strong-AI community were eminently defensible,
another problem exists. By allowing the implication that "free
will is an illusion" to stand unchallenged, we let stand an insult
to our sense of dignity with vast harmful consequences. Why do
we react strongly against it? There are many current social
consequences: The image of the human as a machine influences
every teacher who grades a child, every child who hears his IQ
score, every doctor who too readily prescribes medicine, every
uneducated person who stammers in the presence of a scientist.
It does a very serious disservice to the notion of human dignity
to suppose that we know "scientifically" what human beings are
like when we do not. If free will exists, then there can be no
exhaustive "explanation" of human behavior by reducing it to a
set of components with fixed interactions.
NOTE
1. David Griffiths, Department of Physics, Reed College, contrib-
uted many ideas to this review. Although he did not wish to be a co-
author, I feel as if his ideas and my ideas are all actually his. So he is
present and absent at the same time. Quantum mechanics?
1
 Just seeming true?
Adina Roskies
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, 3-002, La
Jolla, CA 92037
Electronic mail: adina@helmholtz.sdsc.edu
The reigning king of cognitive science, strong AI, is in trouble.
It still wears the royal vestments, but some subjects question
whether its mental abilities are up to its demanding task. What
happened to the emperor's mind? Penrose tries to dethrone
strong AI with the argument that minds are nonalgorithmic, and
thus that strong AI can never achieve its aims. Should we rally
behind him?
Real minds are conscious. The hallmark of consciousness,
according to Penrose, is the ability to directly perceive (mathe-
matical) truth (p. 428). I want to examine this claim in detail,
after pointing to a general flaw in Penrose's arguments that our
ability to see mathematical truths can be accounted for only
nonalgorithmically. Briefly, Penrose conflates the ability to
solve an instance of a noncomputable problem with the ability to
solve all instances of that problem. Only the latter would entail
solving it nonalgorithmically. There is no convincing evidence
that humans can always solve these types of problems, so
Penrose does not succeed in establishing that human minds do
things that algorithms can't (For a thorough discussion of these
points, see Benacerraf (1967) and Dennett (1978a).
What would it mean to perceive mathematical truth directly?
Would it entail infallibility? It ought to, for the notion of
mathematical truth is closely related to the notion of necessity,
and direct perception implies (minimally) preserving truth val-
ues. According to standard accounts, knowing that something is
true involves two components: (1) knowing the meaning of
something, and (2) knowing that what the meaning expresses is
the case. Our intuitions about the self-evidence or truth of
mathematical statements, however, often turn out to be mis-
taken. For instance, Hilbert believed that arithmetic was com-
plete until Godel proved him wrong, and Cantor and Frege
thought their formulation of set theory was consistent until
Russell advanced his paradox. The moral is that "seeing some-
thing to be true" is indistinguishable from "something seeming
to be true" until a proof is given. Penrose is a Platonist, and
consequently has no account of (2). As a result, seeming true is
the best he can get. And that is a far cry from being true.
Penrose talks of "seeing truth," but since he cannot establish a
necessary connection between mathematical perception and
truth, the hallmark of consciousness boils down to a weaker
concept: grasping meaning. Surely, Penrose will maintain, not
just meaning. Seeing the meaning of the claim "all even integers
are divisible by two" is quite different from seeing the meaning
of "please pass the salt." Too true. It is that flash of insight, that
feeling of certainty, that grasp of how the whole picture fits
together. Penrose's "direct perception of mathematical truth"
can thus be reduced to (a) grasping the meaning or semantic
content of a statement or idea, and (b) the "Aha!" feeling that
accompanies it. The important thing to realize is that the "Aha!"
feeling is what we gain from introspection, a notoriously unrelia-
ble window into our inner workings and the outer world, and
definitely not truth-preserving. Therefore (b) can be regarded as
epiphenomenal, with no necessary connection to matters of
truth.
Once we are clear on the relation between truth and the
"Aha!" feeling, accounting for seeing truth in an algorithmic
system becomes no more mysterious than accounting for recog-
nizing that something seems correct. Imagine a neural network,
Ralph, trained to recognize aspects of mathematical structure.
Ralph's internal representation is a partial model of the mathe-
matical world, itself an abstract structure defined by relations
among elements (Benacerraf 1965). The model would include a
finite representation of primitives and their relations, and rules
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for extending that representation. The meaning of an element in
this representation corresponds to the role it plays in the context
of the representation. Since-Penrose, too, must relinquish the
notion of direct access to truth, we can demand consistency
without worrying about establishing reference. The hard part
would seem to be accounting for the "Aha!" feeling, but now
that we see it as distinct from truth, it is simple. Suppose Ralph
evaluates the degree of matching between propositions and its
internal partial model, something neural nets do very well. If
the structure of the proposition is isomorphic to the structure of
the model (or the model properly extended), or if it exceeds a
certain threshold matching criterion, then Ralph can be said to
have "grasped" the truth of the proposition. This kind of pattern
matching is achieved by networks practically instantaneously,
much like our flashes of insight. The degree of fit is the degree of
force that the "insight" has. For added realism, we can even
endow Ralph with an "Aha!" unit that is activated in those cases
of adequate matching. Realize, finally, that truth-grasping neu-
ral networks like Ralph, though not considered algorithmic, are
routinely implemented on standard digital computers that are
instances of Turing machines and thus are algorithmic accord-
ing to Penrose's definition.
The real question, it seems to me, is not how we perceive
truth, but how we perceive at all: how we feel the "Aha!" feeling,
or see red, or feel pain. If this is the crux of Penrose's worries, he
is not alone. We can't see how an algorithmic system can have
subjective states. But we can't see how any physical system can
have subjective states, including ourselves. Yet we do. It is no
more evident how consciousness would arise from collapse of
the wave packet than how it would arise from a very complex
algorithm. This doesn't put algorithms on any worse footing than
it does physicalism, which Penrose and I both wish to uphold.
So what of the emperor? One should always be aware of
potentially better social orders, but it is reckless to overthrow
the old regime without an indication that the new one will not
fail in the same way. The emperor hasn't yet had a chance to
prove his mental mettle: We do not know that algorithms cannot
give rise to consciousness.
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Tim Smithers
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Professor Penrose's book contains a great deal of material,
ranging over a number of "large" subjects. The question is, does
all this material succeed in appropriately adorning a new argu-
ment against strong AI? The answer is no, for two reasons. First,
Penrose seems to misunderstand strong AI. Consequently, his
argument that Turing computation is inadequate for con-
sciousness is irrelevant to AI. I admit that pure symbol process-
ing is not enough, but we need a different approach not some
(only to be hinted at) new theory of physics. I will expand briefly
on each of these points in turn, and then make some concluding
remarks.
In this book we have a very odd and very poor description of
what AI is. Its objectives are said to be "to imitate by means of
machines . . . as much of human mental activity as possible."
We are told that "one of the aims of AI is that it provides a route
towards some sort of understanding of mental qualities, such as
happiness, pain, hunger." (p. 14) AI supporters (Penrose
doesn't mention its practitioners) are supposed to envisage that
"such concepts as pain or happiness can be appropriately model-
led" by, for example, machines whose power packs are running
low, or are fully charged. I know of no serious AI researcher, in
strong AI or otherwise, who would be at all happy with this kind
of description. Artificial intelligence is the science concerned
with understanding intelligent behaviour and how it can be
created in the artificial. This does involve investigating the
cognitive goings on that engender intelligent behaviour, but AI
is not concerned with artificial emotions.
So where did Penrose get his idea of AI research from? I don't
know, but it cannot have been from the literature I am familiar
with as an active researcher in both symbol processing and
robotic kinds of AI. Penrose's description sounds like the sort of
thing we might hear on a rather low quality popular science
radio or television programme. Wherever it came from it is
clear, from the style and manner of presentation, that Penrose
doesn't much like his idea of what strong AI is - a point to which
I shall return in my concluding comments.
The picture we get of AI goes roughly like this. AI's aim is to
build a computer to pass the Turing test. This requires a
program which takes typed questions from the tester's terminal,
which then computes convincing textual answers. This is to be
done by an algorithm that treats the input text as a string of
symbols and, by a suitable sequence of manipulations, produces
the required output string. This I will call the algorithmic one-
shot description of AI, where an algorithm is a precisely defined
sequence of operations (from a finite set of operations) that
produces a precisely defined result (not necessarily in finite
time). In presenting this picture, Penrose equates the kind of
algorithmic symbol manipulations of the Turing machine with
the kind of symbol manipulation that strong AI suggests form
the stuff of mental states. This basic mistake arises from a failure
to appreciate that the kind of symbol manipulation underlying
strong AI is not the machine code of the digital computer, but
that expressed in Newell & Simon's (1976) Physical Symbol
System Hypothesis (PSSH). Penrose makes no reference to this
hypothesis, indeed he makes no reference to any of Newell and
Simon's work. He therefore appears to be unaware of the ideas
underlying symbolic AI developed by two of the most important
people in the field. In fact, no references are cited to substanti-
ate the view of strong AI he presents.
This failure to understand the symbol processing paradigm in
AI leads Penrose to describe strong AI as seeking an algorithmic
(in his strict sense of the term) explanation of mind and con-
sciousness. He fails to realize that although algorithmic pro-
cedures may be used to achieve the required manipulations of
symbol tokens, this does not necessarily mean that the overall
behaviour of an AI program can be described as algorithmic, or
that it can be achieved purely algorithmically. Of course, if you
look at the right level of the system what you see is just
algorithmic behaviour, but this does not provide an explanation
of the system as a whole - just as looking at the firing patterns of
neurons inside my head doesn't explain my behaviour. AI
programs typically work by (amongst other things) building and
maintaining internal descriptions of what is going on in the
environment; they use these in deciding how to act. To do so
they use a mixture of algorithmic and nonalgorithmic processes;
nonalgorithmic processes are ones that must continue to run to
fulfill their function, as opposed to complete and produce a
result, as in the case of algorithmic processes. A good example of
such a programme, better described as a machine, is the Hitech
chess playing machine from Carnegie Mellon University; see
Berliner 1988 for a tournament report. Its behaviour in winning
a game of chess is not reasonably described as algorithmic, but
many of its internal workings might be.1
If Penrose has argued that all this symbol processing cannot,
of itself, give rise to mental states, then I would agree with him.
But it's not a new theory of physics we need to solve this
problem, its a different approach, a change of emphasis.
The PSSH as Newell and Simon presented it talks of the
processes of designation and interpretation as being central to
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the concept of how symbolic manipulation can lead to intelligent
action. The problem is that much of the symbol processing
research that has gone on around it has either ignored these
aspects or believed that they could be achieved simply by
"bolting on" appropriate sensors and actuators to the computer.
Researchers have thought that a robot is just a symbol process-
ing computer with sensor and motor input and output devices -
sensory-motor functions are seen as requiring only the right
technology, whilst the "intelligent" bit (requiring mental states)
is all in the symbol processing. The fact that programming
computers became easier much faster than building real robots
probably also has a lot to do with it - if real robots were as easy to
build as complex symbol processing systems we would have
many more of them today, and consequently would probably
know much more about the problem of getting them to behave
intelligently. This problem involves understanding how their
internal workings can be (or can become) semantically coupled
with their tasks and how they can be (or can become) seman-
tically embedded in the environments in which these tasks are
performed - semantically for the robot, that is, not for us as
observers or designers. The trivialization of this problem is also
a result of its lack of emphasis in the PSSH. Consequently, the
problem of how the symbols are to be grounded, to use Hamad's
(1990) term, has received very little serious attention, and in fact
is not understood even to exist as a real problem by many-
symbolic functionalists (Hamad 1989).2
Understanding how the internal processes of intelligently
behaving agents can come to have meaningful content for them
does not require some new physics. It requires an approach that
puts the question of how systems can be or become mindful of,
and so act intelligently in, their environment: how a system can
become semantically embedded. Hamad (1990) has called this
kind of AI robotic functionalism.
In AI there is a much needed debate about how symbol
processing can really play a role in engendering the mental
states required for intelligent behaviour. What is not required is
to have some distorted image of AI put up and shot down with
threats of some new physics.
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NOTES
1. This algorithm-using nonalgorithmic kind of behaviour is not
peculiar to AI. Computer operating systems and word processors offer
other examples.
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which are artificial extensions (amplifiers) of human intelligence, are a
good example.
And then a miracle happens - . .
Keith E. Stanovich
Department of Psychology, Oakland University, Rochester, Ml 48309-4401
Electronic mail: keithstanovich@um.cc.ijmich.edu
A few years ago a cartoon appeared in the American Scientist
that showed two somewhat satisfied mathematicians looking at a
blackboard on which was written a long and complex proof. The
complicated formulae began on the far left side of the board and
continued until reaching the middle where, written in block
letters, were the words AND THEN A MIRACLE HAPPENS.
The proof then recommenced, finally reaching its conclusion on
the right side of the board. Penrose's book reminds me of this
cartoon. For more than three hundred pages he presents a
wonderful introduction to mathematical concepts, algorithms,
Turing machines, concepts of truth and proof, classical physics,
quantum mechanics, and cosmology. And then in the final two
chapters we are presented with a theory of "consciousness" that,
with very little argument and much question begging, is simply
asserted to rest on the quantum mechanical concepts previously
introduced.
The last two chapters go awry because Penrose adopts a folk
psychological notion of "consciousness" far outside the main-
stream of cognitive science: "I am implying that when I refer to
thinking, feeling, or understanding, or particularly, to con-
sciousness, I take the concepts to mean actual objective 'things'
whose presence or absence in physical bodies is something we
are trying to ascertain, and not to be merely conveniences of
language!" (p. 10) "Since the cerebrum is man's pride . . . then
surely it is here that the soul of man resides!" (p. 383). Although
this neoCartesian view is quite similar to the layman's concep-
tion (Stanovich 1989), it is a view that has been utterly rejected
by modem cognitive science.
Despite the poor record of vernacular-based concepts in the
history of science (Churchland 1979), Penrose makes no bones
about the fact that it most definitely is a vernacular concept of
consciousness that he intends to utilize in his quantum theory:
"We can rely, to good measure, on our subjective impressions
and intuitive common sense as to what the term means" (p. 406).
Of course, the problem is that our "intuitive common sense"
about what consciousness is has changed across historical epochs
and cultures because our folk language of the mental has evolved
(Wilkes 1988). Is the quantum account of the brain culturally
dependent? This never becomes an issue because Penrose
remains imprisoned within a folk psychology that simply doesn't
recognize that there is a question of this type to be addressed.
That the folk term consciousness fractionates into at least four
vastly different usages goes unrecognized in The Emperors New
Mind, even though the author himself slips and slides among
these usages constantly. For example, Wilkes (1988) discusses
usages of "consciousness" as a one-place predicate meaning
roughly "awake," consciousness of internal sensations like pain,
consciousness of sensory experience, and consciousness of prep-
ositional attitudes like beliefs (see Wilkes 1984; 1988). So when
one sees such questions as, "Where is the seat of con-
sciousness?" (p. 381) one is tempted to ask whether all of these
consciousnesses are localized in the same place. Are they all to
be subsumed under the same "quantum" explanation?
In short, the folk language of the mental is simply not the
place to begin when analyzing any concept of brain function.
Connectionist models (Churchland & Churchland 1990; Mc-
Clelland & Rumelhart 1986; Seidenberg & McClelland 1989;
Sejnowski & Rosenberg 1988), modular brain theories involving
semi-autonomous processors (Allport 1980; Dennett 1978b;
Hofstadter 1985; Minsky 1987), and dissociation phenomena
increasingly uncovered in neuropsychology (P. M. Churchland
1988; Springer & Deutsch 1985; Tranel & Damasio 1985) and
cognitive psychology (Kihlstrom 1987; Nisbett & Ross 1980;
Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Rollman & Nachmias 1972) - all are
putting tremendous stress on the integrity of our folk language
for mental processes (P. S. Churchland 1983; 1986; Dennett
1987; 1988; Rorty 1979; Stich 1983).
As Wilkes (1988) argues:
"If 'consciousness' is as central and unavoidable as many seem to
suggest, it is then at least prima facie interesting that other languages,
and English before the seventeenth century, appear to lack the term,
or anything that corresponds more than roughly with it; in other
words, that what strikes some of us so forcefully, as being so 'obvious,'
seem to have left little impression on others" (p. 170) "We are thus
thrown back on the unsurprising thought that 'conscious' and 'con-
sciousness' are terms of the vernacular. . . . 'consciousness' does not
pick out a natural kind, does not refer to the sort of thing that has a
'nature' appropriate for scientific study" (pp. 192—193).
Wilkes's argument that the vernacular term "consciousness"
does not carve nature correctly is consistent with the way that
scientific developments in cognitive science have occurred. As
Pylyshyn (1980) has noted: "Information-processing theories
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have achieved some success in accounting for aspects of problem
solving, language processing, perception, and so on, by deliber-
ately glossing over the conscious-unconscious distinction" (p.
443). Anyone familiar with developments in cognitive science is
aware that 10 years later the situation remains as Pylyshyn
described it. A strong indicator of just how out of step is
Penrose's emphasis on vernacular consciousness is the fact that
Posner's (1989) 800-page compendium, Foundations of cog-
nitive science, contains no entry for "consciousness" in the
index!
At the very end of the book Penrose very nearly admits that all
the quantum hand waving was a cover for his "gut feeling" that
our vernacular folk vocabulary about consciousness is "right"
and will not be altered or eliminated by computational explana-
tions ("Yet beneath all this technicality is the feeling that it is
indeed 'obvious' that the conscious mind cannot work like a
computer," p. 448; "I simply cannot believe that it
[consciousness] is something just 'accidentally' conjured up by a
complicated computation." p. 447). Beyond simply asserting
the importance of taking consciousness seriously, and asserting
its nonalgorithmic nature, the final chapter is heavy with Pen-
rose's introspections about his thoughts while doing mathe-
matics ("Part of the reason comes from my experiences as a
mathematician" p. 413). This all gets somewhat embarrassing,
for the discussion rambles on, in pop-psych fashion, in blissful
ignorance of decades of work in experimental psychology indi-
cating how tenuous are such reports as mechanisms of theory
justification.
Consider an analogy. I am an expert reader. Let me tell you how I
do it. Because I am a highly practiced expert, meaning is absorbed
into my brain with just the most fleeting contact with the actual print
on the page. As my eyes flow smoothly across the page, the press of
meaning and the involvement in the text make it seem hardly a visual
task at all. More technically, what is happening is that my brain is
exploiting the redundancy of the message, making it unnecessary for
me to process the fine visual details of the print. This is what it means
to be an expert reader like myself.
Now, as all cognitive psychologists will know, this little
introspective story I have just told is an utter fable. It is wrong
from start to finish. The brain does not process print in the way
described (see Rayner & Pollatsek 1989). The eyes, of course, do
not move smoothly across the text, despite our introspections.
Information is acquired during discrete visual fixations during
which the eye is largely still, and the interposed saccadic
movements are discrete and ballistic. Moreover, even fluent
readers process extremely fine visual details in the print, again
despite our introspections to the contrary (Rayner & Pollatsek
1989). Introspective fictions like my "reading story" and like
Penrose's "what it's like to do mathematics" tale cannot be taken
as evidence for even mundane claims - like the pickup of visual
information in reading - let alone for highly speculative claims
regarding the nonalgorithmic nature of conscious thought.
Given the pretensions of the book, Penrose - despite the
remarkable breadth evidence in other parts of the volume -
must be faulted for virtually ignoring the actual empirical work
in the field of cognitive psychology and, beyond some passing
citations of Churchland and Dennett, for giving modern philos-
ophy of mind short shrift. The familiar prejudices of the physical
sciences are present here. To understand physics and mathe-
matics, it is assumed that some time must be devoted to building
some foundational concepts. In contrast, it is assumed that the
literature generated by the science of human behavior can be
safely ignored - because, after all, anyone can do it. We all
behave and of course we all "have minds" don't we? I have tried
to expose the fallacies in these attitudes elsewhere (Stanovich
1986) so I will devote no more time to them here.
Ignorance of actual empirical work in the behavioral sciences
allows Penrose to commit the howler of making his concept of
intelligence dependent upon consciousness: " I do not think that
I would believe that true intelligence could be actually present
unless accompanied by consciousness" (p. 407). This, of course,
ignores a century of work on the behavioral concept of intel-
ligence during which none of the dozens of major theorists have
seen fit to ground the concept of intelligence in consciousness in
this way (see Sternberg & Detterman 1986) - for the sound
reason that the folk concept of consciousness is considerably
confused (Armstrong & Malcolm 1984; Dennett 1969; Lyons
1986; Rorty 1979; Ryle 1949; Smith & Jones 1986; Wilkes 1984).
Intelligence has proven a tricky enough behavioral concept
without linking it to a folk term of highly dubious scientific
value.
Finally, because of the book's premise, I should say a word
about where quantum mechanics come in. In the author's own
words:
Since there are neurons in the human body that can be triggered by
single quantum events, is it not reasonable to ask whether cells of this
kind might be found somewhere in the main part of the human brain?
As far as I am aware, there is no evidence for this. . . . One might
speculate, however, that somewhere deep in the brain, cells are to be
found of single quantum sensitivity (p. 400).
In other words, AND THEN A MIRACLE HAPPENS. Of
course, this is only one step in the argument. How can there be
implications for "deeply" understanding "consciousness" even
if there are such cells? Well, you guessed it, another miracle
happens ("if something like this could be developed into a fully
coherent theory then there might emerge a way of providing a
quantum description of the brain" p. 403).
In summary, this book contains a host of chapters that are
exceptionally good introductions to modern physical theory and
computation. The concluding chapter on the physics of the mind
is, however, hopelessly muddled.
The thinker dreams of being an emperor1
M. M. Taylor
Defence and Civil institute of Environmental Medicine, Box 2000, North
York, Ontario, Canada M3M 3B9
Electronic mail: mmt@zorac.deciem.dnd.ca
"I am inclined to think —," said I. " I should do so,"
remarked Sherlock Holmes, impatiently.
(Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Valley of Fear, 19.14)
Roger Penrose is inclined to think of algorithms, but thinks he
does not use algorithms to think. For Penrose to believe he does
not think in algorithms, he dreams of a new nondeterministic
physics, correct quantum gravity (CQG), which will allow his
thinking processes to be nonalgorithmic. In justifying this idea,
he embarks on a fascinating journey to both ends of the uni-
verse, which is well worth the price of the book; but does he
need to go so far to study what lies behind his nose?
It is extraordinarily unlikely that we evolved as thinking
machines suited to prove mathematical theorems. Almost cer-
tainly our thinking developed to permit us to behave reasonably
well in rapidly changing circumstances. We do not need to know
whether it is true that stripes of colour belong to a tiger, so long
as we evade the possible tiger. A real-life travelling salesman
does not need to traverse a minimum distance Hamiltonian
path, so long as he spends only a reasonable amount on travel
fares. The operative words are "good enough," not "optimum."
The mathematics of truth, proof, and infinity are rare among
forms of thinking, and arguments relating to computability or
provability or the halting of algorithms seem to be irrelevant to
normal thought, on which mathematical thought is presumably
founded.
Penrose argues that thinking must be nonalgorithmic because
it can be proved that in any formal system there are theorems
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that we can see to be true, but that we cannot prove al-
gorithmicaliy to be true. The only way out that he can see is to
devise CQG.
Penrose uses the term algorithm in two different senses. In
the first sense, which is carefully defined and illustrated by
example, an algorithm is a precisely defined method for convert-
ing data of a given class into a result of a defined type. It is
ideological, being driven by the goal of finding a result of the
specified type. It is also, by implication, executed in a ther-
modynamically isolated system: The workings of the algorithm
are hidden between the intake of the data and the emission of
the result, and partial results cannot be considered reliable.
Some algorithms, given some data, may never finish, and even
worse, it may be impossible to decide for a particular case
whether the algorithm will finish, until it actually does so.
In the second sense, algorithmic seems to be identified with
deterministic, where there is no commitment to avoid inter-
rogating or interfering with the processing of the algorithm. In
this second sense, algorithms could conceivably be involved in
thinking, whereas algorithms in the first sense could not. Think-
ing always proceeds in an interactive environment, and no train
of thought can be guaranteed to run to completion unaffected by
outside influences. Furthermore, the thoughts engendered by
an input do not stop when the relevant output has been made. In
the second sense, then, algorithm means only the manipulation
of the elements of thought according to rules, in an environment
in which the data, the results, and the manipulations can be
influenced by unexpected events. Algorithms in the second
sense cannot be deterministic in the real world. Only the
behaviour of the universe as a whole could be deterministic, not
that of any nonisolated subpart, since even if the subpart arrives
twice in exactly the same state, external events may cause its
future behaviour to follow two different paths. Living organisms
are particularly responsive to external events, because not only
is their very structure maintained by a high nonequilibrium
energy flow, but also their "aliveness" is signalled by their
effective and timely behavioural responses to external events.
Living things cannot be functionally deterministic.
Living systems are dynamic systems, and, as such, their
internal and external behaviour (including any physical corre-
lates of "thought") can be described in terms of orbits in a phase
space of very high dimensions. If left alone, an orbit in a dynamic
system settles in the neighbourhood of an attractor, of which
most such systems have many, each with its own basin of
attraction. Typically, the high-dimensional phase space can be
separated into many loosely coupled subspaces, into all of which
the orbit may be projected. Loose coupling means that the
projection of the state into one subspace does not much affect
the state as projected into another subspace, so that for the most
part one can treat each subspace as a dynamical system with its
own set of attractors. Similarities in the dynamic behaviour of
the subsystems can cause them to affect one another more
readily than if their behaviours are dissimilar. Such effects may
be called resonances.
If the dynamic system in question is the brain, it is natural to
identify attractors within the low-dimensional subsystems (of
which there are many) as potential thoughts, and the current
state and orbit as representing actual thoughts. Resonances
correspond to analogies, or to perceptions of events in the
external world, and most particularly, if a resonance shifts an
orbit in a subspace from one attractor basin to another, we may
call the result "insight," especially if the final effect is to enhance
the overall resonant coupling within the greater dynamic struc-
ture. In the absence of external input, we may call the ongoing
shifts of resonance "dreaming," and from this viewpoint we
might suggest that no biological or silicon system can think
unless it first learns to dream.
NOTE
1. This commentary is DCIEM Technical Note 90-N-06.
which emperor is Penrose talking
John K. Tsotsos1
Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada M5S 1A4
Electronic mail: tsotsos@ai.toronto.edu
I began reading this book with high expectations; that is only
natural given the reputation of the author. Unfortunately, my
expectations were not fulfilled. Penrose has written a book that
has a solid, interesting, and illuminating middle; he should have
left it at that. The beginning and end were quite disappointing,
but for very different reasons.
The book begins very weakly, with the old, standard, boring
critique of artificial intelligence. Penrose's bibliography con-
tains exactly four AI works: a 1968 paper by Marvin Minsky, a
1977 book by Roger Schank and Robert Abelson, David Waltz's
1982 survey article in Scientific American and a 1972 paper by
Terry Winograd. Suppose someone were to criticize physics and
base their argument on three out-of-date references and one
survey paper intended for general audiences? I am certain
Penrose would not consider this a scholarly critique. So, too,
with Penrose's criticisms of AI. The discussions by other philos-
ophers on whether or not the brain can be computationally
modeled are also based on a pitifully small number of now out-
of-date works. Philosophers invent definitions and terms, which
are not generally accepted by the practitioners of AI, to suit
their purposes, leaving their own concepts woefully undefined.
Penrose himself says that "it is unwise to define consciousness"
(p. 406), yet he happily defines the positions taken by AI
researchers and uses relentless (and, I think, inappropriate)
precision in criticizing computation. His auxiliary title, "Con-
cerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics," seems
much more appropriate than his main title.
In any case, the conclusions reached in this book about the
nature of the mind really are disappointing. Even if all AI work is
ultimately wrong with respect to brain function, it forms a body
of falsifiable research. Why bother with the philosophical argu-
ments if it is so easy to falsify or confirm the theories put
forward? Questions about strong versus weak AI are irrelevant.
The only important property of a scientific theory is that it
provides the simplest explanation for the experimental observa-
tions and makes predictions that can be tested. If a theory is
inadequate, experimentation will falsify it and a new theory will
take its place. We can take Schank & Abelson's (1977) work, for
example, and put it to the test. Proper experimentation will
settle the issue once and for all.
There is no question that physics is important in our under-
standing of all aspects of our universe; this does not mean,
however, that physics alone can explain everything. It was truly
a pleasure to follow Penrose on his tour through the world of
physics, fondly remembering my undergraduate courses in each
of the major topics covered. Penrose draws the link between
computation and physics especially well, correctly going to the
heart of his problem: If one wishes to prove that the brain is
nonalgorithmic, one must find some aspect of the physical world
for which a computational explanation cannot suffice. Although
the wonders of Mozart's brain seem to involve nonalgorithmic
actions, a great deal of the brain's action seems algorithmic, such
as perception. To emphasize the ill-defined yet magical qualities
of a brain we label a "genius" over the equally unexplained
abilities of the more automatic systems of the brain is to miss the
point of understanding intelligence. Consciousness disembod-
ied from perception has no input; unconnected to action it has
no output. And it is not at all obvious that perception and action
have no connection whatsoever to consciousness, as the dif-
ferences in single-cell recording experiments carried out on
alert and anesthetized animals have demonstrated.
Penrose appeals to the not yet discovered Correct Quantum
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Gravity theory and to neurons deep in the brain sensitive to
single quantum events to find the root of conscious thought. In
particular, he appeals to gravitons; I thought that the existence
of gravitons had not yet been confirmed. Let us suppose that.this
is a valid scientific hypothesis; how can one devise an experi-
ment to test it? How can an alert and normally functioning brain
be isolated so that the only input to any of its neurons is a single
graviton passing through the cortex? This presupposes that one
can detect a graviton in the first place. Even if this were
possible, what part of the cortex does it affect and how? A
synapse perhaps? A Purkinje cell? How will its effect be de-
tected? Will billions of probes be required so that activity at
each synapse of each cell is recorded? Would not those probes,
which must form an electromagnetic circuit themselves, inter-
fere with the graviton itself as it passes through? Or would we be
required to use some form of noninvasive method that can both
detect that a single graviton has entered the cortex and tell us
what its effect is through the cortex? If its effect is to induce
nonalgorithmic events, how can those events be anticipated and
characterized so that they may be detected? Whatever detec-
tion method is used, it seems that it must be able to resolve
individual synapses at least, and probably individual electrical
and chemical activities, in order to discover the effect of the
graviton. I cannot see how Penrose's proposal constitutes a
falsifiable hypothesis.
Although Penrose seems to misunderstand computation in
general, taking a very "binary" view of.it, I agree that there may
be nonalgorithmic components to conscious thought. Algo-
rithms are defined as mechanistic ways of evaluating functions,
implemented with some computing agent. Their outcome de-
pends only on their inputs. More precisely, an algorithm, when
applied to a particular input set, results in a finite sequence of
actions; each action in the sequence has a unique successor, and
the algorithm either terminates with the solution to the problem
or with a statement that the problem is unsolvable. Nondeter-
minism within an algorithm leads naturally out of this definition
and one could speculate that perhaps there is a form of non-
determinism in the brain. For example, some neural networks2
as well as more traditional computer science techniques such as
queuing theory, depend on random variables: They use
stochastic algorithms and thus their outriut does not depend
solely on their inputs. Moreover, the neural networks, among
other methods, depend on the kind of energy-minimization that
Penrose claims is important for their success. This seems a much
more straightforward way out of Penrose's dilemma; but it need
have nothing to do with quantum physics, of course!
There is one additional point I wish to make. Penrose dis-
cusses questions of consciousness without questions of "real-
izability." Is the kind of consciousness, and indeed intelligence,
that Penrose envisions actually realizable in a brain? In my own
work (Tsotsos 1990), I tried to show that this issue is a very
serious one, and that considerations of computational complex-
ity seem to rule out many "in principle" correct solutions exactly
because they are not implementable within the resources of-
fered by the brain. We know they are correct "in principle"
Penrose would say that we "see" the correctness of the solution
- but the brain is both too small and operates too slowly to be
able to implement those solutions as they stand. We can thus
capture the essence of Penrose's argument in a mathematically
well-founded manner without appeal to undiscovered entities.
The solutions that are realizable, and that seem to agree well
with experimental observation, are exactly those that yield
approximate answers (of specific character). Could Penrose be
confusing this with aspects of consciousness and judgement?
Although philosophical discussions of the computational
nature of the mind are interesting, they detract from the busi-
ness at hand: finding good scientific theories of intelligence.
Arguments similar in spirit to Penrose's have been made
throughout mankind's history about the inexplicability of mat-
ter, of light, of the motions of planets and stars, of gravity, of
disease, of reproduction, and other topics we now take more or
less for granted even if they are still not fully understood
(Churchland 1990): Fortunately, some past researchers were
not convinced that these phenomena were inexplicable.
NOTE
1. Author is also with Canadian Institute for Advanced Research in
Toronto.
2. One of the most glaring typographical errors I have seen in some
time is at the top of p. 398, where "neutral networks" are defined!
Between Turing and quantum mechanics
there is body to be found
Francisco J. Varela
Centre de Recherche Epistemologie Applique~, Ecole Polytechnique, 75005
Paris, France
Electronle mail: bitnelfv@frunip62.bitnet
This book is a mixture of a lot of things: the interesting, the
original, the naive, and the infuriating. In that order, the inter-
esting and the original compose, luckily, a good deal of the book.
I am referring to Penrose's clear and relentless review of the
notions of algorithmicity and recursivity. In this he succeeds
admirably well. Most interesting to me is the way he weaves
together the issues of algorithmicity in the mathematical and
traditional AI setting with such similar issues as natural pro-
cesses in modern physical theories. I found myself engrossed in
this reading. I wish Penrose had written just that book, for
which I have nothing but praise.
To be sure, a discussion of the nature and limitations of
algorithms breathes heavily on the neck of the proponents of so-
called "strong AI" whom Penrose sets up as his opponents from
the very beginning. He isn't satisfied with Searle's (1980) con-
clusion (from his Chinese Room argument) that machines are
different from brains because the latter have "intentionality"
and "history" (p. 23). He wants something better, something
like a "successful theory of consciousness - successful in the
sense that it is a coherent and appropriate physical theory" (p.
10). He wants to show that there is "an essential nonalgorithmic
ingredient to (conscious) thought processes" (p. 404).
And it is in this dimension of the book (clearly the one that
electrifies Penrose the most) where things go awry, toward the
naive and the irritating. Penrose, without as much as a blink,
jumps to the conclusion that the only way out of no-clothes-
strong-AI is to invoke physics! Let me call this the first basic
conceptual premise or leap of the book: Since cognition/con-
sciousness is nonalgorithmic (contra strong AI), therefore we
arrive at the "fundamental question: What kind of new physical
action is likely to be involved when we consciously think or
perceive?" (p. 371, his emphasis). And as if one somersault were
not enough, he goes into yet another extreme leap: This re-
quired physical action must be something like the link between
brain and quantum processes (which are, as he has explained,
nonalgorithmic in some complex and fascinating ways)! This is
the second basic premise/leap of the book: "I am speculating
that the action of conscious thinking is very much tied up with
the resolving out of alternatives that were previously in
[quantum] linear superposition" (p. 438). Because physics must
be involved in explaining nonalgorithmicity (cf. the previous
leap), it must therefore have to do with the brain tapping
directly into quantum mechanisms. For this commentary let me
call these Penrose's Leaps I and II, and examine them in reverse
order.
About Leap II, there is little to say; it strikes me as an
illustration of the physicist's hubris, even though Penrose him-
self warns us that "even they [i.e., the physicists] don't known
everything"! (p. 23). Prima facie there is no reason to discard a
hypothesis that links brain operations to quantum processes.
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But, as Penrose readily admits, given the macroscopic nature of
the physiological events in the brain, putting forth such a
hypothesis seriously would demand at least a modicum of
explicit work, some shred of solid evidence. Instead, we get
little more than a remark on the quantum catch of photorecep-
tors (in a mere page and a half, p. 400-01), and some vague
references to nonregular tiling as a process of synaptic modifica-
tion (in another page and a half, pp. 437-39). This is, even for an
optimist, mere wild speculation, which is, in any case the
adjective Penrose uses to evaluate Moravec's (1989) book on
robotics, because "his [Moravec's] speculations are quite ex-
traordinary and go enormously beyond anything that can be
scientifically justified" (Penrose 1990, p. 5).
Now for what I have called Penrose's Leap I: Since brains are
nonalgorithmic they must have some physical principles, other-
wise, "Perhaps we are doomed to be computers after all!" (p.
402). What is plainly wrong with this contention is that, between
the haven of the strong AI and the marvel of quantum mecha-
nisms, there is something that has been forgotten, namely, a
body! Sundry critics of strong AI have for years said in one form
or another that what is wrong with this view is that it lacks
something tangible and straightforward: that a view of disem-
bodied cognition violates the fact that all knowledge is embod-
ied and situated. Every analysis of cognition is always embed-
ded in a context, in a given milieu, and can only have a limited
competence in given situations. To pretend otherwise (as in the
strong-AI position) is to perpetuate the traditional western
dualism between mind and matter in a sophisticated format, no
more, no less. (One notes without surprise that Penrose de-
scribes himself as a Platonist).
Now, the mere fact of being embedded and embodied makes
it impossible for such cognitive processes to have the univer-
sality of the kind claimed by a Universal Turing machine. Stated
in other terms, it seems to me that a recent trend in cognitive
science and AI is to abandon the notion that issues of general
computability (i.e., problem solving, inference, etc.) are the
hallmark of intelligence, and move toward considering the
apparently trivial tasks of, say, situated visual segmentation and
motor balance as the deepest intelligence. In this sense, an
insect provides the toughest nut to crack, not a chess player.
One of the clearest instances in which this trend is visible (and
not by accident) is in the field of robotics, where more and more
practitioners consider it unnecessary to maintain the classical
notions of central representation of a world and of action plan-
ning. Instead, this trend views viable moment-to-moment up-
dated actions as the main measure of intelligence, thus bringing
contingency and improvisation from the periphery to the center
of consideration. An intelligent action means continually re-
deciding what to do, which means not predefining objects
independently of the agent location but enacting them in terms
of the role they play in the agent's ongoing project (see e.g.,
Agree 1988; Brooks 1986b; JMoravec 1988).
The importance of embeddedness, via a rich sensory-motor
coupling, enacted in specific circumstances (and not in a general
abstract world) is a far cry from the disembodied Turing ideal.
This is, I submit, the "nonalgorithmic" component of thought
that Penrose was looking for. In fact this less glamorous but
more realistic view of cognition has been discussed all through
the history of cognitive science, mostly by a heterodox minority
during the two decades of strong-AI dominance. For recent
presentation see from the philosophical standpoint Dreyfus
(1979), from the AI side Winograd & Flores (1984), from the
neurobiological side Gibson (1979) and Maturana & Varela
(1987). This very selective reading of research in cognitive
science and AI is clearly seen in Penrose's recent critique of
Moravec's book, where he tells us that there are (only) three
possible views on the question: (1) strong AI, (2) a Searlean-
modified strong AI position, and (3) Penrose's, that is, one that
asserts that some aspect of cognition is nonalgorithmic (p. 3).
Now this is wrong on two counts. First, because the non-
algorithmicity critique via the embeddedness of cognition is an
old and articulated view that Penrose ignores although he
should not, because it is precisely" one of his main tenets.
Second, his position (in the book under review at least) is not just
that nonalgorithmic components are important, but also that we
need to find a way out via physical principles. This is an entirely
different matter because he thinks that one will find a way out of
strong AI via physical principles. This is, to say the least,
questionable, and the burden of the proof is on him to show this
is an alternative at all.
I applaud Penrose for identifying with Adam the child in his
opening short story, who, instead of falling for the AI dogma that
the super Ultronic computer about to be inaugurated has a real
mind after all, asks how does the machine "feel." Now what is
wrong with Ultronic (or rather with President Polio and his team
of designers) is that Ultronic has no sensorium or motorium
(other than a trivial exchange through a computer screen), it
therefore does not couple and behave in an environment, and
hence cannot constitute a shared world with us through com-
mon history. Therefore any imputation of feeling is ipso facto
nonsense, for emotion can only come from the moment to
moment situatedness linked to constant assessment, evaluation,
and the ever-present breakdowns leading to constitution of new
actions. This ever-present background from which cognitive
actions are constituted before being solved is where the heart of
the process of cognition lies, and it can only show up in an active,
embodied entity.
Nothing prevents such an embodiment from being manmade,
as far as I can see. Adam should be put into more pertinent
science fiction plots with real opponents, for example, the
roving R2D2 (Star Wars) or even old Hal (2001), whose "body"
extended into the entire spaceship. Adam would not hesitate to
impute some feeling to the tooting androids (the young hero
Luke didn't hesitate either). Children like Adam have to be
allowed to grow by considering alternatives that have at least a
chance of leading cognitive science somewhere. So let us con-
tinue to work weaving together brain operations, phenomeno-
logical analysis of everyday experience, and embodied artificial
machines, and who knows what such future beings will reveal to
us.
Penrose's grand unified mystery
David Waltz1 and James Pustejovsky
Computer Science Department, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254
Electronic mail: awaltz@godot.think.com; bjamesp@cs.brandess.edu
The organization of this book is like a sandwich in which the
filling (eight chapters on computation, mathematics, physics,
and brain science) is much more satisfying than the bread (the
first and last chapters on AI). Penrose gallops through an entire
undergraduate curriculum's worth of material at dizzying
speed, covering topics from GodeFs theorem and fractals to
quantum phenomena and neural function. The treatments of
these range from very good to inspired. Although we could take
issue with many of Penrose's interpretations and conclusions
(generally found at the ends of the chapters) that attempt to
relate these topics to AI, the weakest parts of the book by far are
those that attempt to deal with AI directly, and that give the
book its title. The AI that Penrose attacks in this book represents
only a held-over margin of the current field. Although current
AI - including situated automata, perceptually based cybernet-
ics, the society of mind, connectionism, learning theory, and
memory- and case-based reasoning - is not necessarily immune
to attack, it gets away without a scratch here; Penrose seems
unaware of its existence.
Penrose's central - and most distressing - argument goes
roughly as follows: There are mysteries in each of the sciences
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described in the book. For example, many quantum phe-
nomena are mysterious; we can know mathematical truths only
by methods that seem to lie outside any formal system, and
cannot be computed by any algorithm. Furthermore, the nature
of consciousness is notoriously mysterious. Perhaps then what
we have are not many mysteries, but one "Grand Unified
Mystery" (GUM): That is, the mechanisms of consciousness may
lie outside classical explanations, depending crucially on myste-
rious quantum phenomena, which in turn somehow belong to a
higher order of mechanism that could, for example, know things
to be true which no algorithm could ever find or prove. This
sounds suspiciously like a modern form of vitalism. Penrose also
suggests that such mysterious phenomena may be responsible
for giving us privileged access to eternal Platonic truths, which
may in this mysterious realm have a real existence; for example,
"The Mandelbrot set is not an invention of the human mind: It
was a discovery. Like Mount Everest, the Mandelbrot set is just
there!" (P. 95).
To be fair, some deep and novel issues are raised: The notion
of an algorithm is indeed problematically weak; quantum phe-
nomena might indeed be important in neural functioning; and
so on. What we dispute is the suggestion that all such phe-
nomena may at the root be the same phenomenon, and that
these phenomena have a privileged link with consciousness and
some purported Platonic truths. Unfortunately, Penrose's the-
sis does little or nothing to bring us closer to a real understand-
ing of consciousness or cognition. In fact, his programme seems
inclined to hand-wave while at the same time encouraging the
reader to accept a view of science as religion, revealed only to
the blessed (e.g., Turing, Godel, Mandelbrot, and Penrose).
Nevertheless, on the whole, the science portions make for good
reading as long as they stick to science.
In the rest of this review, we would like to primarily concen-
trate on Penrose's attack on AI and his views on the nature of
Intelligence.
Penrose unfortunately takes on only the symbolist tradition in
AI, which is already well on the way to intellectual death as an
adequate explanation for mind. Although much of his same
criticism could (and should!) be leveled against connectionism
(as Searle, 1990, suggests), he seems totally unaware of this work
- not even the PDP books are referenced, which is almost
unthinkable for a BBS target article on AI! He is likewise
unaware of recent thinking on "situated automata" (cf. Brooks
1986a; Minksy 1986); models of emergent computation, (cf.
Cariani 1989; Rosen 1978; 1987), and other models'based on
reactions and adaptations to an environment, e.g., perceptual
and memory-based reasoning, (Stanfill & Waltz 1986; Waltz
1988). These approaches form for us the most satisfactory bases
for models of mind currently available.
Penrose takes on only the purest symbolic paradigm of AI. In
this tradition, thinking is viewed as the disembodied formal
manipulation of symbols and the Turing test is taken to be a valid
way of assessing intelligence. Sensory and motor systems are
viewed as peripheral modules whose respective purposes are to
convert sensory signals into symbol structures and to convert
symbol structures into actions (cf. Fodor 1983 and Pylyshyn
1984). The hardware used for symbol manipulation is of no great
concern - any universal computing device will do. Along with
Penrose, we find this brand of AI unsatisfactory, but for different
reasons. Ironically, for instance, like strong symbolic Alers,
Penrose accepts a dualist position that the mind is somehow
disembodied from the organism it is controlling. Given this
separation of mind from body, it is not surprising that inten-
tionally and consciousness would appear to be mysterious
concepts.
In our view, the mind/brain must be seen as including the
perceptual faculties as a proper part of its functioning (a strongly
Aristotelian position), and not as peripheral to it. Perception
may involve computational processes, but it is norialgorithmic
(in Penrose's sense), since it does not involve purely symbolic
processing. The perceptual faculties do not have to compute
every computable function but only those of classification and
discrimination involving similarity, difference, and so forth, that
are important to the organism. The computations involving the
measurements of observables are what in fact grounds the
organism and its symbolic system in the world (cf. Cariani 1989
and Hamad 1990).
It is this explicit link between perception and understanding
that gives rise to the "aboutness" or intentionality for that
organism. We believe that, in principle, a device could be
constructed with such machine intelligence if it is properly
situated in its environment and allowed to develop its own
semantics for the world that it constructs through its own
sensors and effectors. Alas, the world perceived by such a
synthetic organism would provide us with as few Platonic truths
as those "discovered" by our own privileged species.
More specifically, we imagine that most of the "mind" of a
situated automaton consists of perception, action, and memory;
situated automata react to events in the world with actions that
have led to "desirable" outcomes and/or avoided "undesirable"
outcomes in the past. Perception is an active process, involving
layers and "societies" of detectors and agents, gated according
to the particular situation, the set of goals, and the past experi-
ence of the organism. Assuming that a given level of precision is
sufficient, brute force computation, communication, I/O, and
memory may eventually suffice to reach that precision, though it
is possible to ask for precision so great that a computer with a
number of elements equal to the jiumber of electrons in the
universe would not suffice. This degree of precision is very
unlikely to be required, however, as we seem designed for
making inferences from scraps of evidence, and out of wetware
with a high degree of redundancy and fault tolerance: We can
still think and act effectively even though many neurons die
every day; we can recover from strokes or accidentally caused
lesions; and substantial changes in the operating environment of
the brain (e.g., fever) do not disable thought. Speed is an issue,
however; proper situated automata must be able to respond to
situations'as rapidly as the situations change. If not, this would
be like a weather forecasting system that took a week to figure
out the weather one day ahead. It seems clear that we are
designed to be good at very rapidly picking interpretations and
actions that (usually) "satisfice" (cf. Simon 1981) in particular
situations, not for proving truths. Statistics are certainly as
relevant as logic!
Thus, symbols are part of the story, but only a small part:
Certain classes of inputs, seen often enough, may be treated as
effectively identical, and become candidates for symbolic en-
shrinement (Hillis 1988). Nonetheless, formal symbols and
sequential actions that operate on them are only a small part of
the overall story of mind, one that is always accompanied by
nonsymbolic activity that is important for explaining the be-
haviour of the automaton.
What does this buy us? It allows us to imagine a system that
responds to situations not by running an appropriate algorithm,
but by classifying the situation (and its subparts) and then
responding to the situation both according to its memories of
what actions were appropriate in the past for such situations,
and with continuous compliant tracking of moment to moment
changes. Furthermore, unlike the Turing machine model, the
system is continuously and invariably changed in the process of
interacting with the world. It literally cannot run the same
algorithm twice - the second time it tried to do so, it would
remember doing the same thing before, and so on (though there
may be such other, more significant, changes as skill learning or
insights that cause much more extensive changes in the automa-
ton). To be sure, there are plenty of mysteries here, but no need
for mysticism.
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NOTE
1. David Waltz is also associated with Thinking Machines Corp., 245
First St., Waltham, MA.
ability,
Robert Wilensky
Division of Computer Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley,
CA 94720
Electronic mail: wilensky@larch.berkeley.edu
Is the mind algorithmic aloeg the lines of a digital com-
puter? That it might not be is suggested by Penrose's
introspection about his own mathematical reasoning, by
an argument that humans may not be limited by Godel's
theorem in the way computers are, and by philosophic
arguments that consciousness, and so forth, cannot be
achieved by formal systems. The missing piece, Penrose
suggests, may have something to do with quantum me-
chanics. Unfortunately, Penrose's arguments are mostly
restatements of old confusions about AI, and illuminate
little of scientific or philosophic interest.
Penrose starts out on the wrong foot by paying serious
attention to Searle's (1980) "Chinese Room" argument,
which, like the ghoul in the horror film, having been
convincingly and utterly vanquished last time around,
inexplicably appears in the sequel as if the previous
episode had never occurred. Suffice it to say here that
Searle's argument has nothing to do with computers or
AI; it is a warmed-over version of the "mind-body prob-
lem" and the "problem of other minds." My favorite short
rebuttal is to note that, following Searle's line of reason-
ing, if we should be leery of believing that computers
could really have minds because mind is "a biological
phenomenon and it is as likely to be as causally dependent
on the specific biochemistry of its origins as lactation and
photosynthesis or any other biological phenomena," then
we should be at least as reluctant to believe that God, if
He exits, has a mind because He lacks "the specific
biochemistry"; most likely, He would simply be faking
the correct behavior.
While not taken in entirely, Penrose is led astray. I can
mention only a few points. Contrary to Searle's and
Penrose's claim, believing that something exhibiting the
correct behavior actually has consciousness, or inten-
tionaiity, is not dualistic in the slightest. These features
would simply be emergent properties of such systems.
Indeed, this is exactly Searle's claim for the relation of
such properties to the brain. Again, the only controversy
is about which systems such properties will emerge from,
and no light is shed on this issue by Searle or Penrose. In
addition, it is simply false that if one believed that
computers really understand then one would have to
attribute full-blown intentional states like hopes and
beliefs to all sorts of nonneural devices (e.g., thermo-
stats) any more than one would have to attribute hopes
and beliefs to all simple neural ones (e.g., bees or earth-
worms).
More substantively, Penrose's presentation of the lim-
its of formal systems goes off track when the implications
for human beings are considered. The first misconception
is that machines are somehow limited by these results in
ways that humans are not. The second and more impor-
tant misconception is that such limits play an important
role in the difficulties that have been experienced in
creating artificial intelligence. Both views are uneon-
troversially wrong.
First, contrary to Penrose's claim, it is perfectly pos-
sible for computers to "see" that results not provable
within a particular formal theory are nonetheless true.
Here Penrose confuses the mechanism doing the proving
with the theory in which the proof is stated. The fact that a
proof doesn't exist within a given theory doesn't mean
that a given mechanism must be constrained to operate
only within that theory, as Penrose falsely presumes.
Indeed, much of what Penrose seems to believe is not
doable by machines has already been done. An interest-
ing case in point is Shankar's 1986 Ph.D. thesis entitled,
"Proof-checking Metamathematics," in which the Boyer-
Moore theorem-prover (i.e., a mechanism used to prove
assertions within a theory) is used to prove a number of
metatheorems (i.e., theorems about that system), includ-
ing Godel's theorem.
More important, Godel's result and the like are sin-
gularly uninteresting from the standpoint of the AI enter-
prise. The reason relates to Penrose's claim that his own
mathematical processes aren't algorithmic. Here, Pen-
rose seems to confuse "algorithmic" in the formal sense of
something that always computes what you want in finite
time with "algorithmic" in the sense of being specifiable
as a computer procedure. But these are entirely different
creatures. Indeed, the party line among AI researchers is
that most interesting mental capacities are best described
as heuristic procedures. These are nonalgorithmic in the
sense that they don't inexorably grind out the right
answer all the time. Thus virtually all AI programs aren't
algorithmic in the first sense, as Penrose incorrectly
suggests. Although we don't know whether such pro-
grams will do, they appear to be perfectly compatible
with Penrose's description of the subjective impression of
his mathematical processes (a precarious line of reasoning
in any case).
Proving theorems appears to have little in common
with interesting human cognitive capabilities, such as
using language, or being able to see, or being able to walk
down a hallway. That is, what is impressive about people
is not the rare capabilities exhibited by mathematicians,
but the mundane capabilities of any five-year-old child. It
is precisely such capabilities with which AI is primarily
concerned, and, in these basic areas we have no proof
whatsoever that the capabilities to be emulated are be-
yond the limits of rather banal models of computation.
This is not very strange. We have proofs about the
limits of computation only for esoteric enterprises like
proving theorems in number theory. But most human
beings, who have no aptitude for proving theorems at all,
are perfectly capable of talking and seeing and walking. If
humans aren't hindered from having cognitive capacities
by an almost complete lack of theorem proving ca-
pabilities, why should a remote limit on it be a hindrance
to computers?
Therefore, there appears to be no reason to believe that
artificial intelligence will be difficult to achieve because of
computational deficiencies in our ordinary models of
computation. Does Penrose have a useful quantum-me-
chanical insight nevertheless? This is perhaps the most
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disappointing aspect of the book. Virtually no evidence is
offered that quantum mechanics plays a role in the func-
tioning of the brain. Indeed, one is hard pressed to
imagine what has motivated Penrose to alert us to the
possibility that something as ubiquitous as quantum-
mechanical effects would somehow account for what is
unique about the brain.
My guess is that Penrose is on a wild goose chase for a
missing piece that does not exist. Here is why: If qualities
like consciousness are truly separable from behavior,
then there is by definition no objective test to determine
whether a creature with acceptable behavior actually
possesses them. Indeed, whether you and I have these
elusive qualities, as opposed to just the capability to
exhibit the right behavior, has no empirical ramifications
whatsoever. In a universe without such qualities, but in
which behavior is identical to that in our world, a Searle
without authentic intentional states continues to insist
that he has them, and that computers do not.
I suggest that the way out of this peculiar situation is
simply to remain skeptical that pretheoretical notions like
consciousness will emerge unscathed from our future
scientific endeavors. Even the most cherished common-
sense notions about time, space, and energy have under-
gone drastic revision in the course of science. It would be
astonishing if concepts like consciousness did not. In any
case, the road to progress will probably require a lot more
hard work and a lot less idle speculation.
Minds beyond brains and algorithms
Jan M. Zytkow1
Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
22030
Electronic mail: zytkow@gmuvax.gmu.edu
Mind and computer. Is our thinking basically the same as the
action of a computer, perhaps a very complicated one? Penrose
strongly disagrees because two things are missing from any
computational picture of mind. One thing is consciousness;
another is the mind's capability to do better than any algorithm.
I agree with him on both issues, but I find his demonstration of
the nonalgorithmic nature of mind unconvincing and vulnerable
to the attacks of the proponents of strong AI.
Penrose repeatedly uses the distinction between recursive
and nonrecursive problems to argue that although computers
are bounded by the former, humans can successfully deal with
the latter. Take a nonrecursive but recursively enumerable
word transformation problem (p. 130-31). Procedures exist that
can find a solution for each word problem that has a solution. But
if there is no solution, the procedure will continue forever.
Penrose believes that humans are not so limited. They use their
intelligence and ask metalevel questions about solvability.
Rather than endlessly trying to solve the problem at hand they
can prove unsolvability. For a given word problem this can be
done by finding a property that is present in the input, is
conserved by each transformation, but is absent in the output.
Because no algorithm would find such a property in all cases (the
problem is nonrecursive), the computers are left behind by
human intellects.
The argument works for simple algorithms, but it does not
cross the defense line of strong AI, because a more sophisticated
software can mimic the ways Penrose thinks human intellect can
outwit an algorithm. Consider a program that monitors its own
performance. After spending some time on unsuccessful search
in one problem space, the program can switch to another
problem-solving approach or to a proof that no solution exists.
There are even programs that can change themselves. None of
these alters the nonrecursive nature of the word problem, but
there are programs that can prove nonsolvability for subclasses
of all word problems. When Penrose claims that we must use
our intelligence in choosing a particular property, the propo-
nents of strong AI will be more than delighted to repeat the
same about their heuristic search programs. But what if no
program works for all cases? Well, on what ground can anybody
ensure that a human is able to do better? Can anybody demon-
strate that humans can prove the unsolvability of every unsolva-
ble word problem?
I do not think that there is a well defined, formally specified
problem that can be solved by humans but not by computers.
Penrose would lose in the game, "Show me an example of
nonalgorithmic thinking and I will implement it on the comput-
er," with an AI system builder worth his LISP machine. Still, I
believe that no computer can fully reproduce our mental pro-
cesses. We can model a sum of well defined human capabilities,
each limited to a particular context, but not an unbounded
variety of all capabilities and all contexts in which our mind can
work. The existence of algorithms for many different problem
classes is not equivalent to a total simulation of human thinking.
Mind and physics. According to Penrose, the conscious mind
can eventually be explained as a physical device. Although I
agree with him about the causal influence of consciousness on
the physical world, I do not think that his idea of "the strange
way that CQG [correct quantum gravity] must act, in its resolu-
tion of the conflict between the two quantum-mechanical pro-
cesses U and R" (p. 446) can provide a solution. It is not just that
his explanation is extremely implausible, relying on a possibly
nonexistent phenomenon on the distance scale of 10~33 cm: I do
not see how the collapse of the wave packet in very special
circumstances created by quantum gravity can possibly explain
the intrinsic contents of our conscious states, but instead of
arguing against this particular explanation I will argue that no
scientifically described phenomenon can explain the intrinsic
contents of consciousness.
Suppose that science generates a very accurate explanation of
the brain, that consciousness is identified with a particular class
of material structures and that conscious states can be measured
by physical parameters. Suppose also that conscious activity has
been explained as a physical interaction, perhaps a tremen-
dously complex one. All that science can measure about our-
selves would become explainable. Under these assumptions,
the scientific contents and the influence of our conscious states
would be accounted for, but none of the consciously perceived
intrinsic contents. All the contents of our consciousness would
be scientifically redundant. Indeed, we can imagine a creature
like us, one that would behave exactly the same way for an
external observer, according to all physical parameters he could
measure, and would satisfy the same laws, but unlike ourselves
it would not have any intrinsic conscious states.
Penrose does not believe in the redundancy of consciousness
and tries to find an evolutionary advantage that would justify its
existence. But whatever advantage can be expressed in scien-
tific terms, it is also an evolutionary advantage for the uncon-
scious physical lookalike from my example. Because we cannot
find a scientifically documented advantage that would not occur
in our unconscious counterpart, we cannot claim that there is an
evolutionary advantage specific to consciousness. Like Penrose,
I do not believe in the redundancy of consciousness, but unlike
his argument, mine is supposed to be a reductio ad absurdum of
the assumption about scientific explanation of our mind.
My argument against the scientific explanation of conscious-
ness can be also applied against algorithmic explanation. Here
Penrose cannot believe that consciousness is "just 'accidentally'
conjured up by a complicated computation'; so why does he
seem to believe that it is "accidentally" conjured up in a
complicated physical structure? I agree with his diagnosis (p. 23)
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that "Searle, and a great many other people, have been led
astray by the computer people. And they, in turn, have been led
astray by the physicists," but it seems that the latter category of
misled people includes the author of this extraordinary book.
For somebody who argues so strongly for the importance and
causal activity of consciousness, there is just one small step to
admit that not everything can be scientifically explained.
Why can we not accept that mind is an anomaly in the
worldview propagated by scientific and computational univer-
salism? We can still be scientists and constructors of AI systems.
I find nothing more fascinating than to chase and imitate that
elusive being - our mind. I am sure, however, that we will not
create an artificial mind, although we will construct very com-
plex and enormously useful computational systems.
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I think it is fair to say that the least complimentary of these
thirty-seven commentaries are also the ones containing
the most serious misunderstandings of what I was trying
to say in The Emperors New Mind (henceforth Emperor)
They add up to at least one very sobering - and evidently
valid - censure: The book was not nearly clear enough!
It is perhaps not surprising that the most negative
remarks come from the AI community. Let me begin by
saying that I intended no criticism whatsoever of what
they are doing Or of their striving to simulate intelligence
or other activities of human or animal nervous systems. I
had hoped this would be clear from a detailed reading my
book. Although the title might be interpreted as suggest-
ing that the proponents of AI are (like the fraudulent
weavers in Hans Anderson's "The Emperor's New
Clothes") trying to "put one over," on the general public,
certainly no such insinuation was intended by me.
(Glymour & Kelly say that my title is "almost the only
rude thing about the book"!) I was aware, when I chose
my title, that such an interpretation was possible, but I
had not expected that some AI proponents would be
sensitive enough on this point to take such an interpreta-
tion seriously. I hope that they will accept both my
dissent from such an interpretation and also my unre-
served apology, if they believe that some might be misled
into thinking that I viewed AI proponents as being in any
way dishonest in their intentions - which I emphatically
do not.
Although some criticisms came from what I shall call
the "soft" side (people who believe that mental phe-
nomena cannot be accounted for in terms of physical
explanations: possibly Niall, Keeper, Taylor, Varela9
and Zytkow), it was clear that most would come from the
"hard" side (those with at least some admitted sympathy
for the position of "strong AI": Boy!e9 Breuel, Dennett,
Doyle, Eagleson, Glymour & Kelly, Johnson, Ettinger &
Hubbard, MacLennan, Madsen, McDermott, Perls,
Smithers, Tsotsos, Waltz & Pestejovsky, Wilensky). I in
fact believe that there are strong arguments on both
sides, as I tried to explain in my book. Those on the "soft"
side are right in their belief that there is no evidence
whatever to suggest that "feelings," or "qualia," can be
described in physical terms at all, let alone be evoked
by the mere carrying out of a calculation; while those on
the "hard" side are equally right to point out how inti-
mately our feelings and perceptions are associated with
the states of particular physical objects, namely brains,
while all physical objects are, as far as we know, like
patterns of "information" (?) governed in full detail by
marvellously precise mathematical • laws. The very
strengths of both arguments had seemed to present us
with a paradox. The way out of this paradox, in my
opinion, must lie in our obtaining much deeper insights
into what physical laws actually are and in unearthing
those aspects of physics that must evade computational
descriptions and begin to allow room for experiential
phenomena. It is towards such goals that I have at-
tempted, with my book, to guide our future thinking. Let
me now make some comments addressing the arguments
on both sides.
Why physics?
Those on the "soft" side might wonder why I even both-
ered to write the book at all, since it is surely "obvious"
that subjective experiences, or "qualia," are not things
that can ever be reduced to physics (i.e., to "mass,
length, and time," in Niall's words; see also Zytkow's
account). So what light can possibly be shed on this
question by bringing in physics at all, let alone CQG
("correct quantum gravity")? To this I must reply, "pre-
cious littlexif_ anything, so far"_as_ they might expect. I am
certainly not claiming to have a theory of the mind - and I
am rather surprised that some of my critics (e.g., Boyle)
seem to be chastising me for not presenting one! It would
be presumptuous in the extreme for me to claim to have
solved a fundamental puzzle that had remained unsolved
for some three thousand years despite its having been the
subject of deliberations of some of the deepest thinkers
since antiquity. Introspection can certainly yield signifi-
cant information but introspection has not really got us
very far with regard to the basic question of what percep-
tion is, or of why we perceive at all.
It seems to me that we shall never be able to make
progress toward understanding these issues until we have
a much better picture of what physical reality is actually
all about (and with reference to Glymour & Kelly's
remarks, I do not see how we can do without physical
realism, whatever view one might hold about the relation
between the mind and computation). It is in science, and
above all physics (profoundly supported by mathematics),
where enormous strides in our understanding of this
world — the universe in which we (and our minds) actually
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appear to live — have been achieved. It is in physics that
we have at last found SUPERB theories, and although these
theories are still very incomplete and do not yet shed any
significant light on what minds actually are, it is through
the back doors of physics and mathematics, in my opin-
ion, that our assault on the problem of mind must ulti-
mately be mounted. The SUPERB theories which have
emerged in this century, namely, relativity and quantum
theory, have actually moved us some good way from the
rather sterile-seeming "mass, length, and time" charac-
terization of classical physics to something much more
subtle. I have no doubt whatever that there are more
profoundly subtle theories (still to be found) underlying
both relativity and quantum theory, and that the more we
understand about the nature of our world, the less sterile
the physics of this world will seem - and eventually the
actual role that consciousness and perceptions play in our
universe will begin to be discerned. Despite what some of
my critics (StaiM>vich9 Waltz & Pustejovsky) seem to be
implying, I certainly do not believe that CQG (correct
quantum gravity), when it finally comes to light, will in
itself solve the problem(s) of mind. But I have tried to
present arguments in my book in support of my view that
some (nonalgorithmic) physical theory of this kind (very
probably CQG) is a necessary prerequisite if a scientific
theory of mind is ever to be achieved.
Simply finding a (necessarily algorithmic) "physical
grounding for information processing" (Boyle) in terms of
existing physics will not be enough. Nor do we know,
despite what MaeLenean seems to imply, that physical
behaviour is necessarily algorithmic just because de-
scribed by differential equations. (Breuel even seems to
take the opposite view, see later!) A good part of my
purpose was to stress that computability in physics is not
at all the same thing as determinism (Eagleson and
Taylor please note).
Mathematical insight and G6del's theorem
Let us now turn to the question of why I think that an
algorithmic theory like strong AI can never provide a
theory of mind. A large part of my argument is based on
Godel's theorem, but a good many of those who criticized
me from the "hard" side (Dennett, Doyle
 9 Glymowr &
Kelly5 MacLeimae9 MeDei°m©tt9 Perlfs9 Tsotsos9
Wilensky), and also several others (Boolos, Butterfield5
Chalmers9 Davis9 BtodgMn & Houston, Keetridge9 Man-
aster-Mamer9 Savitcti & Zadrozny, Mortensen9
Rosldes), have objected, and even claim to have located
errors in my argument ("quite fallacious," Chalmers;
"wrong," Mortensen; "lethalflaw" and "inexplicable mis-
take," Manaster-Ramer, Savitch & Zadrozny; "old and
fallacious argument," Perlis; "deeply flawed," Davis;
"invalid," Kentridge) - while only a few seem partially to
support my type of argument (perhaps Gilden & Lappin,
Higginbothani9 Lutz9 Niall) on this issue. As I shall
explain in a moment, there is actually nothing wrong with
my argument - and I make no apology for the fact that
much of it is "old," certainly appreciated by Godel him-
self already in the 1930s and never properly refuted since
(cf. Godel 1986; 1990; and as cited in Rucker 1982, p. 171;
also Nagel & Newman 1958) - except that I evidently did
not present my case forcefully enough, nor did I antici-
ResponsefPenrose: Emperor's new mind
pate the most likely misunderstandings. All my adverse
critics on this topic have jumped to conclusions and, in
one way or another, have missed the point of what I am
trying to say. None seem to have grasped the full import
of the Godelian argument. The fault is mine: I should
have explained things more clearly.
Most of these critics have pointed out that the Godel'
proposition (P,(k) (which I shall subsequently denote
simply by G(F) here), constructed from some formal
system F, cannot be "seen" to be true unless the system is
already known to be consistent. (Actually the particular
Godel-type proposition I construct does not depend on
the consistency of F, as my critics maintain, but, as the
argument is given, on what is called its "co-consistency."
This is stronger than actual consistency, asserting that if
~Vx[Q(x)] is a theorem in F, then it must not be the case
that all the propositions Q(0), Q(l), Q(2), Q(3). . . . are
theorems. This depends upon the symbol" ~ " and, more
particularly, "V" actually meaning what they are sup-
posed to mean: "not" and "for all" respectively! The
distinction between consistency and co-consistency is not
important for us here - and in fact one can get away with
assuming much less for F - so let it pass for the moment.)
My point is not that, in any particular case, G(F) is true or
"seen" to be true (or false or "seen" to be false). My point
is that the deduction of G(F) from F is (and is "seen" to be)
a perfectly valid procedure. Thus, if we are already
accepting F as a sound system, then we must accept G(F)
as being true also. (The word "sound" is used by logicians
for systems whose theorems are actually true in the
intended interpretation of the symbols.) If we are pre-
pared to use the procedures of F as sound methods of
inference then we must accept the passing of F to G(F) as
another sound method of inference. This is not unlike any
other form of reasoning in mathematics. One does not
directly perceive a "new" mathematical truth in isolation.
What one does is to see that the new proposition follows,
in some way, from the body of mathematical understand-
ing that has already been established. It is in this sense
that one "sees" the truth of G(F), just as one does in
constructing any mathematical argument for obtaining
new truths from old. But the Godel method lies outside
the procedures that have been actually laid down within
F itself. I am not concerned with how we may (or may not)
already "know" that the procedures of F are sound - that
is part of what is assumed - but with the remarkable fact
that if we are accepting F as sound, then we must also
accept G(F) as true.
Some of my critics (Boolos9 Chaliners9 Davls9 Perils)
have drawn attention to some particular formal system
(e.g., the standard Zermelo-Fraenkel system ZF - or a
modification thereof, such as ZFC or ZFM - cf. Boolos,
Davis), claiming that we do not know whether or not it is
consistent. Thus we cannot be sure that its Godel proposi-
tion is actually true. (Inconsistency is just one particular
type of manifestation of a system F not being sound.
There are many others, even apart from the co-inconsis-
tency actually relevant here. The system might be con-
sistent, or even co-consistent, whilst some of its implica-
tions might be false; but my critics seem to have paid
attention pnly to the possibility of inconsistency.) If F is
inconsistent, then any proposition that can be described
within the system is derivable using the rules of F,
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irrespective of whether it is true or false. Thus, in particu-
lar, G(F) is itself a theorem! In fact, the Godel proposition
for any system F is always either true as a statement in
mathematics or it is a theorem of F. Of course, the latter
are the situations in which F is useless as a means of
deriving mathematical truth. (If F is inconsistent^ then, in
particular, 2 = 3 Is a theorem also.) But I simply do not
understand how mathematicians of a formalist disposi-
tion1 (Boolos, Davis) can claim that mathematical argu-
ment within some particular formal system F are more
acceptable than the mathematical argument that derives
G(F) from F.
In his criticism, Boolos asserts that the systems gener-
ally used in mathematics (e.g., ZF) are good approxima-
tions to mathematics. (Approximations to what?! Boolos is
revealing himself to be a good Platonist after all, since he
evidently believes that there is something there, other
than the formal systems themselves, that the formal
systems are supposed to be approximations to.) But if ZF
turns out to be inconsistent, then it is no approximation to
mathematics at all since 2 = 3 would then be a theorem
according to the rules of ZF (Mortensen take note!) -
though the rules of ZF might approximate the rules of
some consistent formal system which does approximate
actual mathematics.
To reiterate my central point: I am not asserting that, In
any particular case of a formal system F, we need neces-
sarily be able to "see" that G(F) is true; but I am asserting
that the "Godelian insight" that enables one to pass from
F to G(F) Is just as good as a mathematical procedure for
deriving new truths from old as are any other procedures
In mathematics. This insight Is not contained within the
rules of F Itself, however. Thus, F does not encapsulate
all the insights available to mathematicians. Such a limita-
tion applies to any formal system whatsoever. I nowhere
claim that the mathematicians' insights would enable
them, in principle, to resolve any mathematical question
(Dennett, Doyle, Roskies). I merely claim that the in-
sights which are available to mathematicians are not
formalizable.
MacLeenae (and also Wilensky) refers to a distinction
between mathematics and metamathematics, the deduc-
tion of G(F) from F being, he asserts, metamathematics,
not mathematics. But this distinction only really exists If
one adheres to a purely formalist view of mathematics. To
a Platonist (or a "common-sense mathematician"), meta-
mathematics - which is reasoning about formal systems
(rather than within a formal system) - is still mathematics,
on a par with any other form of .mathematical reasoning.
I should make a remark about formal systems, such as
ZF, ZFC, or ZFM, which refer to reasoning about infinite
sets. These sets are allowed to be rather enormous; one
might indeed have reasonable doubts about their exis-
tence or about the system's consistency (at least In the
case of ZFM). One might even encounter differences of
opinion amongst mathematicians as to whether or not to
accept reasoning which involves such infinite sets. But
one can avoid much of the argument about such possibly
controversial issues by concentrating on just the small
area of mathematics consisting of propositions in number
theory. In fact, it is sufficient merely to consider proposi-
tions of the special form
[Q]: "Q(n) is true for all natural numbers n"
where Q(n) is some given computable (recursive) true/
false arithmetical property of the natural number n (i.e.,
there is an algorithm for deciding, for any particular n,
whether Q(n) is actually true or false - so Q(n) is an always
terminating Turing machine action).2 The point about
this is that the Godel proposition G(F), as presented in
Emperor, is explicitly of this particular form, so we do not
have to consider anything set-theoretically more obscure
than statements of this kind.
How do mathematicians decide the truth or falsity of
such propositions? They might decide to use the rules of
some formal system F that (like ZF) refers to mathe-
matical structures (say, enormously infinite sets) that go
far outside the concepts of ordinary arithmetic, and in
doing so, might Introduce some doubt (e.g., see Davis) as
to their consistency, let alone their soundness. Neverthe-
less, for any given system F, there will be propositions of
the form [Q] that can be "proved" using F and others that
cannot. If F is inconsistent, then the system F would be,
strictly speaking, useless. The decision as to whether or
not to trust a formal system F as being sound is normally
the job of those logicians concerned with the details of
that system. But If I choose, myself, to use the rules of F
In some calculational way - say, to decide the truth of
some proposition of the form [Q] - then, to know whether
I am to trust a result derived from these rules, I, also,
should persuade myself that F Is sound. This is a much
stronger requirement (i.e., actually using the rules of F)
than I would need If I were to use my Godelian insight to
deduce G(F), since for that I need only know that F is co-
consistent. All mathematical knowledge requires mathe-
matical Insight and understanding. This applies to the
judgements I might apply in trying to decide whether or
not F is sound; it also applies to the Godelian insight that
enables me to deduce G(F) from F. The Godelian insight
Is just one kind of mathematical Insight amongst many. It
Is emphatically not something given only to a "chosen
few" such as myself (as Glymour & Kelly seem to claim
with some irony). Indeed, It Is an insight simple enough
even for me to give a reasonably adequate description of
it in my (semipopular) book! It is something noncontro-
versial and, in principle, accessible to all of us, unlike
(apparently) the insights lying behind the validity of cer-
tain particular systems like ZF or, more especially, ZFM.
The important thing to realize about the Godelian Insight
is that it derives from an (at least, partial) understanding of
the meanings of the axioms and rules of procedure of F,
and also of the actual meaning of G(F). (Most particularly,
it derives from an understanding that the symbol "V"
actually means "for all natural numbers," since this the
essence of w-conslstency. GodeFs theorem In the form
that I have presented it illustrates the fact that the actual
meaning of "V" cannot be fully encapsulated by formal
rules. Mortensen is puzzled how a "finite" mathemati-
cian can comprehend such things as hyperreal numbers.
But the puzzle is more simply based than this, since it
applies already to the natural numbers.) One cannot
regard F as providing the rules merely of some "game" for
manipulating meaningless symbols (as the strict formalist
might lead one to believe). Thus Godel's theorem has
another profound implication (Garnham take note; also, I
think Moskies grossly underestimates this point, whereas
Smithers does not even seem to recognize it!): Semantics
cannot be formalized.
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Are mathematical insights algorithmic?
It is important to realize that "formalizable" and "algo-
rithmic" are virtually synonymous terms. (The "proving
of theorems" - say of statements of the form [Q] - within
some formal system F, is certainly something algorithmic
whereas, conversely, any algorithm that generates "the-
orems" can be adjoined appropriately to the axiom system
of predicate calculus: a standard set of rules of logical
inference). Thus we can directly apply the Godelian
insight to any algorithm that purports to be generating
(say [Q]-type) mathematical truths. (Note: apart from
considerations of complexity theory, a truth-generating
algorithm is formally equivalent to a truth-proving al-
gorithm - despite what McDermott says!) If the al-
gorithm in fact generates only mathematical truths then
we can obtain a new mathematical truth by using the
Godelian insight - a truth that is not obtainable by the
given algorithm (together with predicate calculus). The
original algorithm is thus limited in what it can achieve: It
is unable to incorporate the particular insight
"F sound" => "G(F) true"
that Godel has revealed to us. Moreover, as soon as we
have seen that G(F) is true we realize that we have not fin-
ished with the insight, because "G(F) true" can now be
adjoined to "F sound" (etc. etc.).
Some of my critics (Davis, Doyle, Keetridge9 MacLee-
nan) have objected, claiming that the Godelization pro-
cedure could itself be automated. But this is not so if by
"procedure" we mean the above "insight." If the Godel-
ization procedure as a whole could be automated, then we
i could apply this procedure to the very system that the
automation would yield, and hence obtain a new Godel
proposition that lies outside the scope of that automation.
In detail, the way that this can come about is quite subtle,
and it is perhaps not surprising that people often feel that
they could automate Godelization. The Godelian insight
is a very slippery character, who can flee in a different
guise as soon we feel that we have got him algorithmically
cornered.
Let us see how this can come about. Suppose that we
have some formal system F. We wish to adjoin to F
another rule which might seem to encapsulate the Go-
delian insight: "If {A, B . . . D} is any finite3 set of
theorems, then the Godel proposition obtained from
them as axioms (and the rules of procedure of F) is to be
also a theorem." This gives a new system F* that is much
broader than that obtained by simply adjoining G(F) to
the axioms of F, since it allows Godelization to be applied
again and again, as many times as we might wish, always
within this one system. If F is sound, then so also will be
F*. But F* still has not really incorporated the Godelian
insight because the proposition G(F*) will now lie outside
the scope of F*, and G(F*) will be true if F is sound (and
will be seen to be true so long as F is seen to be sound). Of
course we might now perceive how to automate the
procedure F=>G(F*), rather than just F=>G(F), but
again, that very perception would allow a new Godel-
ization procedure that lies outside the scope of that new
automation.
The slipperiness of the nonalgorithmic nature of the
Godelian insight lies partly in the fact that we are never
quite sure what it is that has slipped through the al-
gorithmic net, though something always does! One might
argue that what has slipped through it is the very percep-
tion of how one actually formulates something in an
algorithmic way, in the knowledge that the suggested
algorithmic procedure actually yields a truth (or a set of
truths). In particular, the algorithmic procedures that
Davis refers to whereby the consistency of a set of axioms
can be coded into the nonsolubility in integers of some
polynomial equation P = 0 involve the knowledge and
insights (very ingenious ones, at that, for which Davis
himself was partly responsible!) that the insolubility of
that equation actually does encode the consistency state-
ment it is supposed to encode. There would also be
numerous unsound algorithmic procedures of this type,
but we need (nonalgorithmic) insights to tell us which
procedures are in fact sound!
It seems to me that this is the same kind of slipperiness
of the roles that conscious understanding and insight play
in any kind of mental activity - especially as they relate to
the procedures whereby one might try to program a robot
to behave in certain humanlike ways. As soon as we have
seen how to turn the implications of a certain insight into a
set of rules, we can make a robot act according to those
rules. There seems to be nothing barring our being able
to automate anything we can precisely formulate by such
rules - and when it is automated, the robot can carry out
the implications of that particular automation far faster
and more accurately than we can ourselves. Yet the very
insight itself has not been automated. Nor has the insight
that we have used a particular insight to program the
robot. Insights in general cannot themselves be auto-
mated - as is illustrated by the fact that the full Godelian
insight, in particular, can never be automated. The un-
derstanding of what that insight actually is doing will
allow us to do better, in some ways, than the robot that we
have constructed by using it.
Learning to perform some human action that initially
requires some conscious understanding appears to be a
very similar phenomenon. Once learnt, that action can be
relegated to unconscious (perhaps cerebellar rather than
cerebral) control. This unconscious control seems much
more like that of a programmed robot - and as with an
electronic computer's action, it can be carried out much
faster and more accurately than can action under con-
scious control - while unconscious control does not ap-
pear to embody the actual understanding the initial
consciousness was needed for. What is the actual role that
consciousness plays? It seems to be a subtle - and even a
slippery role - like that of the Godelian insight. This
slipperiness is in the nature of all nonalgorithmic under-
standing.
I should emphasize that there is nothing "paradoxical"
in the Godelian insight^  unlike (as MacLeeean seems to
be suggesting) the case of the "liar" paradox. People often
seem to think that the self-referential aspect of Godel's
theorem is its essential content. This is extremely mis-
leading. The relation of Godel's theorem to the liar
paradox is largely a historical and motivational one. Most
nonalgorithmic classes of problem have no evidently self-
referential aspect at all. Of course human language is
imprecise, and it does allow inconsistent selfreferential
statements like, "This statement is a lie," to be made.
(Compare Wilensky's self-destructing assertion that my
deductions from Godel's theorem and their relevance to
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AI are "uncontroversially wrong"!) This imprecision is
just as well, for without it, we should be constrained to
converse within some specific formal system, and discus-
sion of matters such as the Godelian insight itself (and
other reflection principles) - let alone semantics in gener-
al - would become impossible.
Kentridge refers to my version of the Godelization
procedure (as given in Emperor) according to which one
can, by the exercise of understanding, "outdo" any given
algorithm H for testing the stopping of Turing machine
actions.4 He says that with this argument (as with the
Godel argument), all I have shown is that humans can do
better than one particular algorithm, not better than all
algorithms. Not so! To say this is to miss the point of what
one is achieving with a reductio ad absurdum, of the kind
I have been presenting. (Chalmers and Wiensky also
take note — and despite Zytkow's friendly warning, I do
not lose the "outdoing an algorithm" game!) My argu-
ment is of the form: "Given any particular algorithm, that
algorithm cannot be the procedure whereby human
mathematicians ascertain mathematical truth. Hence hu-
mans are not using algorithms at all to ascertain truth."
Recall, for comparison, Euclid's argument that there is no
greatest prime number. This is also by reductio ad absur-
dum: "Given any number n that purports to be the
greatest prime, n! + 1 has a prime factor larger than n, so
n was not the largest prime after all. Hence there is no
greatest prime." As with the algorithms above, Keetridge
would appear to be claiming that all Euclid has shown is
that for any particular number e, one can find a larger
prime. But this certainly does suffice to show that there is
no largest prime! The argument with the algorithms is
similar. Given any algorithm that purports to be the one
that, humans knowingly use to ascertain mathematical
truth, one can find a more powerful algorithm that we
(humans) can see will also ascertain mathematical truth.
This likewise suffices to show that humans do not as-
certain mathematical truth by means of any knowable
algorithm.
A more serious issue is that humans might be using an
algorithm whose validity is in fact, unknowable to them,
and this is indeed the very point I was trying to address in
the final chapter ("disappointing" to Tsotsos) of'Emperor.
Only a very few of my critics appear even to have noticed
that my argument is not the same as that of Lucas (1961).
Rather than addressing, with Lucas, the possibility that
some particular individual might be acting according to
an algorithm, I refer instead to a putative algorithm that
the mathematical community as a whole is supposed to be
using. It is rather more believable that any particular
individual might be using some horrendously compli-
cated unknowable algorithm than that the mathematical
community as a whole is using one. The existence of an
algorithm X, according to which mathematicians as a
whole are supposed to act, would place an absolute limit
on what human mathematicians are able to achieve. The
algorithm (or formal system) X, or at least the soundness
(or merely (^-consistency) of X, would have to be some-
thing unknowable to human mathematicians. Otherwise
G(X) would be seen to be a mathematical truth, although
it. is inaccessible to X: a contradiction.
I never claimed that the existence of X is a mathe-
matical impossibility, but it would seem to be exceed-
ingly unlikely. Appealing to a "horrendously complicated
unknowable algorithm" is totally at odds with the actual
way mathematics is done. As I said in Emperor, mathe-
matics is "built up from simple and obvious ingredients"
although sometimes, as when one uses a Godel type
insight for a reflection principle5 these ingredients are
sometimes quite subtle - though still "obvious"! - and
their very "obviousness" may require some genuine
appreciation, of the underlying meaning of the symbolism
used. (It should have been clear that I am not claiming, as
Davis and perhaps Ctialmers seem to be suggesting, that
mathematical arguments are themselves always "ob-
vious." That, would be very far from the truth, since they
are sometimes exceedingly complicated. It is just that
such arguments are, at least in principle, built up from
such "obvious" ingredients. Moreover, I don't even need
any outrageously subtle "obvious" ingredients. The Go-
delian insight alone will do (Chalmers and Higginbotham
take note.)
Of course, it might be the case (and I suppose that the
following is the sort of thing that the AI people have in
mind, cf. HodgMe & Houston, also Butterfield) that
mathematicians have the illusion that all the time they are
appealing to such "simple and obvious ingredients"
whereas in fact they are actually using the horrendous X,
where X has somehow arisen by natural selection. This
seems to be an implication of the sort of picture being put
forward by Dennett in particular, although I am not
altogether sure that I have understood his point com-
pletely. Somehow, X is supposed to have arisen because
our remote ancestors were clever at designing mammoth
traps and the like, and now some of their descendants
have found that. X is also good for discerning obscure
mathematical truths! I find such a picture quite implausi-
ble. It is creatures who can understand, and who can
comprehend meaning, be it mathematical or be it concep-
tually valuable for the construction of mammoth traps,
that natural selection has favoured. Understanding and
meaning are nonalgorithmic (as the Godelian insights
demonstrate) and they are mental attributes that clearly
seem (to me, at least) to be particular manifestations of
conscious contemplation.
Perils makes the very curious suggestion that Fermat
might have worked according to the system ZFC (as his
"X") and that that was how he discovered mathematical
induction. But. that would imply that the great. Fermat
was intellectually incapable of understanding the axioms
of ZFC - and certainly incapable of believing them!
I cannot agree with Butterfield that consciousness is
just "baggage" from the point of view of natural selection,
like the weight of the polar bear's coat, I argue that
consciousness is a necessary ingredient of understanding
and insight, so I believe that it must, in itself, have been a
very positive factor with regard to natural selection. I
should emphasize that I strongly believe in natural selec-
tion, although some (e.g., Hodgkin & Houston) seem to
have taken a certain passage in Emperor (p. 416), to the
effect that natural selection appears to work better than it
"ought" to, as implying that I have significant doubts. I
was referring only to the remarkable way in which the
actual physical laws, with their propensity towards form-
ing complex and highly organized structures (like quasi-
crystals or Frank-Casper phases of crystals) seem to fit in
with natural selection extraordinarily well, and making
the whole process work better than it ever could if the
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laws themselves were not so appropriate. Breed (as well
as Hodgkin & Houston) refer to "fault tolerant" al-
gorithms that are more robust than ordinary Turing
machine specifications. I agree that such things would be
preferable from the point of view of natural selection, but
I still do not see how the horrendous X could possibly be
selected for in this kind of way.
• Dennett refers to the algorithms that chessplaying
computers use, these being "extremely good" rather than
"correct" algorithms for playing chess. I think that he
(and, in effect, Taylor also) is suggesting that mathemati-
cians are likewise using such an "extremely good" rather
than "perfect" algorithm to decide mathematical truth.
But I really do not see how Dennett gets around the
above argument. His proposal does not at all explain the
types of insight mathematicians are using all the time,
which are correct but nonalgorithmic rather than approx-
imate but algorithmic. Of course, as Boolos5 Chalmersy
Davis9 Garnham9 Hodgkin & Houston., Lutz, Perils, and
Moskies point out, mathematicians sometimes do make
mistakes (although Cantor was not shown by Russell to be
wrong), but the mathematical community as a whole
makes extraordinarily few; and this would be totally
inexplicable from the "naturally selected X-algorithm
point of view" given the extraordinary abstractions away
from actual experience involved in most of pure mathe-
matics. Any approximate algorithm for generating all the
mathematical truths we know would have to be incredibly
complicated (and in no way related to the kind of thing
creatures need to survive), whereas mathematical in-
sights are, at root exceedingly simple.
It seems that Turing himself thought that somehow it
was the fact that humans make mistakes that got around
the seeming paradox of an algorithmic device (as was his
view of the brain) being able to appreciate the truth of the
nonalgorithmic Godelian insight (see Hodges 1983). To
me his proposed way out seems exceedingly unlikely, for
essentially the reasons outlined above; and it is hard to
see that introducing inaccuracy is what makes the brain
work better! I have said that the imprecision of human
language allows it greater scope than otherwise, but
language only works at all because of the underlying
power of the mind that allows precise sense to be extract-
ed from imprecise language (e.g., from an informal de-
scription of the Godel procedure: Garnham take note).
Godel (cf. 1990, p. 297) found himself forced into a
different extreme, namely, that the "mind" was only
loosely to be associated with the brain, and was not
limited by the brain's finiteness. The fact that these two
great thinkers found themselves driven to take such
improbable-sounding positions is an indication of the
genuine seriousness of the problem which must be faced.
Neither Turing nor Godel seems to have considered the
possibility of nonalgorithmic physical action operative in
the brain. If this also sounds improbable to some on the
face of it, they should at least appreciate why something
remarkable is actually needed!
I should make it clear that in taking the argument
outward from single mathematicians to the mathematical
community as a whole, I am not allowing that a non-
algorithmic entity (the "mathematical community")
might somehow arise from a collection of algorithmic ones
(as some indeed suggest individual mathematicians might
be). On the other hand, at one stage down from this,
Chalmers (and perhaps Doyle and f erlis) seem to be
suggesting that humans might manifest nonalgorithmic
behaviour on a large scale while being constructed from
entirely algorithmic (microscopic) ingredients. In this
view, it would be possible in principle to simulate the
behaviour of the ingredients using a complicated-enough
computer program and make it look as though the simula-
tion was behaving nonalgorithmically on the large scale.
This is basically a version of the same suggestion as
Dennett's above, where a "horrendous X" algorithm is
supposed to underlie all human insights and understand-
ing. My (main) arguments against this are just as before.
Moreover, despite what Perlis seems to be claiming, it
seems exceedingly unlikely (though perhaps not totally
impossible) that anything usefully nonalgorithmic can
ever arise out of algorithmic basic ingredients in this way.
For example, "chaos" (referred to by Mortenseii5 though
I am not altogether clear about what his point is, and also
by Waltz & Pestejovsky) does not seem to be "usefully
nonalgorithmic," as I discuss at length in Emperor, but
perhaps this is a question that is worthy of some more
serious study.
Are there any limitations, in principle, to what human
mathematicians can achieve? I would not know the an-
swer to this question, but (despite what Deenett5 Doyle5
and Moskies appear to be implying) I do not assume that
there are no such limits - although it does seem to me to
be at least possible that in principle there are no such
limits. There are obviously limits in practice, since, for
example, no human will ever be able to multiply together
each pair of numbers below IOIO1'000'000. (Even a comput-
er could not do this, but it would, of course, be much
better at this sort of thing than a human!) Limits of this
kind are not what is at issue, for the human mathemati-
cian knows how to perform the multiplications in princi-
ple, and this is all that is required. To see that human
thinking is nonalgorithmic, we need only refer to what
can be achieved in principle. Most mathematical thinking
is of the "in principle" kind in any case.
What do i mean by "algorithm"?
I am puzzled that various of my critics seem to be
uncertain as to what I (or others) actually mean by the
term "algorithm." Eaglesoe9 MacLennan^ Smithers,
Taylor, Tsotsos9 and Wlleesky seem to be implying that I
use the term in more than one sense, or in a sense in
which I do not mean it. By an algorithm I always mean
something equivalent to the action of a Turing machine. I
had thought that this was standard terminology, and it is
certainly what I adhere to in my book. Any modern
general-purpose computer is, in effect, a (universal) Tur-
ing machine. There is of course the fact that, strictly, a
Turing machine's tape is infinite - or, at least potentially
unlimited - but this (acceptable) idealization does not
seem to be what is at issue. Any algorithmic action can,
with this proviso, be carried out by a modern general-
purpose computer; conversely, the action of any comput-
er is indeed algorithmic.
This provides a simple test of whether some suggested
model or robot control system is actually algorithmic: If it
can be simulated on a general purpose computer, then it
is indeed algorithmic. This should make it clear that the
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concept of "algorithm5' includes not just the action of
ordinary serial computers, but parallel ones as well; and
that what are referred to as "neural networks" or "con-
nection machines" are also algorithmic, as are the opera-
tions referred to as "heuristics" and "learning" in com-
puter systems. (Thus Johnson,, Ettinger & Hubbard's
ARTI would certainly be algorithmic if he existed -
despite his charmingly human display of misunderstand-
ings of my book!) Neural networks, for example, may be
constructed as special hardware, but as often as not their
activity is simply simulated on a general purpose comput-
er. I am aware that people often seem to use the phrase
"algorithmic computer" in a more restrictive way than I
have been doing, namely, only when the computer is
programmed in a strictly "top down" way, proceeding
according to some specific mathematical algorithm whose
action is clearly laid down to solve a specific problem in a
well-understood way. Neural networks are supposed to
"learn" and modify their structure in ways that are not
"preprogrammed" for the solution of specific problems,
but in general ways that gradually improve their perfor-
mance. The rules governing this learning and improve-
ment, however, are themselves just algorithms (other-
wise it would not be possible to simulate them on a
general-purpose computer). Sometimes there may be
random choices involved. Strictly, the concept of random
choice would go outside what one means by algorithmic,
but not usefully so. In practice, random choices are very
effectively simulated in a purely algorithmic way, by the
use of pseudo-random number generators. Similar re-
marks apply to "heuristics" (and whatever other similar
terms might be or might subsequently be employed). As
soon as they have been programmed on a general purpose
computer, their algorithmic nature has been secured.
A number of commentators (Boyle9 Breuel, Doyle?
Lutz, McDermott) have criticized me for not addressing
the question of'learning at greater length; they appear to
claim that learning is not algorithmic. In fact I did briefly
refer to the question of learning in Emperor, in connec-
tion with neural networks (pp. 397-98), but I did not say
much (and certainly nothing significant) about it. Evi-
dently I should have done, especially now in view of such
criticisms, but I had not thought that people would have
taken the, view that there is something new in principle
here, and that some would regard a learning system as
anything other than a particular type of algorithmic sys-
tem. The procedures whereby the system is supposed to
learn are always preprogrammed into the system right at
the beginning (unless a human intervenes to modify the
system at some stage - but that is clearly cheating!). A
random element may be included, of course, but in prac-
tice this simply means using an (algorithmic) pseudoran-
dom number generator. This is all just as algorithmic as
before - as should be obvious from the fact that such
learning systems are (or at least can be) run on an ordinary
computer. Of course, a learning system is supposed to be
continually influenced by its environment, so there is an
external input all the time. But that is just like the Turing
machine's tape, which is being continually read by the
machine - and, indeed, the whole original point of the
tape was that it was supposed to model the environment!
Likewise, I do not see what is to be gained by searching
for the concept of "perception" in the relation between an
animal and its environment (Cilden & Lapple9 Waltz &
PiistejoYsky). Again, we have not got away from the
Turing-machine model. The same applies also to Varela's
feeling that "movement" and "bodies" would make an
essential difference. Actual physical movement is irrele-
vant to a Turing machine's action, and I find it hard to see
what it has to do either with computations or con-
sciousness. Eaglesoe refers to "intelligence" perhaps
residing in "semantic levels of algorithms," but, as we
have seen earlier, semantics cannot be encapsulated
within an algorithm, so we are really no closer to under-
standing what intelligence actually is, on these terms.
Lutz seems to be saying that a human mathematician
could provide provisional answers to problems all the
time which are continually being improved, so it is as
though we were allowed to have our Turing machine
provide such provisional answers before it has actually
reached a stop instruction. I do not really see how this
buys us anything new. Such a device would need to
specify the stages at which its output was allowed to be
examined, and that is just like putting in a stop instruction
at that stage instead. When it starts up again, it would just
be another running of the Turing machine's action.
Again, it is easy to see that all we get is something
algorithmic in the old sense - clearly, because all these
things can be run on an ordinary computer. Likewise,
Perlls's tapes, which "vary in time," do not really give us
anything new if the way the tapes vary is itself well
defined (and in principle computable, or computable but
with random elements also). Turing's original analysis
really covered all this sort of thing. The same applies to
Perlis's "enlarging formalisms"; and Lutz's possibly non-
terminating Turing machines are certainly algorithms, in
the sense that I am using the term. That's precisely what a
(possibly dud) Turing machine is. Nonteraiinating action
must certainly be admitted. There is, after all (as
Gigerenzer reminds us), no general (algorithmic) way of
deciding whether or not a Turing machine's action does
terminate!
Breuel refers to continuous systems subject to differen-
tial equations as being "not intrinsically restricted to
Turing equivalent computation." In fact, a significant
portion of Emperor was devoted to this very question.
Not a great deal of a rigorous mathematical nature seems
to be known about it (except for the seminal work of Pour-
El & Eichards, and there is the new theoretical frame-
work of Blum et al. - both of which I refer to in Emperor
and my BBS Precis). As I tried to argue in Emperor, there
does not seem to be anything usefully nonalgorithmic in
continuous action according to standard physical laws,
which is one of the reasons I believe we must look to CQG
for the needed usefully nonalgorithmic action. The case is
no doubt arguable, but Breuel does not even mention it!
Breuel9 Doyle and Manaster-Ramer, Savitch &
Zadrozny refer to Turing's "oracle" machines and "rela-
tive computability" (and "infinite nets"). These ideas
certainly do go outside what is meant by algorithmic. (An
oracle is a putative device that can perform nonalgorith-
mic actions of the nature of giving correct yes/no answers
to, for example, all propositions of type [Q] above.) The
trouble is, of course, that no one knows how to build an
oracle; moreover, the very possibility of constructing
such a device would be denied by all those (including
strong-AI supporters) who believe that we live in an
algorithmic universe. Those who rest their hopes on the
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possibility of constructing such oracles should be pursu-
ing my general line of endeavour and trying to locate
nonalgorithmic ingredients in actual physical laws! My
own proposals were, in this respect, more modest, since
(despite what McDermott seems to suggest) I nowhere
insisted that an oracle must actually be cbnstructable but
merely that nonalgorithmic ingredients be present in
physical laws!
Glymotir and Kelly present an argument purporting to
show that even if human mental output is nonalgorithmic,
we shall never be able to ascertain this fact. There seem to
be two parts to the argument. First, the "we" in the above
claim might actually be Turing machines; and I am
certainly prepared to accept Glymour & Kelly's argument
that Turing machines cannot "tell" whether or not an-
other object is a Turing machine. The claim tells us
nothing of relevance to my own arguments, however,
since I am claiming that we are not Turing machines!
Second, Glymour & Kelly seem to be claiming that, on
some rather obscure limiting interpretation ("A2 proper-
ty of the Borel hierarchy"), the argument still goes
through even if the "we" are not Turing machines (i.e.,
we are instead "noncomputable scientists"). The argu-
ment seems to boil down to something like the following:
Can an oracle recognize when some other object is
merely a Turing machine? An oracle would be an example
of an "noncomputable scientist." We may assume that the
Turing machine the oracle is examining is one that consid-
ers the truth of statements of the form [Q] one after the
other, and correctly asserts yes or no in each case, except
that sometimes it will get stuck and run on forever
without ever giving any answer at all. In those cases the
poor oracle will just have to sit it out forever (itself
knowing the correct answer all the time), but at no stage
will it be sure that the Turing machine isn't just a very
slow oracle that hasn't yet come out with the answer!
Technically Glymour & Kelly are right, if I can take it
that this is the kind of thing they do mean, but this is
adopting an absurdly narrow view of what science can
(and has been able to) achieve. We could likewise argue
that the confirmation of any scientific theory depends on
only a finite number of data points, and on a finite number
of bits of information. There are infinitely many different
physical theories that could fit those data, and no "scien-
tist," in Glymour & Kelly's sense, could ever be sure that
the appropriate theory had been confirmed. Yet scientific
progress has undoubtedly been made - and superbly
impressive progress at that. A good measure of common
sense (or appropriate judgements with regard to one's
statistical analysis, as Gigerenzer very usefully points
out) is always required in the (albeit temporary) confirma-
tion of any physical theory. Precisely the same considera-
tions will become relevant when CGQ (or whatever turns
out to the appropriate nonalgorithmic theory) finally
emerges. Considerations such as those of Glymour &
Kelly will not be (or at least should not be) any bar to
progress!
The relevance of G6del's theorem to cognition
and
Several critics have argued that Godel's theorem is irrele-
vant to the important issues of mind and AI. I completely
disagree. The role of Godef s theorem is crucial, though I
am certainly not trying to suggest that one has to be able
to appreciate Godel's theorem to be conscious! (I can
hardly be suggesting that, since in Emperor, I say that I
believe that at least certain nonhuman animals - dol-
phins, chimpanzees, dogs, . . . ? - have some degree of
consciousness.) Clearly one does not have to be a mathe-
matician (or a mathematician actually doing mathematics)
to be conscious. But the central role for Godel's theorem
is that it is only here (or with mathematical reflection
principles generally) that one can demonstrate, on any-
thing like rigorous mathematical terms, that our con-
scious understanding must be nonalgorithmic. It is, in-
deed remarkable that any such clear general statement
about the nature of our thinking can be made at all!
Without Godel's theorem (or even with it, before the full
impact of that theorem is properly appreciated) one
would have to resort to much vaguer and less conclusive
arguments about "semantics," "understanding," "in-
sight," and perhaps "inspiration."
In Emperor, I use such arguments also - and I am
criticized by Boyle9 Breuel, Eaglesoe, Perils, Stanovlch,
Taylor, Tsotsos9 Waltz & Pustejovsky for "simply" using
inconclusive and anecdotal arguments from "introspec-
tion" to support my case for nonalgorithmic action. These
reviewers have simply ignored the powerful argument
from Godel's theorem, however (and others, such as
Wilensky, seem to underestimate it). I never intended
that the case for a nonalgorithmic ingredient to our
conscious thinking should rest on anecdotal arguments of
this kind. These provide only a supplement to the power-
ful Godelian case, providing some additional tentative
clarification as to what must really be going on. These
arguments are for those who are already prepared to
entertain the probability that some ingredients of our
thinking are nonalgorithmic, and who are interested in
gaining some insights into the possible nature of those
nonalgorithmic ingredients. Like Higginbotham, I cer-
tainly do not believe that the nonalgorithmic quality of
human thought is something restricted to the apprecia-
tion of sophisticated mathematical thinking. If it were, it
would never have arisen by natural selection! It must
have been useful for such things as the conception of
mammoth traps and the like - or for apes perceiving the
value of using tools! It is the elusive quality of under-
standing (and things related to it) that has this non-
algorithmic character - and this is what Godel's theorem
demonstrates, albeit (of necessity) in a particularly so-
phisticated context.
I have taken the line that consciousness is a quality that
must be present for a nonalgorithmic (Godelian) activity
of the brain to come into play. Here I would agree with
Butterfield and others that my case is not so strong,
resting, as it does, on the fact that consciousness is (as I
believe) essential for actual understanding (and hence for
the appreciation of the truth of Godel's theorem). From
the different point of view of his "Chinese Room," John
Searle has also used "understanding" (and related con-
cepts such as "semantics" and "intentionality") as a funda-
mental quality that cannot be evoked merely by computa-
tion. These arguments do not directly address other
aspects of consciousness, but I feel sure that they must
ultimately have relevance for them. [See Searle: "Con-
sciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Sci-
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ence" BBS 13(4) 1990.] Butterfield, McDermott, Niall,
EosMes, and StaiiovicSi take me to task for not dis-
tinguishing various different aspects of consciousness and
for not being precise enough about what I do mean by the
term. Perhaps I should have been more explicit, but I am
not sure that this would have been helpful. I agree that
any direct connection between the Godelian insight and
"red" or "pain" or "pride" or "hope" would be pretty
hard to discern; but it seems to me that there is some sort
of unified concept of consciousness, albeit a difficult .one
to pin down, and any small progress toward understand-
ing some part of this concept will lead ultimately to
progress toward understanding the rest of it.
McDermott objects to my "oneness" of consciousness,
but I think he totally misunderstands what I mean. I know
that consciousness can take multifarious forms, and also
that the mind (where this term includes the unconscious
mind) can indulge in many activities simultaneously. Yet,
especially considering the incredible amount of uncon-
scious activity that goes on at once in the brain, it is quite
remarkable that consciously we feel like a single person at
all. I feel sure that Freud and James would agree with me
that this aspect of consciousness is quite unlike the action
of a parallel computer - which was my point!
Libet raises the point that much of what is unconscious
in mental activity could well be nonalgorithmic also (I
think Gigerenzer and perhaps Moeper are making a
similar point). On reflection, I think I might well.agree
with them. I am certainly taking the line that CQG (or
. whatever turns out to be the appropriate physics span-
ning the two quantum processes U and R) is something
that can (and does) take place independently of con-
sciousness, and I am also taking the line that this physics
should turn out to be nonalgorithmic. From this I ought
indeed to be inferring that important nonalgorithmic
actions are taking place at much lower levels than the
level of consciousness. I think, however, that con-
sciousness itself must have some special role to play in
relation to question of noncomputability (something to do
with the level at which nonalgorithmic aesthetic truth-
judgements begin to be important?), but the understand-
ing of these matters must lie a long way beyond even
CQG!
Be that as it may, Al researchers will ignore the
arguments from Godel's theorem at their peril. Mathe-
matical thinking, although a tiny minority activity, is
thinking, after all, and if that is demonstrably non-
algorithmic, then nonalgorithmic thought is shown to be
possible. That is all we need from the argument. I believe
that most AI people are grossly underrating the impor-
tance of a possibility of nonalgorithmic control (perhaps as
exhibited by conscious action?) as a separate quality from
computation - that could indeed (Wilensky take note)
even be relevant to one's walking down the hallway!
My inadequate treatment of AS
Several critics (Perils, Smithers, Tsotsos, Waltz & Puste-
jovsky) have chastised me for being out of date, mislead-
ing, or inadequate in my treatment of artificial intelli-
gence. As I confessed in Emperor, I am aware of only a
small part of the current activity in this subject, and I fully
admit that a somewhat more comprehensive treatment of
this activity would have been helpful. It is in the nature of
this activity, however, that although there is much of it
going on, I have been unable to perceive any fundamen-
tally new principles that have emerged, of relevance to
what I had to say. A survey would have amounted largely
to a list of things that people in different parts of the world
are doing, and that would not have been very helpful.
Many (e.g., Perils) rebuke me, naturally enough, for
not having referred to their own work, while Smithers
takes me to task particularly for not referring to the
"foundational" 1976 paper of Newell & Simon, where a
form of "symbolic manipulation" that he claims is more
relevant than Turing machine algorithmic action is de-
scribed. I cannot understand why he thinks there is
anything new in principle here. Newell & Simon's sys-
tem, for all its virtues with regard to practicality, and so
on, is nevertheless still subsumed by Turing's simple yet
comprehensive original scheme. A trouble, of course, is
that coming to the subject from the outside, I do not see
clearly which publications AI people think I should be
concentrating on. For example, no critics other than
Smithers tell me that I should have referred to Newell &
Simon's (1976) paper, although it receives a passing
mention by MacLennan. I am quite prepared to accept
that the paper may be important to theoretical AI, but I
still do not see how it affects the arguments that I have
been putting forward in any substantive way.
Tsotsos tells me that my references are out of date
(though I did describe what must surely be the most
impressive achievements of artificial intelligence to date:
the development of such chess-playing machines as
"Deep Thought," with its success in co-winning an inter-
national chess tournament in late 1988 and defeating a
grand master). He thinks I would be upset if, in a
description of a physical theory, all the references were
old ones; yet the most recent reference to electromag-
netic theory that I gave in my own book was to Maxwell,
1865. The important thing is to be right (like Maxwell),
not necessarily to be recent! I have yet to be convinced
that any substantial new advance in the theory of AI has
occurred in very recent years. Chess-playing machines
apart, the early things I described still seem to be the
most striking achievements of AL
Sraittiers maintains that I am wrong in attributing to AI
workers the desire to simulate feelings of any kind, such
as pleasure and pain (cf. pp. 14-17 of Emperor). But
surely these are among the intentions of the supporters of
strong AI, since all mental qualities are supposed to arise
from computation. Weak-AI practitioners need certainly
have no such intentions, and I apologize to them if they
feel that they have been misrepresented. Nevertheless,
the very name "artificial intelligence" implies that even
the practitioners of weak AI must be attempting to simu-
late genuine intelligence, and actual intelligence is some-
thing that (in my view of what the word means at least,
and despite what Stanovich says) implicitly involves some
degree of awareness. Simulated pleasure and pain are
certainly aspects of simulated awareness - and Doyle
claims that a limited simulation of actual consciousness
has already been achieved (though how he knows this is
hard for me to fathom!).
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Pointers toward a new physics
Comparatively few commentators (Butterfield, Davis,
Kentridge3 Lutz, MacLennan9 Manaster-Mamer? Sav-
itch & Zadrozny9 Madsen9 Tsotsos9 Varela9 Zytkow)
address the actual physical ideas I put forward in Em-
peror, despite the fact that the physics is the central
theme of the work. Perhaps it is unfair to expect much
discussion of such matters in a journal mainly devoted to
issues of psychology, neurophysiology, and philosophy,
but I am nevertheless disappointed at the overall re-
sponse here because of the importance of the issues
raised. Varela refers to my "wild speculations" (which he
appears to place on a par with even the fantastical physical
suggestions of Moravec 1988), whereas Madsen refers to
my "extremely tall and particularly shaky edifice" to be
accepted "on faith alone." They are unable to point to any
actual flaws or omissions relevant to my chain of reason-
ing, however (although I consider that Madsen is being
complimentary when he says that my book "raises more
questions than it answers"!). Madsen asserts that I ignore
Mott's work on a-particles (citing no reference - but
presumably he means a paper I actually refer to in my
reference list in Emperor - Mott 1983), appearing to
claim that Mott showed that large quantum systems will
necessarily behave like classical ones - though Mott
actually did nothing of the sort; nor was he trying to.
Madsen is upset that I give short shrift to the still
somewhat fashionable inflationary models (though my
placing them in the TENTATIVE category is surely
unexceptionable). Such models usually do depend on
GUT theories; but the fact that some may not is neither
here nor there. They do not in any way alter the argu-
ments that I give in my book (see Penrose 1989 for a
critical discussion of the relevant points). Madsen closes
with some very odd ideas about "particles . . . using
Turing's methods to compute their trajectories in phase
space," although such ideas certainly played no role in my
own discussions - nor would a theory of the (deliber-
ately?) absurd type suggested by McDeraiott at the
beginning of his critique.
Various criticisms refer disparagingly to my search for
ideas that might lead to an improved quantum mechan-
ical theory that would be more satisfactory with regard to
the "measurement problem" ("vague thought," says
McDermott9 "purest speculation" according to Madsen -
though these critics offer no counterarguments, appar-
ently forming their judgements on the basis of my own
apparently over-modest reference to my suggestions
being "only a germ of an idea," p. 371 of Emperor).
Tsotsos and Zytkow appear to have totally misunderstood
my "one-graviton criterion," incorrectly thinking that it
refers to effects at 10 ~33 cm or else to real graviton
emission or absorption. No doubt I was not clear enough:
Only virtual, or longitudinal gravitons are needed (cf.
Note 5 on p. 372). These can occur at a much tinier level of
energy-difference than real gravitons, and the relevant
scales of distance can be as large as you like (e.g., ten
metres or so, as in the Aspect experiment; cf. Aspect &
Grangier 1986). Moreover, I am referring to all wave-
function collapse, not just the "very special circum-
stances of quantum gravity" Zytkow; and that would be
taking place in the brain all the time.
I should have thought I had made it clear that in my
view, wavefunction collapse (R) occurs spontaneously,
quite independently of the presence or absence of con-
scious observers. I do not hold to the view that it is the
"interaction between minds and the rest of the universe"
(MacLenean) that leads to R; nor do I believe in a
"subjective view of the state vector involving conscious
observers" (Boyle). Moreover, I did not say that I be-
lieve the brain to be a quantum computer, in the pres-
ently understood sense - though there may well be
aspects of that conception in brain function; and despite
what MacLennan says in a footnote, there are very fun-
damental distinctions between quantum and classical
linearity.
I also find it remarkable how many AI people appear to
regard the many-worlds interpretation as "obviously
true" (MacLennan, McDermott), despite its numerous
problems and (deserved) unpopularity in the physics
community as a whole - and the fact that it does not (in
the absence of further nonstandard ingredients) allow one
to derive the correct quantum probabilities. (The "ob-
server being part of the physical universe," which I
believe in as much as does MacLennan, is no explanation
of why a many-worlds universe looks like one world!) I
trust that their reasons for believing in the validity of the
AI programme are more soundly based.
Kentridge's remarks about the possible effects of quan-
tum processes in computation are well thought through
and helpful (if perhaps somewhat inconclusive), but I do
not think that Mortensee or Moeper have yet grasped the
point that quantum mechanics is not just a "fuzziness" in
our classical descriptions, but a theory of the utmost
precision. Quantum processes can lead to effects that are
not possible to achieve by classical means. I should point
out to Lutz, however, that Deutsch's (1985) analysis of
quantum computation is that it does not, in itself, lead to
nonalgorithmic behaviour - which is one reason I believe
that more (e.g., CQG) is needed.
Butterfield refers to my speculations, in relation to the
timing of consciousness, that putative causality-violating
effects might sometimes not lead to inconsistency (be-
cause of the timelessness of the Platonic world). His
criticisms are indeed pertinent, and I agree with him that
any too blatant causality violation by a "Platonic realiza-
tion" could lead to serious consistency problems. My
remarks were supposed to be exploratory only, however,
and were intended to indicate that there might be more
scope for temporal nonlocality in consciousness than one
might otherwise have thought. Whether or not any kind
of a consistent scheme can be worked out remains to be
seen.
I had in mind, with these considerations, the curious
time delays involved in the experiments of Kornhuber
and of Libet (Libet et al. 1979). I am grateful for Libet's
reassurance that I had not misrepresented him, and also
for his comments in relation to his own more recent work
in following up the Kornhuber-type experiments. (I had
become vaguely aware of these more recent experiments
just before I completed my book, but I had not had the
opportunity to follow them up.) It seems to me that there
are still some very puzzling aspects of the combined force
of all these important experiments (despite what MeDer-
mott says), but I think I had better reserve my judge-
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ments until I have had the opportunity to examine these
newer results a little more closely.
Perhaps I may comment, afthis point, that I am also
grateful to Eccles for his remarks, and that I am very
much in agreement with his belief that scientific methods
- and particularly neurophysiological experiments, such
as those he and Libet have pioneered, in addition to a
deeper probing of physical laws - must hold the key to
our eventual understanding of the mind/brain issue. I
shall try to follow up his comment concerning the "elim-
ination" of the brainstem centre theory of consciousness
(and also his recent work referred to in his commentary).
Experimental verification of all these ideas (my own
included) is always the final test. The one-graviton sug-
gestion for the onset of R, for example, should certainly
be experimentally testable, and certain tentative ideas
along these lines have already been mooted.
If the physical suggestions I have been putting forward
can be formulated as a fully fledged nonalgorithmic CQG,
then that theory (including its very nonalgorithmic nature
- in spite of Glymour & Kelly's remarks) will eventually
also be put to the experimental test. If nonalgorithmically
behaving objects are ever shown to exist in nature, then
that will alter the whole focus of what we actually mean by
a "machine" or, rather, by an analogue machine. (Accord-
ing to the terminology of Chalmers and Maeaster-
Ramer5 Savitch & Zadrozny9 the Church(-Turing) thesis
would then be false - though I prefer the original termi-
nology according to which that thesis refers to a mathe-
matical idea, now almost universally accepted as true.)
Piatonisstij mysticism, and dualism
Several commentators (Gareham, HIgginbotham9 Mac-
Leneae9 Varela, Waltz & Pustejovsky) express discom-
fort (or worse, Madsee) with the idea of mathematical
Platonism - some seeming to identify it with mysticism.
Yet the evidence from the majority of mathematicians
(who appear to be Platonists of some degree, cf. Davis &
Hersch 1982) should not be ignored. It is the mathemati-
cians, after all, who know most about their subject.
Though Platonism does have certain difficulties (mainly
to do with deciding which enormous sets should be
considered actually to exist, or the problem of deciding
when to accept a "proof as a proof), the various alter-
native viewpoints (formalism, intuitionism, finitism) all
have much more severe difficulties (cf. Garnham). Hig-
ginbotham writes that the mathematicians have "had to
learn to live with incomplete theories," but it is only the
formalists whose mathematics has been rendered in-
complete by Godel. The Platonists are not so constrained.
Moreover, the evidence for a Platonic existence for such
things as the Mandelbrot set seems to me to be over-
whelming; nor does a pragmatist view (as expressed by
Garnham) come to terms with the extraordinary agree-
ment between mathematicians as to whether or not a
mathematical result is true, or with the very fact that they
settle their issues by abstract reasoning. It would have
been helpful if some of the opponents of Platonism had
provided more convincing arguments against such
powerful cases for a Platonist view. The facts that certain
mathematical concepts may take many years to take
shape and that nonstandard analysis can coexist alongside
standard analysis (just as nonEuclidean geometry can
coexist with Euclidean geometry) are, despite what Mac-
Lennae seems to be claiming, perfectly consistent with
Platonism.
As for mysticism, I have never myself made that asso-
ciation. Platonism is, to me, totally consistent with (and
even a concomitant of) a completely scientific viewpoint.
But it if is insisted that Platonism entails mysticism, then I
shall • insist that it is the only form of mysticism I can
accept. What about dualism? Waltz & Pustejovsky, not to
mention MacLennan, seem to be insisting that I am a
dualist, presumably because of my Platonistic opinions. If
I am, then it can only be in the sense that the strong-AI
people are also dualists - because they believe that
Platonically existing algorithms provide the substance of
awareness. (Higginbotham has trouble with the appar-
ently temporal aspect of my argument: "Strong-AI sup-
porters must be Platonists, because if algorithms exist
only in minds, pre-existing minds are needed for al-
gorithms and pre-existing algorithms for minds!" But I
intended this argument to be taken logically, not tem-
porally, and then the circularity is surely clear.) If my
Platonism (with regard to the nonalgorithmic procedures
I believe must underlie consciousness) makes me a du-
alist, then, again, that would be the only form of dualism I
could accept. Unlike the AI supporters, however, I have
not made the claim that it is the mere enaction (or
existence) of some mathematical process that evokes
consciousness.
Perils writes about the "dynamic action of algorithms"
as being what AI people are concerned with - and
presumably what strong-AI people would claim evokes
awareness - rather than the mere static existence of an
algorithm. This is totally, unclear, however. "Dynamic
action" presumably means that what counts is the moving
around of bits of matter in accordance with the algorithm.
The (strong) AI position seems to be that it does not make
any difference what the bits of matter that are being
moved around actually are. If the nature of the matter is
irrelevant, why is the matter itself relevant? What about
showing a film of the pages in a book in which the working
of the algorithm is written out - or just running one's
finger (or a little window in a piece of paper) down the
page? The viewpoint is unclear at best.
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NOTES
1. Ironically, a truly committed formalist would accept G(F)
only if it. is false! For only then is it actually a theorem of F.
2* Examples of such Q(n)s would be: "6n is divisible by 3"; "if
n is prime, then 2n + 1 is prime"; "n is the sum of four squares";
"2n + 4 is the sum of two primes". For the corresponding
universally quantified proposition [Q], we have, in each case:
The first is obviously true, the second false, the third nonob-
viously true (by a theorem of Lagrange), and the fourth (Gold-
bach's conjecture) unknown. Although I suppose that a case can
be made (according to a fairly extreme form of intuitionism) that
it is not even meaningful to say whether statements of the form
[Q] are either true or false unless they have been "demon-
strated" to be, none of my critics have followed that unreason-
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able (to my mind) stance (except for a brief allusion to it by
Mortensen) and I shall not pursue it.
3o If we allowed an infinite set of theorems here , we would
need some procedure for algorithmically generating them. The
argument given in the text still applies (cf. pp. 109-10 of
Emperor). Cha lmers please note.
49 In fact, one can strengthen the argument I gave, since it
applies to any "stopping-tester" H(m;n) which is allowed even to
make mistakes or to run on forever — provided that it does not
ever assert that Tm(n) runs on forever when in fact T (n) stops
(the only directly falsifiable case!). (Thus, H(m;n) = O,"! or D, if
Tm(n) = • ; and H(m;n) = 1 or D, if T m ^ D. Here , in the
notation of my book, TT means "does not stop" and H = 1
asserts that the action of Tm(n) stops while H = 0 asserts that
it does not.) W e construct k so that 1 + Tn(n) X H(n;n) = Tk(n)
and consider the action Tk(k). W e can see that this action
does not stop, but H ei ther gives no answer or gives the wrong
answer. It would not be too hard to construct a completely
explicit Turing machine T that gives k in terms of the Turing
number of H (with q probably less than half as long again as
the number u that I gave in my book for T u to be a universal
Turing machine). One might think that since there is an algo-
ri thm for producing the number k that defeats H, we could
pu t the whole (Turing-)Godelization process on a machine,
bu t this is not so, for the same reason as in the argument in the
main text.
50 According to a reflection principle, an unders tanding of
the meaning under lying the rules of a formal system F can
provide n e w mathematical t ruths not accessible within F (see p .
110 of Emperor or, more extensively bu t with a somewhat
different emphasis , Rucker 1984).
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* Abstract; The emperors new mind (hereafter Emperor) is an attempt to put forward a scientific alternative to the viewpoint of
"strong AI," according to which mental activity is merely the acting out of some algorithmic procedure. John Searle and other
thinkers have likewise argued that mere calculation does not, of itself, evoke conscious mental attributes, such as understanding or
intentionality, but they are still prepared to accept the action the brain, like that of any other physical object, could in principle be
simulated by a computer. In Emperor I go further than this and suggest that the outward manifestations of conscious mental activity
cannot even be properly simulated by calculation. To support this view, I use various arguments to show that the results of
mathematical insight, in particular, do not seem to be obtained algorithmically. The main thrust of this work, however, is to present
an overview of the present state of physical understanding and to show that an important gap exists at the point where, quantum and
classical physics meet, as well as to speculate on how the conscious brain might be taking advantage of whatever new physics is needed
to fill this gap to achieve its nonalgorithmic effects.
*From page 643.
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